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ABSTRACT 
The International Monetary Fund, Power Politics, and the Changing Political 
Economy of the Twenty First Century. 
 
By 
Eduardo M. Flores 
Dr. Jonathan Strand, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada Las Vegas 
  
The governance of the global economy is in a constant state of change. Since the 
creation of the Bretton Woods system, the International Monetary Fund has had to pursue 
a series of reforms to meet the changing demands of the international monetary system. 
At times, the Fund’s institutional design has been adjusted to reflect the rise and decline 
in economic fortunes of member states. Other times the Fund has been resistant to 
change. However, the original design has proved to be durable and has overcome a 
number of historical challenges. Currently, two realities are challenging the institutional 
design of the Fund leading to seriously consideration to reform the governance of the 
Fund. The first factor involves emerging market economies and developing countries 
which are demanding equitable representation commensurate with their new found 
economic strength. The second factor is the ongoing legitimacy problem. For the Fund 
this has been a problem the Fund has never fully been able to overcome and this problem 
originates in the governance of the Fund. Two factors contribute to this situation: 
informal governance and formal Articles of Agreement. The argument made in this thesis 
is that power politics explicitly or implicitly define the institutional design of the Fund. 
Reforms will become a reality but not at the expense of the major shareholders and non-
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economic factors (i.e., politics) will continue to have a role in the governance of the 
Fund. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Many observers claim recent shifts in the global economy may require rethinking 
the architecture of global economic governance (Stone 2011; Woods 2010). A myriad of 
changes have raised doubts about the effectiveness of extant international organizations. 
The Great Recession that began in the United States has highlighted the fragility of 
developed economies because of increased linkages between national economies 
resulting from financial globalization. Other changes, such as the rise of the BRICS and 
other emerging markets, increased regionalism and multilateralism, and the absence of a 
singular and clear economic doctrine to govern and regulate the global economy in the 
post-Washington Consensus era have raised questions about the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the current global financial architecture. Today’s global economy 
involves complex interconnected financial markets and rapid flows of capital often 
resulting in economic crises extending from one economy to another (Copelovitch 2010). 
The causes and consequences of the Great Recession will long be debated. The United 
States experienced a severe, complicated subprime mortgage crisis that impacted Europe 
and East Asia (Shirai 2009). In Germany, the IKB Deutsche Industriebank experienced 
financial losses related to the American subprime crisis and ultimately was rescued by 
domestic public and private banks (Shirai 2009). In 2008, the Asian Development Bank 
reported 965 billion dollars in total worldwide write downs by financial institutions, 
Europe accounted for 271 billion of this due to active investment in US capital markets 
(Shirai 2009). 
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Prior to the Great Recession, the International Monetary Fund was facing its own 
crisis. Large shares of its outstanding loans were paid back in early 2000s. While the IMF 
relies on the capital contributions of its members for loans, the day-to-day operating costs 
of the Fund are largely paid for by fees and interested from loans (Mohammed 2003). In 
other words, the IMF was losing customers and facing a cash-flow problem. Numerous 
observers pointed out that the Fund was at risk of losing its legitimacy (Griesgraber 2009; 
Seabrooke 2007; Torres 2007). Demand for IMF assistance due to the Great Recession 
mostly came from middle-income and wealthy economies. The Fund, along with the 
G20, took center stage in the policy responses of governments to the recession. 
In the face of volatile situations, the IMF has often been the international lender 
of last resort seeking to manage crises and maintain global financial stability 
(Copelovitch 2010). Put differently, the Fund is among the world’s most powerful 
multilateral institutions. The general research question asked in this thesis is: how has the 
IMF’s internal governance responded to changes in the distribution of resources and 
power in the world political economy? This question is fundamentally important to 
international relations because it addresses issues of global governance, global economic 
networks, anarchy, and cooperation in an increasingly interdependent global economy 
(Stone 2011). Furthermore, this research question is important to the new financial 
architecture because international organizations promote legitimacy and credibility for 
effective multilateral cooperation. Both powerful and weak states can benefit from 
international organization membership (Stone 2011). 
Why does it matter how the IMF’s internal governance has responded to changes 
in the world political economy and power politics? It matters because the current wave of 
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globalization is unprecedented (Ranis, Vreeland, and Kosack 2006). Prominent scholars 
argue the OECD countries are no longer able to maintain positions of privilege in the 
hierarchy of the world economy. China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets are 
deserving of louder voices in the international financial architecture. Some see it as 
inventible that rising powers will supplant those of the old order in terms of both formal 
and informal internal policies of international organizations (Stone 2011). Others point to 
ideas associated with power transition theory. A rising challenger state will be 
dissatisfied with the existing global order (hierarchy) and prestige (Schweller 2011). 
Rising economic powers seek greater political influence. Applied to the IMF, such 
concerns focus on IMF quota calculations with some observers claiming quotas do not 
accurately reflect the economic power of many states. The IMF’s internal governance 
procedures determine the order of the hierarchy pyramid for international economic 
governance, and which states determine the financial rules. Also, power transition has the 
potential to create violent international conflict and is costly for all parties involved 
(Rapkin and Thompson 2003; 2013). At some point, the ascending state will seek to be a 
status quo power or revisionist power (Schweller 2011). 
The IMF can respond to the challenges of a changing world political economy by 
reforming its internal governance to meet the challenges of a changing financial 
architecture and the power politics associated with international organizations. In the face 
of these challenges, international regimes facilitate mutually beneficial agreements. 
Scholars argue these regimes produce lower transaction cost, provide legal frameworks 
for legal liability, improve information sharing and otherwise facilitate cooperation 
(Keohane 1982). 
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CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In order to understand the concept of the institutional design and governance of 
the Fund and be able to answer the question of the thesis it is important to understand the 
history of the Fund. Therefore, chapter two will proceed with a historical analysis of the 
Bretton Woods monetary system with a focus on the history of the Fund. In 1944 the 
Bretton Woods Conference established the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. Ostensibly, the IMF was created to help avoid the economic turmoil of the 1930s 
and facilitate international economic cooperation in the post the World War II era. 
Establishing rules to avoid “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies was an important goal of the 
Fund (Gilpin 2001). Central to this goal was the establishment of the Bretton Woods 
Monetary System. Important subjects examined in chapter two will include the role of the 
Fund in the Latin American debt crisis and the Asian Financial Crisis. The last section of 
this chapter will examine how financial globalization is changing the international 
economic order. 
Chapter three will focus on the internal governance and institutional design of the 
Fund. The chapter will highlight the complicated mechanisms of the Fund that make up 
the decision-making processes and the exercise of power within the Fund. Chapter three 
will begin by analyzing the Articles of Agreement that give the Fund its decision-making 
authority and will move into areas such as conditionality and Fund surveillance. Formal 
and informal governance will also be examined with an emphasis on loan conditionality 
requirements. The informal rules allow the Fund to be autonomous from its shareholders; 
these rules will be analyzed to explain how they influence the institutional design of the 
Fund and address how these respond to the changing world political economy. 
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Since the Fund’s creation, the most important features of IMF governance are 
votes, quotas, selected representation, formal rules, and informal procedures. Votes are 
assigned based on economic strength measured by IMF quotas. The quotas largely are 
based on the relative economic size of member countries’ economies. The variables used 
for quota calculations are shares of world output of products and services (GDP), 
purchasing power parity based on GDP, trade, international reserves, variability of 
exports and imports. In theory, voting rights are supposed to match the economic 
influence of a country and the financial contribution it makes to the IMF, but this is not 
the case for many emerging and low-income economies. 
Chapter four will focus on significant cases of discord/reform regarding Fund 
governance to the end of the Cold War. Namely, this chapter will explore China’s entry 
in the Fund and Russia assuming the preliminary Soviet seat at the end of the Cold War. 
China and Russia mark significant turning points in the governance of the Fund. Both 
countries helped the Fund become a universal institution, created changes in the 
institutional design of the Fund, and created adjustments of power within the Fund. The 
China case will review the Republic of China (ROC) and international institutions and 
then examine the discord between the ROC and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
regarding Fund negotiations for the PRC’s representation in the Fund. 
The second case will focus on Russia joining during the early 1990s. By Russia 
gaining membership another 14 countries gained membership into the Fund (Boughton 
2012; Stone 2002). Russia’s membership was not without discord. Internal Fund 
documents were analyzed to examine the level of discord among Fund members and the 
power politics of Fund governance and quota allocation. 
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Chapter five will focus on the Fund’s governance post-Cold War by analyzing 
three cases: Japan’s ongoing influence in the Fund since the 1980s; European over-
representation; and the BRICS emerging economies. Undoubtedly, Japan has been a 
major player in the Fund. Japan has served as financier to the Fund when many countries 
were reluctant to contribute to new financial facilities to assist debt stricken countries 
with balance of payment problems. The issue of European over-representation has been a 
concern that has caused much discord. This chapter will examine the power and effects of 
European over-representation on the institutional design of the Fund. Additionally, the 
chapter will examine the role of the BRICS in the institutional design and possible 
challenges for the Fund. The BRICS have not accepted unequal representation in the 
Fund with quite voice. Moreover, the BRICS and other emerging economies have begun 
to publically denounce the Fund for failure to reform its internal governance to give an 
equitable voice to emerging economies. 
Chapter six will focus on internal governance and reform of the Fund. Review of 
cases from prior chapters will be examined and show why there is pressure from the 
international community for the Fund to reform its governance model. Data analysis will 
be conducted for major countries before and after recent quota reforms. This analysis 
reveals if the Fund has truly embarked on internal governance reform that reflects current 
economic realities. A section will focus on possible quota reforms and consideration of 
other governance reforms beyond quotas. 
The thesis research design will focus on qualitative methods for country specific 
cases and institutional design cases. The cases selected are those that have presented 
significant challenges to the institutional design of the Fund and challenges to the 
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financial stability of the global economy. The cases selected have overtime created 
changes in the balance of power in the institutional design of the Fund and overtime have 
created and will continue to create challenges for international relations. For example, 
China’s admittance into the Fund has facilitated Chinese economic growth. Stone (2011) 
argue rising powers will supplant those of the old order in terms of both in the formal and 
informal internal policies of international organizations. Others point to ideas associated 
with power transition theory. A rising challenger state will be dissatisfied with the 
existing global order (hierarchy) and prestige (Schweller 2011). Rising economic powers 
seek great political influence. In these cases, data will be used to measure gross domestic 
product (GDP), foreign exchange reserves, international trade, GDP per capita, openness 
of economic variability, and international reserves against the world totals of the different 
variables. This approach will be useful in analyzing the quota and voting share of 
member states and answer the thesis research question. The specific question of member 
state over- and under-representation will be answered by comparing members’ relative 
weights in the world economy to their voting weights in the Fund. 
This topic is important to the changing international monetary system because 
without a legitimate international framework to oversee international trade and 
cooperation dire consequence can result from international discord. Groups such as the 
foreign policy establishment, policymakers, and others should be concerned with the 
institutional design of an international organization that will acquiesce or prevent the 
benefits and consequence of unprecedented globalization. Some observers argue 
globalization is a benefit to rich and poor countries alike. Conversely, others argue 
globalization only benefits wealthy countries at the expense of poor countries. 
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Ultimately, the international political economy is changing and a Fund that can promote 
economic cooperation will be essential to the future changing international financial 
architecture.  
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
The International Monetary Fund is one of the two intergovernmental 
organizations that resulted from the Bretton Woods Conference. This chapter will 
concentrate on the history of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and lead into the 
discussion in the following chapter of the institutional design and governance of the 
Fund. The first section will detail the factors that contributed to the Bretton Woods 
Conference. The second section will focus on the history of the Fund leading up to the 
period of the recent Great Recession.  
The factors that contributed to the success of the Conference were United States 
leadership and the collapse of the international monetary system due to World War I, the 
Great Depression, and the beginning of World War II. Lastly, another factor contributing 
to the Bretton Woods Conference success was the careful planning preceding the 
Conference, especially the blueprint for the International Monetary Fund (Garritsen De 
Vries 1986).       
World War I had dire consequences for the international monetary system. During 
this period the gold standard was destroyed and became ineffective for sound monetary 
policy (Garritsen De Vries 1986). In the 1920s, several large industrial states attempted to 
reestablish the gold standard for exchange rate policies, but the exchange rates did not 
account for divergent macro-economic policies that fostered unequal balance of payments 
and high domestic unemployment rates (Garritsen De Vries 1986).  
The Great Depression intensified the dire economic consequences of the latter 
period. Commodity prices and world trade plummeted to unprecedented levels. To 
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mitigate the currency devaluations of the 1930s and the Great depression, states applied 
restrictions to capital flows and protectionist policies became the standard. These factors 
aggravated the decline in world trade (Garritsen De Vries 1986; Joyce 2013). Large 
industrial and developing states suffered from deflationary pressures. States imposed 
their own parochial solutions by imposing competitive exchange rates; effectively states 
attempted to export their unemployment rates creating beggar-thy-neighbor policies 
(Garritsen de Vries 1986). No universal polices to prevent financial contagion existed. 
The gold standard was no longer effective, international monetary chaos was prevalent, 
and the outbreak of World War II worsened matters (Garritsen De Vries 1986).     
The Bretton Woods System 
In academic circles, the success of the Bretton Woods system is often debated. 
Prominent scholars argue the Bretton Woods Conference was one of the most successful 
economic achievements of the twentieth century (Eichengreen 2008; Garritsen De Vries 
1986). The Conference consisted of representatives from 44 states who convened at 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944 (Eichengreen 2008; Joyce 2013). The explicit 
goal of these governments was to prevent the economic and financial chaos of the past. It 
delivered a degree of exchange rate stability (Eichengreen 2008). During the Bretton 
Woods era, 1944 to 1973, living standards improved in Western Europe, North America, 
Australia, and developing countries experienced high rates of economic growth, along 
with unprecedented growth in international trade (Eichengreen 2008; Joyce 2013).  
The success of the Bretton Woods System was not by capricious circumstances. 
Careful planning was essential to the creation of the IMF and other international 
organizations like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World 
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Bank). Charters were constructed for the creation of a new international monetary system 
(Garritsen de Vries 1986). Historically, international organizations have facilitated 
cooperation based on agreements of mutual benefit. Some scholars claim this has reduced 
the potential for violent conflict among states (Keohane 1982). During this period, the 
United States assumed a leadership role. The “White Plan,” was sponsored by Henry 
Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the US Treasury (Garritsen De Vries 1986; 
Steil 2013). John Maynard Keynes, from the British delegation, represented the British 
view for a new international monetary system.  
The Keynes Plan was designed in 1943, it concentrated on an international 
currency union, a new International Clearing Bank (ICB), and bank money (Bancor) 
would be used in the ICB (Steil 2013). This plan was to be defined in terms of gold and 
national currencies where the value of the Bancor would be fixed in terms of gold. 
Member states would obtain Bancor in exchange for gold, but were prohibited from 
obtaining gold in exchange for Bancor (Bordo and Eichengreen 1993; Garritsen de Vries 
1986). All countries adhering to the plan would be subject to fixed exchange rates, and a 
governing board vote would be required for amending the fixed rate (Garritsen de Vries 
1986). At this point, countries would be permitted to change their exchange rate and 
apply trade and exchange rate policy fluctuations in order to generate full employment, 
which was a major goal for the British (Eichengreen 2008). Countries would be allowed 
to carry debt balances in the form of overdrafts rather than loans with the ICB and the 
Keynes’ system would finance balance of payment deficit (Eichengreen 2008; Garritsen 
De Vries 1986; Steil 2013). Central banks would manage the Keynes Plan. Countries 
would be permitted to settle debt imbalances with each other using the Bancor system 
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(Joyce 2013). For Keynes, a monetary system that revolved around money was 
inconsistent with the self-regulating forces of supply and demand in the economy (Steil 
2013).  
The Keynes Plan was very shrewd, it would allow the United Kingdom to attempt 
to re-establish and preserve its hegemonic position in the global order (Steil 2013). The 
Keynes Plan would shift the global economy from the gold standard and dependency on 
the US dollar. It was more liberal in conditionality requirements, would give debtor states 
more autonomy, and limit the freedoms of creditor states. The plan imposed strict 
regulations governing the balance of creditors and debtors. Inherently, this condition was 
intended to limit the US position in global foreign affairs because the U.S. would result 
as the global economic and military leader after World War II (Steil 2013). Also, Keynes’ 
vision of a monetary institution revolved around Anglo-American ideals and advocated 
for a small selective group of finance ministers to approve the Bretton Woods system 
(Steil 2013).      
According to IMF historians, the White Plan was most conducive for establishing 
perimeters for a new international monetary system (Garritsen De Vries 1986; Joyce 
2013). Originally, White’s plan intended the Fund to act as a bank, the first draft of the 
plan was called the United and Associated Nations Stabilization Fund. Eventually it took 
on the name the International Monetary Fund and became a geopolitical international 
institution (Steil 2013). The White Plan called for a contributory institution, with 
members making subscriptions in gold and national currencies. Member states would be 
permitted to draw loans based on their respective subscriptions; the total amount of 
drawing rights permitted in the beginning was a total of five billion US dollars 
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(Eichengreen 2008; Joyce 2013). The latter would help prevent inflationary consequences 
created by a new source of international liquidity (Joyce 2013). The White Plan was 
concentrated on establishing a cooperative post war monetary system. The plan was 
predicated on peaceful international relations. Henry Dexter White foresaw three 
potential problems for the United States if an international monetary system was not 
established. First, there was a clear need to prevent a collapse of foreign exchange, credit 
and monetary systems. Second, White wanted to see stability in monetary relations to 
help reestablish foreign trade. Lastly, White worried about the capital needed for 
reconstruction efforts after the war (Steil 2013).  
The White Plan emphasized pegged exchange rates, an economic system 
unrestrained by unnecessary economic regulations, and an international organization with 
veto power for important monetary issues (Eichengreen 2008). White, like Keynes, also 
had a hidden motive for the new economic doctrine. White was determined to elevate the 
dollar as the only currency capable of being a replacement for gold as the anchor in the 
new system. The goal was to prevent other states from manipulating gold prices in order 
to manipulate U.S. monetary policy (Steil 2013).  
Based on the Bretton Woods agreement gold, central banks, and the US dollar 
were essential to the success of the new international monetary system. Central banks 
maintained fixed values for their currencies based on the value of gold or US dollars. The 
United States would assist a member state by standing ready to sell or purchase gold to 
other member states at 35 US dollars per ounce of gold (Joyce 2013). The practice of 
purchasing gold only extended to official foreign creditors of the U.S. (Eichengreen 
2008). The dollar was used as an intervention currency in lieu of gold. According to 
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Eichengreen, the Bretton Woods system indirectly became a gold-dollar based system. In 
1971, the gold standard ended and the Bretton Woods system became a dollar-based 
system (Eichengreen 2008).  
The Fund was designed to promote and monitor the new international monetary 
system and facilitate international cooperation. The IMF blueprint was based on a series 
of compromises agreed to by Keynes and White. Ultimately, the White Plan was more 
influential and congruent with the hegemonic position of the United States (Joyce 2013; 
Steil 2013). The Keynes Plan presented strong intellectual challenges to the White Plan. 
However, the British did not have much leverage over the U.S. as Britain was in need of 
financial assistance during the war and postwar reconstruction efforts would require 
financing. There was no other country willing and able to provide such support other than 
the U.S. (Steil 2013).        
The Bretton Woods blueprint encouraged international trade and a response to the 
“impossible trinity” that was the status quo monetary system responsible for limiting 
independent policy-making (Joyce 2013). The impossible trinity involves three factors: 
fixed exchange rates, unregulated capital flows, and/or control of the domestic money 
supply. For example, the gold standard dictated that countries purchase or sell gold at 
fixed standards. Therefore, the values of currency reserves were universal for all 
countries (Joyce 2013). The Bretton Woods system was significantly different than the 
Gold Standard. Countries were allowed to implement capital controls and monetary 
policy to regulate economic cycles (Joyce 2013). The Bretton Woods system resulted in 
adjustable pegged exchange rates, conditionality for exchange rates, and the formation of 
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the IMF (Eichengreen 2008). Within the system all currencies except the dollar could be 
adjusted.    
The Bretton Woods system was consolidated in the international monetary system 
in December of 1958 when European countries agreed to the conditions of Article VIII of 
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. The Article allowed convertibility of national 
currencies for current account transactions (Eichengreen 2008; Steil 2013; Joyce 2013). 
By 1961, two-thirds of the IMF’s membership had adopted Article VIII. The Bretton 
Woods system was effective in promoting economic stability through the 1960s. 
Although, the Bretton Woods system provided stability and created the IMF, the 
foundation of the Bretton Woods system was unsustainable. 
In due time after the Bretton Woods system was created, major shareholders 
realized the system based on the gold standard and the US dollar as reserve currency was 
not sustainable. The Bretton Woods system served as a gold-dollar standard system from 
1959-1967. The U.S. pegged the dollar to gold, and other countries pegged their 
currencies to the dollar (Bordo 1995). During the 1950s and 1960s European states 
agreed to Article VIII, convertibility of national currencies for current account 
transactions, as long as the U.S. was willing to exchange these reserves for gold (Steil 
2013; Joyce 2013). 
The trilemma of international economics resurfaced during the Bretton Woods 
era. The impossible trinity is an inevitable limitation placed on policymakers and 
international organization bureaucrats. It was impossible to have free capital movements, 
fixed exchange rates, and autonomous monetary policy work together at the same time, 
there has to be a trade- off (Bordo and Eichengreen 1993; Joyce 2013). Countries like 
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Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia in 1997 in part suffered currency crisis because they 
failed to acknowledge the constraints of the impossible trinity (Fisher 2001).  
The U.S. received criticism for the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. 
Contributing to the problem were the flaws of the gold exchange standard, the adjustable 
peg system, and the acceleration of world inflation due to an increase in the growth of 
money supply. In reality, the problem was how to achieve adjustment in a world with 
capital controls, fixed exchange rates, and domestic policy autonomy (Bordo and 
Eichengreen 1993). In 1960, economist Robert Triffin published his thesis called “Gold 
and the Dollar Crisis” (Williamson 2009). Triffin argued the Bretton Woods system was 
doomed to fail because the internal mechanisms were flawed with internal economic 
contradictions. The gold supply was small and volatile because commodities were linked 
to market forces. International liquidity was only sustainable if the U.S. ran a payment 
deficit in order to continue supplying dollars to foreign central banks (Steil 2013; 
Williamson 2009).  
During this period, an abundant supply of US dollars became the norm, foreign 
central banks retained more dollars exceeding the value of U.S. gold holdings. 
Ultimately, this reduced confidence in the U.S. dollar (Strand 2014; Joyce 2013). The 
Triffin Dilemma suggests the global economy would lack adequate liquidity and 
undermining the confidence of the US dollar, which would create a financial crisis, as the 
amount of gold within the U.S. would be worth less than the value of dollars outside the 
U.S. (Williamson 2009). Steil documents during a Congressional testimony in 1959, 
Robert Triffin simply put it best, “there were absurdities associated with the use of 
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national currencies as international reserves, it constituted a built in de-stabilizer in the 
world monetary system” (Steil 2013, 333).  
One factor undermining the Bretton Woods system was the discord from the 
European Union. Several EU members were not satisfied with the dollar as reserve 
currency. Another factor was that increased capital mobility was testing the legitimacy of 
the fixed exchange rate system (Bordo 1995). Third, global leaders were pressing the 
U.S. for a resolution to the monetary problem. In 1971, U.S. President Richard Nixon 
removed the U.S. from the gold-dollar link. Bordo (1995) argues that during this period 
the Fund was a weak institutional power, U.S. power was threatened, economic 
governance was ineffective, G-10 governors were in discord, and the breakdown of 
Bretton Woods signified the end of an era of U.S. financial dominance.  
Historical Analysis of the International Monetary Fund 
The IMF started with 44 governments in attendance at the Bretton Woods 
Conference. The IMF was first established in 1945 with 29 member countries signing the 
Articles of Agreement. While it was designed to help manage the Bretton Woods System, 
it never fully assumed this task and instead early in its history it served as a lender of last 
resort for members facing balance of payments problems. Although, the Fund was 
originally created to facilitate international exchange among industrial countries, it never 
truly performed that role (Vreeland 2007). Some argue the Fund was looking for a new 
role to play when it first began to assist developing countries (Vreeland 2007). In the 
1970s the Fund began to become more involved with developing countries and also took 
on a larger role as an economic policy advisor and continued as a lender of last resort 
(Strand 2014). By the 1980s Fund membership was effectively bifurcated into the 
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wealthy governments who made the rules and borrowing countries who had to live by the 
rules. By rules, it is meant the policy conditions placed on loans made by the Fund. 
Highlighting this role polarization in the Fund is the simple observation that from the late 
1970s until the Great Recession no wealthy economy utilized IMF lending facilities. The 
IMF charter advocated for collective action amongst countries in order to achieve 
benefits such as increased employment and real income, facilitate balanced growth of 
international trade, improve standards of living, and improve the domestic resources of 
member states (Woods 2006). In theory, the Fund was established to be an apolitical 
international organization created to maintain a stable international financial system, 
provide loans to member states so to offset short-term payment imbalances, and defend 
member state exchange rates (Gould 2006). In reality, the Fund’s internal governance and 
policy outputs where inherently political (Rapkin and Strand 1997).    
 The Fund’s blueprint consists of 31 Articles of Agreement (Joyce 2013; IMF 
2013). The Articles address a broad range of areas, from quotas and subscriptions to 
operations and transactions of the Fund, to emergency provisions (Joyce 2013; IMF 
2013). Quotas are designed to   reflect the relative size of economies, the larger the 
country’s economy the larger its quota. The subscriptions determine the amount of capital 
a member country must contribute to the Fund when joining the Fund and during capital 
increases. The Articles have been subject to revision as to reflect the ever-changing 
nature of the international monetary system. Since 1945, the Articles have been subject to 
six amendments, the most recent effective March 3, 2011 (IMF 2013). Article one 
highlights the purpose of the Fund. IMF Article of Agreement I: 
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1. To promote international monetary cooperation through a 
permanent institution which provides the machinery for 
consultation and collaboration on international monetary 
problems. 
2. To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international 
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and 
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and 
to the development of productive resources of all members as 
primary objectives of economic policy. 
3. To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange 
arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive 
exchange rate depreciation. 
4. To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of 
payments in respect of current transactions between members 
and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which 
hamper the growth of world trade.  
5. To give confidence to members by making the general resources 
of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate 
safeguards, thus, providing them with opportunity to correct 
mal-adjustments in their balance of payments without resorting 
to measures destructive of national or international prosperity. 
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6. In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen 
the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of 
members (IMF 2013). 
Historically, since 1946, the Fund has experienced a number of changes such as 
the post Bretton Woods System, the Latin American debt crisis, the Asian financial crisis, 
the Fund’s role with developing countries, poverty alleviation initiatives, and the Great 
Recession. This malleable Article set the groundwork for the Fund’s ability to reinvent 
itself to address the constant changing international monetary system. Equally as 
important, the Article paved the groundwork for the collection of subscriptions, quota 
allocation, loan facility disbursement, and the ability for the Fund to serve as lender of 
last resort.   
The historic role of the Fund in low-income countries evolved over time. 
According to Boughton and Lombardi (2009), the evolution of the Fund was forced by 
five interrelated factors. First, membership in the Fund increased from 40 countries in 
1946 to over 180 member states by the 1990s. With the addition of the former Soviet 
countries the Fund obtained an almost universal membership (Boughton 2012).     
Second, changes in the world economy require changes to the Fund. Whereby, less 
developed countries began to take advantage of financial globalization. Third, changes in 
economic theory as the era of protectionism was being replaced by neoliberal market 
reforms. Fourth, there have been changes in IMF leadership. Lastly, changes in 
international factors such as an increased influence from civil society in world politics 
have impacted the Fund (Boughton and Lombardi 2009, 51). The Fund has extended an 
olive branch to civil society organizations as a method of acquiring important information 
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and sources of policy inputs (Strand 2014). The Fund’s membership of low-income 
countries grew from 11 percent in 1946 to 40 percent by the 1960. In terms of developing 
countries that borrow from the Fund, by 1972, over 50 percent of Fund members obtained 
financial assistance from the Fund. By 2006, more than 80 percent of low income 
countries obtained Fund assistance, and more than 80 percent of all indebted countries 
were low income countries (Boughton and Lombardi 2009).   
During the early 1960s the Fund established the Compensatory Financing Facility 
(CFF) dedicated to providing loans for countries dependent on commodity exports. Since 
the commodity markets for agricultural and mineral products were beyond the control of 
domestic structural policies, the Fund did not require domestic programs for economic 
policy adjustments as a condition to borrowing (Boughton and Lombardi 2009). The 
philosophy behind the CFF was that member countries did not have control over 
temporary external shocks, and the shocks were not created by inefficient state 
macroeconomic policies. The CFF was designed for low-income countries; however, 
other countries were also allowed to use the CFF. This program was the first step in a 
series of borrowing programs developed for poor countries, and the first step in 
implementing policy modifications at the Fund regarding low-income countries 
(Boughton and Lombardi 2009). Beginning in 1963 lending to low-income countries 
totaled 243 million US dollars and by 1967 lending totaled 723 million US dollars 
(Boughton and Lombardi 2009).  
Phillips (1983) argues the Fund changed radically in the 1970s by implementing 
three significant changes. The changes allowed the Fund to influence domestic policies of 
borrowing member states. The first change was the amending of the Articles to give the 
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Fund more administrative power over the global economy, this was implemented in 1978. 
The second change was the creation of the oil facilities and the expansion of Stand-By-
Arrangements. Lastly, there was an increase in the quota system. The implication of the 
latter was to empower the Fund to have more influence over domestic macroeconomic 
reforms of borrowing countries and to continue support for the world capitalist system 
(Phillips 1983).    
During the 1970s, the Fund continued to promote loan facility programs for low-
income countries. The Oil Facility program was a direct derivative from the CFF. The 
rise in oil prices and the shortage of oil created dire international economic problems not 
seen since the 1930s (Garritsen De Vries 1986). In 1973, six members of OPEC increased 
the price for crude oil. This action created a disruption in the world economy. The same 
theory was applied to fuel importing countries that were affected by the sharp increase in 
oil prices. As a result, these countries experienced difficulty in meeting external debt 
obligations (Boughton and Lombardi 2009). The essence of this program was to provide 
an interest rate subsidy for loans. The subsidy was five percentage points below the 
prevailing market rate. Twenty-five member states qualified for this loan program on an 
automatic basis (Boughton 2012; Boughton and Lombardi 2009). The Managing 
Director, Hendricks Witteveen, traveled to the Middle East to personally lobby member 
states for contributions to establish the oil facility. On August 22, 1974 the oil facility 
was established (Garritsen De Vries 1986).   
In 1976, the Trust Fund was created to provide long-term loans (10 year) at low 
interest rates of 0.5 percent and without policy adjustment requirements for low-income 
countries (Bordo and James 1999; Boughton and Lombardi 2009). The Trust Fund was 
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financed by selling Fund gold assets and provided balance of payments assistance (IMF 
2013). From 1977 to 1980, the Trust Fund provided 3.3 billion in loans to 55 low-income 
countries (LICs) (Boughton and Lombardi 2009). The latter loan programs did little to 
elevate the poverty stricken condition of these member states and resulted in the Fund 
experimenting with loan conditionality programs.  
The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was established in 1974. This facility required 
borrowing countries to develop structural and investment reforms aimed at establishing 
long-term growth rates and had an emphasis on structural adjustments (Bordo and James 
1999; Boughton and Lombardi 2009; IMF 2013). Countries that utilized the EFF had 
experienced serious long term payment imbalances and limits to private capital (Garritsen 
De Vries 1986). Conditionality was based on stand-by arrangements. This loan program 
was available to all member states and payable over a ten-year period with a seven-year 
grace period (Boughton and Lombardi 2009). In 1986, the Structural Adjustment Facility 
(SAF) was created with a concessionary interest rate of 0.5 percent with repayment 
options over a 5-10 year period (Bordo and James 1999). The SAF and the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) were modeled on the EFF, and conditionality was 
standardized for future loans (Bordo and James 1999; Boughton and Lombardi 2009). 
These two loan facilities paved the way for later collaborative bilateral efforts by the IMF 
and the World Bank to examine methods for debt reduction and poverty reduction 
programs.  
Accordingly, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative was 
established in 1996. The Fund’s role was to provide grants to member countries to relieve 
poverty conditions and to manage debt burdens. The initiative was financed with 
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contributions of member states and gold sales by the Fund (IMF 2013). This initiative 
provided 30 HIPCs with over two billion US dollars for debt relief. The initiative was a 
joint program between the Fund and the World Bank (Boughton and Lombardi 2009; 
IMF 2013). The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) replaced the HIPC providing 
total debt relief with conditionality requirements for domestic structural reforms. The 
debt relief is provided by the Fund, the World Bank, and other development banks. 
Country bureaucrats were required to prepare a Policy Framework Paper (PFP) 
establishing policies for poverty reduction, balancing international payments, sustainable 
strategies for economic growth, and stabilizing government finances (Boughton and 
Lombardi 2009; IMF 2013). Without this condition, IMF and World Bank loans would 
be denied to potential borrowers. Many of the country PFP’s were prepared in 
Washington with U.S. Treasury assistance, facilitating criticism of the Fund by low 
income countries.  
In 1999, the Fund created the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to 
supplant the ESAF and its PFP requirement (Boughton and Lombardi 2009). This policy 
authorized structural adjustment recommendations to be developed domestically with 
participation by local groups (Boughton and Lombardi 2009). East Asian countries and 
Latin American countries participated in these loan facilities that often imposed strict 
conditionality requirements during times of financial turbulence. Much debate has been 
generated about the role and success of the Fund in the Asian Financial Crisis and Latin 
American debt crisis.  
For academics, international observers, and foreign government officials 
conditionality has been associated with the “Washington Consensus.”  John Williamson 
25 
 
defines the Washington Consensus as a group of American policy makers, think tanks, 
the Washington technocrat establishment, the executive branch, the International 
Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions that have a strong American 
influence on policy outcomes. The Washington Consensus is primarily focused on 10 
policy reforms concerned with macroeconomic prudence on outward economic openness 
orientation, domestic liberalization, and economic growth (Williamson 1990). The policy 
instruments that make up the Washington Consensus include: fiscal deficit discipline, 
public expenditure priorities, tax reform, interest rates, exchange rate policies, trade 
policy, foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights 
(Williamson 1990). These proposed economic reforms were being urged in Latin 
America by Washington elites. The Latin America debt crisis consolidated the 
Washington Consensus as an idea, but these reforms also materialized in Eastern Europe 
and elsewhere (Williamson 1993).        
Latin America and Fund Conditionality 
 The Latin American debt crisis compelled the Fund to loosen its conditionality 
requirements in order to better serve as of lender of last resort. During the early 1980s, 
Latin America was plagued with nearly half a trillion dollars in debt (Pastor 1989). 
Beginning in the 1960s Latin American experienced an economic growth surge of the, 
between 1979 and 1981, less than a third of Latin American countries obtained loans 
from the Fund. Through the 1970s Latina America’s access to private international 
finance was on the rise. Due to the demise of the Bretton Woods system and the glut of 
American dollars private commercial banks turned to Latin America for maximizing their 
profits (Pastor 1989). For example, US commercial bank profits decreased due to a 
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decrease in real interest rates. By charging Latin American countries extra fees US banks 
were able to increase their profits (Pastor 1989). There was an abundance of capital 
available for borrowing. From 1977-1981, credit increased by 28 percent a year (French-
Davis 1987). From 1966 to 1970, Fund facility program borrowing by developing states 
fell by two-thirds. From 1979 to 1981, Fund programs fell to one-third of their normal 
utilization by borrowing member states as private capital was more accessible. The latter 
aggravated the Latin American debt crisis which facilitated excessive public spending 
(Wiesner 1985) Domestic macro-economic polices contributed to the crisis as economies 
became more vulnerable to exogenous factors (Wiesner 1985).  
Additionally, factors like volatility of terms for international trade placed 
macroeconomic restraints on countries with a high concentration on specific export 
products. Many Latin American countries that were categorized as small economies 
suffered more severe consequences (Goldstein and Turner 1996). A second factor 
contributing to the debt crisis was low levels of import diversification. A third factor was 
the volatility in interest rates and the effects the rates had on private capital. Interest rates 
affect the cost of borrowing and the flow of capital investment. For example, in 1981, 
many Latin American countries experienced an average investment flow of six percent. 
From 1983-1990 the average was estimated at below one percent (Goldstein and Turner 
1996).    
Member states, however, did not have to seek policy advice or financial assistance 
from the Fund anymore (Pastor 1989). The latter posed potential challenges for the Fund. 
This created an institutional power problem for the Fund and many Fund officials 
complained that Latin America was underutilizing Fund resources. In order to acquire 
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more market share the Fund eased conditionality requirements, implemented new Fund 
facilities, published empirical research to prove that Fund conditionality did not 
negatively impact domestic economic growth, and recognized that some Fund conditions 
created useful domestic political cleavages for borrowing countries (Pastor 1989; Phillips 
1983).  
The debt crisis of the early 1980s positioned the Fund to retake its prior position 
as lender of last resort. During this time, the boom-bust cycle of economics came to 
fruition. Foreign trade inflows decreased, nominal interest rates increased up to 13 
percent, and there was a shortage of foreign capital (French-Davis 1987). Many countries 
experienced financial macro-economic hardships and could not sustain payments of the 
accumulated debt. Chile’s debt level exceeded 90 percent of its GDP and the rest of Latin 
America averaged 50 percent debt level to GDP (French-Davis 1987). 
Latin American countries were forced to seek help from the Fund. The Fund did 
not fully understand the difficult macroeconomic, regional financial environment, and 
pursued a strategy to bring Latin American countries under its direct or indirect 
supervision (Pastor 1989). By 1982, the Fund expanded lending to these countries 
experiencing capital liquidity problems. This was a major extension of the Fund’s capital 
market program (Meltzer 1998). By 1983, 75 percent of Latin American member states 
were participating in some type of conditionality Fund program, Stand-by-Arrangements 
or the Extended Fund Facility (Pastor 1989). Due to the Fund loans and high interest 
charged to Latin countries by international commercial banks the Latin American 
countries essentially became permanently indebted to the Fund (Meltzer 1998). The Fund 
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and the private banks entered into agreements, the Baker Plan, that would facilitate bank 
payments and stricter conditionality.  
The Baker Plan was established in 1985 to assist debtor countries in obtaining 
macroeconomic adjustment policies to support economic growth and reduce inflation. 
The Brady Plan increased official lending to 15 middle income countries (Sachs 1989). 
These countries were provided loans in return for reforms in structural adjustments and 
more lending by multilateral banks (Boughton 2012). As a result of the Baker Plan, 
multilateral banks provided 15 US billion for 1986-1988 to Latin American countries. 
The Fund served as catalyst for private sector lending.    
The Baker Plan did not produce the anticipated results. From the beginning the 
Plan was flawed due to deficient operational understanding regarding issues such as 
surveillance, enforcement, and conditionality which were not defined clearly from the 
beginning of its implementation. The Brady Plan much like the Baker Plan focused on 
debt solution on a case-by-case basis and debt reduction assistance must be linked to 
economic reforms under the supervision of the Fund or World Bank (Sachs 1989). 
The Brady Plan was established in 1989 as a debt forgiveness program whereby 
commercial banks to established a debt reduction program by reducing the interest or 
principal on outstanding loans. In return commercial banks would be guaranteed a 
remaining portion of the debt by the Fund and the World Bank. Put differently, the Fund 
and the World Bank would serve as cosigners for the remaining balance (Sachs 1989). 
Four countries became the first to experience debt relief under the Brady plan: Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Philippines, and Venezuela. The Brady Plan focused on debt reduction for 
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a country to obtain positive credit ratings and for the debt to be repaid there must be a 
debt reduction (Sachs 1989).  
It would take over a decade for Latin American countries to recover from the 
financial crisis and banks to recover their losses during this era. As a result, the Fund took 
steps to raise resources to facilitate debt reduction and financial institutions took a loss of 
the debt owed which ended the crisis after a decade of negotiations (FDIC 1997). 
Economic liberalization approaches the Latin American countries implemented consisted 
of reducing state spending and rejecting economic policies that were based on arbitrary 
decisions by poorly trained bureaucrats. Other reforms included widespread deregulations 
of trade and investment, privatization, and the reduction of public spending (Naim 1994).       
The IMF and the Asian Financial Crisis 
In 1997 the Asia region suffered the most severe financial crisis not seen since the 
1982 debt crisis. The countries most affected by the AFC were Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and South Korea, but countries such as Brazil and Russia were also affected. 
The East Asian Tigers generated unprecedented economic growth in the region, with 
gross domestic product increased by five to seven percent per year (Eichengreen 2008; 
Fisher 2001; Katz 1999). Poverty alleviation increased as 350 million people no longer 
lived in poverty. Per capita incomes were increased by tenfold in Korea, fivefold in 
Thailand, and fourfold in Malaysia (Fisher 1998). For East Asian countries, price 
inflation was reasonable, saving rates were high, governments recorded budget surpluses, 
and account balances were positive (Katz 1999).   
The flight of private foreign capital was the main culprit associated with the AFC. 
Liquidity was a major problem for the East Asian economies. Due to an increase in 
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capital mobility, developing countries were exposed to external pressure to allow capital 
inflows for investment. They opened their markets to the global economy. Debt was 
concentrated in short term liabilities and low reserve assets in central banks created a 
classic bank run (Bosworth 1998). Across the region the factors that contributed to the 
crisis included: governments encouraged short term lending when liberalizing capital 
accounts, government policies regarding fixed exchange rates, and the close relationship 
between business elites and government elites created the moral hazard syndrome 
(Thirkell-White 2005). Economic policy performance can be examined by utilizing the 
veto-player model of comparative institutional behavior by applying how the bureaucratic 
system can affect economic performance (St. Marie, Hansen, and Tuman 2007). The 
veto-player model is rooted in the policy rigidity approach. The greater the number of 
veto holders the greater likelihood for policy solutions for financial problems. This 
approach is influenced by internal cohesiveness, autonomy, and control of financial 
matters (St. Marie, Hansen, and Tuman 2007). 
Goldstein (1998) argues the AFC was aggravated by the easy expansion of credit 
in the private sector. The loans obtained by easy credit were invested in real estate and 
equities. Many of the real estate bank loans accounted for 25-40 percent of the total bank 
loans in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Hong Kong (Goldstein 1998). 
The credit boom outpaced the real GDP growth of the region. This type of growth proved 
vulnerable to external shocks, shifts in investor sentiment, and proved unsustainable. 
Fisher (1998) narrows the crisis origins to three factors. First, there was a failure to 
contain the effects of the Thailand crisis. Second, many governments maintained a 
pegged exchange rate regime. Third, there was a lack of financial oversight.      
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The economic and structural framework of many Asian economies lacked 
experience with laws, protocols, administrative experiences, and regulatory institutions to 
deal with disruptive inflow of foreign capital (Katz 1999). However, other factors also 
contributed to the AFC such as weak financial institutions, fragile capital markets, 
vulnerable structural framework, and external economic influences (Katz 1999). The 
Fund, the U.S., Japan, and European countries encouraged East Asian countries to 
liberalize capital accounts for short and medium term capital transactions with long term 
transactions on the horizon (Katz 1999; Fisher 1998). 
During the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997-1998, the Fund was compelled 
to create new solutions that differed from past solutions. The AFC was quite different 
from the Latin American debt crisis (Katz 1999). During this period the Fund responded 
with programs that were limited in size, include questionable conditions, and proved 
ineffective in addressing all AFC challenges (Blustein 2001; Dervis et al 2011). Until this 
point, the Fund did not have an understanding of the domestic and international policy 
consequences of short-term capital flows (Dervis at al 2011; Fisher 2001; Katz 1999). 
Additionally, the Fund did not understand the effects of financial contagion on other 
economies created by an increased integration of emerging economies with global capital 
markets (Dervis et al 2011; Katz 1999).  
For Fund technocrats the main problem with the AFC was concentrated on 
domestic institutions although international capital markets played a role in the crisis. 
However, the solution was to fix the institutions in order to restore confidence to the 
market (Thirkell-White 2005). Banks across the region were poorly regulated and 
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underdeveloped. When it became apparent that governments were unwilling to rescue the 
domestic corporate sector the crisis began (Thirkell-White 2005).   
During 1997, Thailand’s economic activity, exchange rate, and currency (the 
Baht) declined significantly. This was after a decade of economic growth of an average 
yearly rate of 9 percent (Blustein 2001). In Thailand, exports of electronic components 
took a downturn; a strong US dollar rebound hurt the Baht. In 1996, real estate 
investments declined and stocks plummeted 35 percent (Blustein 2001). As the Baht 
depreciated in value the Thai central bank depleted its currency reserves in an 
unsuccessful attempt to preserve the Baht-dollar par value (Katz 1999). During August of 
1997 until 1998 the Fund issued Thailand a series of financial facilities. The facilities 
experienced a number of changes because the Fund did not properly understand or 
monitor the economic situation. The financial facility consisted of US 4 billion to be 
distributed over a 34-month period. The total package accounted for 17.2 US billion in 
multilateral organizations financial assistance, but also bilateral loans. For example, 
Japan was willing to assist the region: Tokyo matched the Fund’s loan with a 4 billion 
dollar loan. Other Asian countries, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank worked 
collectively to raise 6 billion dollars (Blustein 2001; Dervis et al 2011; Katz 1999). 
Economic actors did not respond well to the financial assistance by the Fund because the 
financial package fell short of the 23.4 US billion owed by the Thai central bank (Dervis 
et al 2011). In November 1997, the Fund facility was amended to address the economic 
realities within the Thai economy. In December 1997, an additional 810 million dollars 
was distributed (Dervis et al 2011). The Fund had similar responses to other Asian 
countries.  
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In the case of Indonesia, the Fund considered the economy to be resilient to 
external shocks. Indonesia was not like Thailand in regards to currency reserves. 
Indonesia possessed 20 billion in hard currency reserves (Blustein 2001). The Fund 
attempted reassure international observers that Indonesia was resistant to external shocks 
to no avail. By 1997, 15 percent of Indonesian men were unemployed. In 1998, economic 
output decreased by 14 percent and the official currency, the Rupiah, would plummet to 
15,000 per one US dollar from 2,400 in 1997 (Blustein 2001). Problems that contributed 
to the financial meltdown were Indonesian corruption and incompetent banking practices. 
For example, some borrowers continued to receive loans after defaulting on previous 
loans and obtaining a business license required a partnership agreement with the 
president’s relatives (Blustein 2001) Also, the Fund’s lack of a clearly detailed plan for 
the Indonesian economy stands out as problematic. As a result, the Fund would blame the 
Suharto government for the failed economic recovery.     
In October of 1997, the Fund approved a 40 US billion dollar financial package 
with the caveat of releasing a major portion of the loan at the end of the three-year stand 
by-arrangement (Dervis et al 2011). The Fund provided ten billion with three billion 
dollars disbursed upfront, the remaining balance was provided by multilateral partners. In 
1998, two additional economic facilities were ratified and dispersed, one in April and the 
other in June (Katz 1999).  
The Fund’s financial package failed to create much optimism for the domestic 
economy. After the first Fund disbursement, sixteen banks exited the market place, 
uncertainty increased regarding bank deposits, and the political will of the presidential 
administration to enforce conditionality was unknown (Dervis et al 2011). The latter 
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resulted in political, economic, and social constraints. President Suharto would resign 
amid violent protest that claimed 1,000 lives (Blustein 2001). The second Fund 
disbursement in 1998 did not alleviate previous concerns. The conditions attached to the 
financial package did not solve the root cause of the crisis and failed to address banking 
and corporate debt restructuring (Dervis et al 2011).  
South Korea was also impacted by the AFC. During the 1990s, Korea witnessed 
impressive economic growth, moderate inflation, and had a small fiscal surplus (Joyce 
2013). Much of the economic activity was due to the conglomerates (Chaebol) that were 
financed by domestic banks and government policies to encourage domestic 
industrialization. Due to relationships established between business groups, influential 
families, and government bureaucrats banking policies were poorly regulated (Thirkell-
White 2005). The Chaebol system was based on patronage and was deeply rooted in 
South Korean society. The South Korean business conglomerates collaborated with 
government policymakers for the creation of regulatory processes. External influences 
also contributed to the crisis. For example, The Fund and U.S. business interests 
encouraged South Korean officials to liberalize foreign participation in manufacturing 
and banking sectors (Katz 1999). This permitted short term borrowing abroad, a banking 
environment with unsound investments, and structural deficiencies (Katz 1999). A 
reduction in exports in the mid-1990s created a growing current account deficit and weak 
corporate performance earnings. Eventually, this situation evolved into the beginning of 
the South Korean financial crisis. In November 1997, foreign investors universally 
refused to provide loans for the private domestic sector. The Bank of Korea depleted 
currency reserves as it tried to repay foreign loans (Dervis et al 2011).  
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The Fund’s response was to curtail the power of the conglomerates, but in the 
face of poor market conditions and declining profitability banks continued to provide 
loans to the conglomerates (Thirkell-White 2005). The Fund attempted to implement 
conditionality based on Anglo-American norms. In response to dire economic 
circumstances in December of 1997, South Korea sent the Fund a Letter of Intent 
detailing its policy reforms. Policy reforms included monetary policy adjustment to 
prevent a breakdown of liquidity. Trade policy reforms accelerated measures to open the 
economy up to imports, eliminate trade subsidies, and follow WTO trade regulations 
(IMF 1997). Other areas of reform included capital market openness, financial sector 
restructuring, adjustment to exchange rate policy, labor market reforms, and transparency 
in data publication (IMF 1997).           
In December of 1997, the Executive Board approved a disbursement from the 
recently established Supplemental Reserve Facility to South Korea in excess of 21 US 
billion. This facility was put into place on December 17, 1997 to provide financial 
assistance to Fund members experiencing exceptional balance of payment difficulties. 
This facility was an additional form of resources under the Stand-By or Extended 
Arrangement with access to large loans at penalty rates to countries in crisis. Also, the 
facility was available in two or more tranches and required repayment 12-18 months after 
the first tranche disbursement (Fisher 1999; IMF 1997).  
Malaysia along with other East Asian economies showed signs of financial 
distress and an asset price bubbles by early 1997. Bankers responded by restricting 
lending for property purchases. This triggered a fall of the Malaysian stock market 
(Thirkell-White 2005). In June of 1997, the trade deficit was became a major economic 
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problem. The Malaysian Central Bank raised interest rates to support the value of the 
national currency, the Ringgit (Thirkell-White 2005). Unlike many East Asian countries 
Malaysia did not receive as much bank and private capital inflows. Portfolio inflows for 
every year in the 1990s were very short and at times negative (Radelet and Sachs 1998). 
Additionally, current account deficits and exchange reserves were also low. From 1990 to 
1995, balance of trade for imports was averaged negative 70 percent. However, inflows 
of foreign direct investment averaged 6.6 percent of GDP and private sector borrowing 
averaged 3.6 percent of GDP (Radelet and Sachs 1998). Malaysia was part of the AFC 
due to financial contagion and international intervention. In 1999, Malaysia’s Prime 
Minister broke with the Fund’s economic orthodoxy, rejected an IMF bailout, and 
implemented capital controls on foreign capital (The Wall Street Journal 1999).         
Due to the AFC, the Fund established three new programs: the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP), the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC), and, a new facility the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) (Dervis et al 2011; Fisher 
1999). These programs were created to increase transparency, data dissemination, and 
improve regulatory structures. The FSAP was a joint venture between the IMF and the 
World Bank to promote the dependability of domestic economic structures of member 
countries (Dervis et al 2011). ROSC improved compliance for auditing, bank supervision, 
corporate governance, creditor rights, insolvency, monetary and financial policy 
transparency, payment systems, and securities regulation (Dervis et al 2011). The CCL 
was established to provide financial payouts to members with strong macroeconomic 
structures who were subject to financial contagion. A line of credit would be disbursed to 
countries as a method of insurance against financial contagion (Fisher 1999). The 
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conditionality of the facility was unattractive to many member states, and the facility was 
discontinued in 2003 (Dervis et al 2011). In essence the Fund operated as the 
international lender of last resort during the AFC.  
The history of the Fund in Asia in the 1990s can be characterized by a lack of 
understanding about international capital flows and financial contagion. More 
importantly, the Fund exhibited a lack of understanding the macroeconomic structure of 
East Asian economies. Fund programs failed because of inadequate funding for big 
economic problems and a lack of easy access to additional financial payouts (Dervis et al 
2011; Radlet and Sachs 1998). Prominent scholars argued that Fund’s institutional culture 
of over self-confidence may have aggravated the AFC (Katz 1999). At no point were 
domestic economist consulted about the idiosyncrasies of the Asian economies. Fund 
staff preferred structural reforms in lieu of short-term quick fix solutions to diminish the 
intense financial crisis (Katz 1999). Many of the countries affected by the AFC 
categorized the Fund as illegitimate and opted to obtain loans from other multilateral 
organizations at higher loan rates (Woods 2010). 
This created a serious legitimacy crisis for the Fund. Member states like Korea, 
Russia, Brazil, and Argentina who once paid high fees for Fund loans began to seek 
assistance elsewhere. Consequently, the Fund estimated a budget shortfall losing an 
estimated 400 million per year by 2010. One consequence was the layoff of 300-400 
Fund staffers (Woods 2010). Another highlight of the legitimacy crisis was the Malaysian 
resistance to Fund policies. Prime Minister Mahathir hesitated in seeking Fund assistance 
during the AFC. A second key feature was the rejection of Fund approaches by 
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introducing capital controls. Lastly, the Prime Minister publically promoted alternative 
policies as part of a political attack on the Fund (Thirkell-White 2005).         
The relationship the Fund established over decades was eroded as a result of the 
AFC. Some Asian countries became antagonistic toward the Fund and the hostility was 
associated with conditionality regarding macroeconomic and structural reforms 
negotiated in Fund financial packages (Henning and Khan 2011). The end result was a 
stigma associated with Fund lending.  
The IMF and Globalization 
The Fund has not been immune to the positive and negative influences of 
globalization. Today, because of financial globalization, the Fund has become more 
salient than ever. International markets have expanded over territorial boundaries; 
economic integration has become more complex and private international capital flows to 
developing countries have increased at an unprecedented level (Copelovitch 2010). For 
example, in 1970, international capital flows were estimated at net zero. By 2005, capital 
flows had increased to 491 US billion. In 1986, daily foreign exchange trading was 850 
US billion; daily trading grew to 3.2 US trillion by 2007 (Copelovitch 2010). Today, 
scholars argue that the Great Recession demonstrates reforming the rules and institutions 
of global financial governance is needed more than ever. In particular, the Fund has faced 
an ongoing legitimacy crisis. Emerging economies are dissatisfied with the current 
governance model, voting shares are not commensurate with a members’ economic 
strength, and the rise of multilateralism has created more options for assistance.     
A number of factors compelled the Fund to initiate reforms. The Fund was in 
need of self-sustaining income. Low-income countries and middle-income countries were 
39 
 
distancing themselves from the Fund because they felt conditionality was oppressive and 
even counter-productive. The legitimacy problem was negatively affecting the confidence 
of member states and causing an identity problem for the Fund (Truman 2006; Woods 
2010). The U.S. ceased to be the largest creditor (Woods 2010). A rising China and other 
emerging economies were changing the structure of the world economy, the international 
financial architecture of the Bretton Woods era had changed. As a result, many argue the 
Fund failed to fulfill its role to safeguard the international economy (Truman 2006). 
Emerging economies continue to lobby international partners for the creation of regional 
funds. Additionally, the BRICS financial strength and their role in the new financial 
architecture commanded new positions in the institutional design of the Fund (Lombardi 
and Woods 2008). Shortly after the Great Recession, the BRICS coalesced around the 
Fund to help with financial capital. Although, financial assistance was done with much 
reluctance the Fund was able to positions itself as the de-facto lender of last resort 
(Copelovitch 2013).   
In response of the global economic crisis, the Fund has increased its lending 
power, used international economic relationships to offer policy solutions, and has 
introduced reforms to respond to countries’ needs (IMF 2013). Many of these reforms 
were encouraged by other multilateral organizations such as the World Bank. In response 
to the crisis, the G20 committed almost one trillion US dollars to the Fund’s coffers. The 
outcome was an unprecedented level of loans in excess of 158 billion US (Woods 2010). 
The G20 has committed itself to a leadership role addressing the global financial system. 
Copelovitch (2013) argues the G20 will have to do much work to prove itself as a serious 
forum for international economic cooperation. However, the expansion of the G7 to the 
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G20 signals a move toward multipolar governance mandates. During the financial chaos 
caused by the financial crises of the 1990s, global leaders looked to foster a new 
international financial architecture. The G7 group was not sufficiently capable of such a 
task and it required the expansion of the G7 to the G20 (Wade 2011).       
Conclusion 
Overall, it appears the Fund has evolved in an attempt to meet the economic 
conditions of the day. However, much debate has been generated by the Fund’s successes 
and failures. Overall, the Fund has had five major changes in its history. The first change 
was the cooperation and reconstruction of a new international monetary system after 
World War II. The second major change was the establishment of a currency exchange 
mechanism that would provide the needed liquidity in the market. The third major change 
when Eastern Europe expanded the Fund to a nearly universal organization. The Fund 
entry negotiations with the Russian Federation paved the way for other Eastern Bloc 
countries to join the Fund. The fourth change was encouraged by the severity of the AFC. 
This period was one of great institutional concern due to the legitimacy problem. Lastly, 
current financial globalization and crisis are creating international cleavages among the 
industrialized countries and emerging markets. Beginning with the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system and the increase of world capital markets the Fund emerged as a lender of 
last resort (Jensen 2004). The role of the Fund became complicated with the end of the 
fixed exchange rate system and the beginning of the floating exchange rate after 1971 
(Jensen 2004). Member states began to acquire current account deficits, the Fund was 
unsure if the account deficits were due to short-term fluctuations or macroeconomic state 
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policies. As a result, the Fund transitioned itself from the management of fixed exchange 
rates to country surveillance and macroeconomic consulting (Jensen 2004).  
During the Bretton Woods era the Fund was an institution created to regulate the 
fixed exchange rate arrangements between countries, to provide short term loans for 
balance of payment problems, and encourage economic cooperation (Eichengreen 2008). 
When the Bretton Woods system collapsed floating exchange rates became the standard 
practice and more countries began to have current account deficit problems (Eichengreen 
2008; Jensen 2004). The Fund turned to surveillance activities to monitor countries 
economic activity as a tool for resolving the account deficit problems. The latter 
indirectly shifted the Fund’s focus to global macroeconomic consultant (Eichengreen 
2008). Since the creation of the Fund, it has maintained its position as one of the most 
powerful international organizations. Today the Fund continues to initiate reforms 
designed to strengthen its powerful position in the world. The next chapter will focus on 
the institutional design of the Fund. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE FUND, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND GOVERNANCE 
Chapter three will examine the institutional design and governance of the Fund. 
The Fund’s institutional design is complicated and includes mechanisms such as 
conditionality, decision making rules, managing director responsibilities, policy outputs, 
a weighted voting system, and quota rules (Lombardi and Woods 2008; Strand 2014). 
Understanding internal governance is important to understanding how the Fund operates. 
Internal governance concerns how member states obtain voting shares, the complex 
nature of the IMF, and even the future of the international financial architecture. The 
chapter will focus on the institutional design of the Fund that includes informal and 
formal procedures, governance structure of the Fund, country representation and voting 
shares, conditionality, surveillance mechanisms and a theoretical approach to the 
institutional design. Particularly important to this chapter is the consideration of formal 
and informal governance section. Stone (2002) has coined the term “informal 
governance.” International organizations function according to two types of rules: formal 
rules and informal rules. Formal rules consist of consensual procedures and informal 
rules allow for special privilege for powerful states. 
The first section of the chapter will analyze the formal rules of the Fund. 
Specifically, Articles III, IV, XII, and VX and how they contribute to the institutional 
design, governance, and decision making process of the Fund. The second section will 
move into the informal rules and practices of the Fund and examine the implications for 
governance, power politics, and the decision making process. Variations in loan 
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conditionality are then examined to assess the influence of power politics in the 
governance of the Fund.    
IMF Articles of Agreement 
The mandate of the Fund and its institutional design originate in the Articles of 
Agreement. The Articles were created to facilitate the cooperation of the international 
monetary system, promote exchange rate stability, and create a multilateral payment 
system for account transactions (Joyce 2013). The Fund has a total of 31 Articles. The 
Articles have been amended and approved by the Board of Governors to address the ever-
changing problems in the international financial architecture.  
The Articles of Agreement concentrate on a broad range of member state 
commitments. Issues addressed in the Articles range from the Fund’s purpose to relations 
with other international organizations to quotas. The Articles are important and contribute 
to the formal and informal practices of the institutional design of the Fund. This section 
will emphasize the Articles that are fundamental to the formal decision making process. 
The articles important to the institutional design include Article III “Quotas and 
Subscriptions”, Article IV “Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements”, Article XII 
“Organization and Management”, and Article XV “Special Drawing Rights” (IMF 2013). 
Scholars argue the Fund’s Articles represent a distribution of power by political elites 
that hide the true nature of the Fund and its most powerful member, the U.S. This nature 
is rooted in a member-controlled organization that utilized three components to conceal 
its true purpose of being a tool of American hegemonic power (Stone 2008, 592). The 
Articles represent a system of representation of member states, its official lending 
criteria, and its weighted voting apparatus (Stone 2008).    
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Quota and Subscriptions 
According to Buira (2000), three factors are important to the decision making 
process: the distribution of voting powers, decision-making rules, and the management 
structure within the IMF. In theory each Article details a specific function of the Fund. In 
practical terms the Articles overlap and work in conjunction with each other. For 
example, Article III pertains to quotas and subscriptions. Specifically, each member is 
assigned a quota expressed in Special Drawing Rights (SDR). The Board of Governors is 
responsible for approving quota adjustments, each member must pay its corresponding 
subscription in full to the Fund, and other stipulations relating to the quotas and 
subscriptions. The Fund is structured around the quota system. The quota system is very 
important because it determines the members’ financial commitments to the IMF and 
influences members’ access to Fund financing. Each member state is assigned a quota 
based on its relative position in the world economy. 
According to the Articles of Agreement, the Fund is mandated to review 
members’ quota at least every five years by examining economic positions of member 
states and the financial viability of the IMF and are specifically outlined in Article XV 
(Rapkin and Strand 2006; Strand 2014). The five-year review process is called a General 
Quota Review. Additionally, quotas are important because they determine how much 
money member states can borrow from the Fund and their access to Special Drawing 
Rights. In reality, members’ global economic strength, quotas, basic votes, and political 
considerations determine the voting rights of governments.  
Fund Surveillance and Conditionality 
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Article of IV, “Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements” is important to 
the information sharing process, conditionality, surveillance, and the quality of 
information provided by members (Lombardi and Woods 2008). More importantly, this 
Article influences the disbursement of loan facilities for member states. The Fund has the 
right to oversee the international monetary system and the compliance of each member to 
ensure all sections of the Articles are followed. The Fund has a unique position because it 
has access to 188 member states and their country information. Article VIII, “General 
Obligations of Members” compels members to provide the Fund with information 
necessary for Fund duties. Information that is shared on a regular basis include exchange 
rate policies, international balance of payments deficits/surpluses, trade in goods and 
services, gold transactions, capital transactions, and other macroeconomic data. This 
information is facilitated by section three of Article IV. This section specifically grants 
the Fund an exclusive right to oversee the compliance of member states.  
The Fund maintains surveillance operations on two levels, multilateral and 
bilateral (Lombardi and Woods 2008). Multilateral surveillance is used to collect and 
distribute new information to member states and market participants. Two reports 
produced by multilateral surveillance are the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the 
Global Financial Stability Report (GSFR) (Lombardi and Woods 2008). Additionally, the 
Fund has implemented discussions regarding international financial markets by 
promoting the world economy and market developments. In the early 2000s, the Fund 
launched surveillance on development financing and regional economic effects 
(Lombardi and Woods 2008).  
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Bilateral surveillance puts Fund technocrats in direct contact with member state 
government officials. These meetings are held to educate country officials on the 
universally agreed standards of international finance, market reforms, and other 
macroeconomic policies conducive to a strong international monetary system (Lombardi 
and Woods 2008). Countries agree to participate in country reports per Article IV. These 
reports are prepared by the Fund staff and contain outlook projections, economic policies, 
and staff appraisals of the country’s economic performance.       
Much debate has been generated about the effectiveness of bilateral consultations. 
There is a general consensus that Fund consultations are well prepared, academically 
valuable, and concentrated with technical expertise. However, criticism has been 
generated due to a lack of country specific analysis supporting exchange rate policies and 
a lack of knowledge understanding country constraints and implementation challenges 
(Lombardi and Woods 2008). The Fund’s impact and success on policy reforms were 
based on the receiving country’s economic strength. Large and advancing emerging 
economies were not as receptive to Fund advice. Smaller emerging economy and low-
income economy government officials were more receptive to Fund consultations 
(Lombardi and Woods 2008)   
Conditionality along with other Fund practices has been the subject of much 
criticism. As described above, Fund technocrats are responsible for structuring loan 
programs and conditionality requirements attached to the loan programs. Historically, the 
Fund has implemented one country fits all programs that have little to no sensitivity for 
domestic economic and political constraints (Stone 2008). Conditionality has been 
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viewed by some as to enrich major shareholder states and highly unjust (Steinwand and 
Stone 2007).  
The conditionality is imposed on debt relief seeking member states closely 
associated with neo-liberal economic reform policies and access to Fund bailout packages 
(Soederberg 2003; Strand 2014). Conditionality requirements include: domestic market 
reforms, easy access for foreign direct investment, reductions in public sector spending, 
and structural reforms such as privatization, deregulation, and tax reform (Strand 2014; 
Stone 2008). In theory the Fund applies the same lending requirements for all member 
states based on the “Doctrine of Economic Neutrality and Financial Programming” 
(Thacker 1999). In reality, conditionality is different for member states. Broome (2010) 
argues the Fund became more flexible regarding loan conditionality during the 2008 
financial crisis. For example, Iceland borrowed a program loan by agreeing to two main 
conditions: a dramatic tightening of monetary policy and starting a bank restructuring 
program. Broome also argues Belarus did not get the same treatment as Iceland.     
It is legitimate to argue that Fund conditionality has been influenced and 
encouraged by the Washington Consensus model. The Washington Consensus is a set of 
ten policy reforms suggested for Latin America in the late 1980s. The emphasis was on 
macroeconomic stability based on sound fiscal and monetary policies. (Williamson 
1993). These policy reforms allow the market a bigger role through privatization, trade, 
liberalization, and domestic market regulations (Williamson 1993). Fund economists are 
influenced by neo-liberal economic ideas associated with US foreign policy (Strand 
2014). The Fund has two guiding principles associated with the approval of loans. First, 
trade liberalization is viewed as leading to increased economic growth. Second, 
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international financial openness compels debtor states to implement market-based 
solutions to economic and political problems (Soederberg 2003). In short, Washington 
Consensus ideas are grounded in neo-classical economic assumptions. 
Decision-Making Bodies 
Article XII outlines the Fund’s institutional design and internal governance 
model. The Fund uses a weighted voting system, selective representation, special voting 
majorities, and a set of formal and informal rules and practices (Steinwand and Stone 
2007; Strand 2014; Woods and Lombardi 2006). This section addresses the Fund’s 
decision-making bodies, voting powers, and the inner workings of the Fund on a formal 
basis. 
Board of Governors 
The Board of Governors formally holds power of the Fund’s operations (Strand 
2014). Each of the 188 member countries has a representative on the Board, one seat per 
member state. The Board holds a meeting one or two times a year. The Executive Board 
may call a meeting of the Board of Governors for special circumstances. When this 
occurs, 15 member states or members who accumulate one-quarter of the voting power 
can request a meeting. All decisions made by the Board are binding on member states. 
The Board uses a weighted voting system and a variety of qualified majority rules to 
reach policy decisions (Strand 2014). Day-to-day operations usually are assigned to the 
smaller Executive Board. Logistically, it is easier to find consensus in a 24-member 
board than in a 188 member Governing Board (Woods and Lombardi 2006).  
The Executive Board 
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The Executive Board is a powerful body within the Fund. The Executive Board 
consists of 24 seats and a system of selective representation determines the seats that 
many members occupy. The Executive Board is chaired by a Managing Director who 
delegates over the meetings (Strand 2014; Woods and Lombardi 2006). The largest five 
vote holders occupy appointed seats in the Executive Board. These governments include 
the U.S., United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Germany and these members appoint their 
own executive director (Strand 2014; Woods and Lombardi 2006). The other type of seat 
is reserved for members in voting groups that select a delegate to represent their 
constituency (Strand 2014; Woods and Lombardi 2006). Currently, 3 out of the 19 seats 
reserved for constituencies are occupied by a single country: China, Saudi Arabia, and 
the Russian Federation (Strand 2014; Woods and Lombardi 2006). The remaining 180 
countries fall into 16 different voting groups that elect a director to represent them. For 
example, the director from the Netherlands represents 12 countries. Currently 25 
European Union member states have a lot of influence for chair selections on the 
Executive Board. In the past, the EU selected ten of the 24 executive directors. During 
the early 2000s, the ten executive directors chosen by the EU consisted of six Executive 
Directors from the EU. Also, out of the alternate Executive Directors selected eight held 
European citizenship (Truman 2006). As a result, the European community has 
disproportionate influence on the Executive Board. Today, nine of the Executive 
Directors are from the European Union and seven senior officials are from the European 
Union (IMF 2013).  
Fund Technocrats 
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Staff recruitment is a very important aspect of the Fund’s operations with 
implications for management operations and international policy outcomes. Historically, 
the Fund has focused on employing technocrats. These individuals are highly skilled in 
scientific knowledge, specialize in academic training, particularly in economics and 
engineering, and theorize that most problems are solved with scientific and technical 
solutions (Momani 2005). For example, in the late 1990s, 32 percent of Economic 
Program recruits were from the top twenty economic departments in the United States. 
An additional 19 percent were from other lower ranked economic departments in the 
Unites States (Momani 2005). According to Buira (2002) many developing country 
nationals went from American universities directly to the Fund but lack real world policy 
experience. Rank and file staffers come from 127 of the 183 member countries. However, 
in 1996, 26 of 31 management and senior staffers came from industrialized countries 
(Buira 2000). In 2005, 38 percent of newly hired staff was recruited from the Economist 
Program (Momani 2007b).  
There is a heavy emphasis on Anglo-American neoclassical economic training 
among the Fund staffers. As a result, reform and conditionality programs tend to be based 
on macroeconomic standards and quantitative targets that are universally applied to 
member states and that reflect the idiosyncrasies of Fund staffers (Momani 2007b; 
Soederberg 2003). Many universally applied loan facilities failed to improve macro-
economic conditions in countries. For instance, international observers argue the Fund 
failed to properly diagnose the problems of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1990s. The Fund 
was not able to manage a moderate adjustment problem arising in private capital markets 
and this turned into major financial chaos for the region (Radelet and Sachs 1998). Fund 
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staffers prepare policy reports and structural reform blueprints for member states. Also, 
economists negotiate loan conditions with debtor states (Momani 2005; Soederberg 2003)  
Voting Power 
Section Five of Article XII legitimizes the decision making process of the Fund 
by allocating voting weight to member states. It should be noted that quotas are the main 
factor determining voting rights (Buira 2000). A small number of votes, called basic 
votes, are assigned to all members regardless of monetary contributions (Strand 2014).  
1 The basic votes of each member shall be the number of votes that results 
from the equal distribution among all the members of 5.502 percent of the 
aggregate sum of the total voting power of all the members, provided that 
there shall be no fractional basic votes. 
2 The quota-based votes of each member shall be the number of votes that 
results from the allocation of one vote for each part of its quota equivalent 
to one hundred thousand special drawing rights (IMF Factsheet, website 
2013). 
   
Voting power within the Fund is a fundamental part of its institutional design and 
the topic of much controversy. Votes are based on two factors. First, votes are assigned 
based on economic strength measured by Fund quotas. The quota clause originates in 
Article III. The quota system is complicated. Quotas largely are based on the relative 
economic size of member countries’ economies. The larger the quota the larger the voting 
share. In the past, factors used for quota calculations have been, (1) GDP at current 
market prices, (2) current payments as an indicator to economic openness and the 
possibility of requiring loan assistance, (3) official international reserves, (4) current 
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receipts, and (5) variability at currents receipts (Truman 2006). When an increase in total 
quotas is approved an adjustment may be implemented to bring the actual quota in line 
with the calculated quota (Truman 2006). In 2008, Fund members agreed to streamline 
the quota system. Today, the formula consists of measures of national product, economic 
openness, international reserves, and vulnerability of exogenous shocks (Strand 2014). 
Each variable has a weight designated in the calculation formula. National product is the 
most influential variable is a combination of GDP at market exchange rates (60 percent) 
and GDP at purchasing power parity (40 percent) (Strand 2014). The remain factors are 
economic openness accounting for 30 percent, economic variability accounts for 15 
percent, and currency reserves account for five percent (IMF 2013; Strand 2014). As 
mentioned before, every five years the Fund conducts a quota review called the General 
Quota Review. Not every review results in a quota increase. In the past, only eight of 
thirteen GQR's have increased the size of the Fund (Truman 2006). Currently, the Fund is 
in the process of approving the 14th GQR which will give emerging economies a larger 
voice in the decision making process. Not all member state's domestic legislatures have 
approved the 14th GQR's. In September of 2013, Fund Managing Director, Christine 
Lagarde, addressed the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in an attempt to make the Fund's 
case for the U.S. Congress to approve the 2010 quota reform package (Yukhananov 
2013). As of October 2013, U.S. policymakers have not approved the 2010 quota reform 
package. 
 In theory, voting rights are supposed to match the economic influence of a 
country and the financial contribution it makes to the Fund, but this is not the case for 
many emerging and low-income economies. This weighted voting system is a political 
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process (Strand 2014). Actual quotas are different than calculated quotas, many times 
quota decisions are reached by negotiations. Many member states have voting shares not 
justified by the quota calculation formula measuring the relative weight of their 
economies. Some states are over represented while others are under-represented (Rapkin 
and Strand 2005; Strand 2014; Stone 2008).  To illustrate the point, Rapkin and Strand 
(2005) conducted a study examining the claim that developing countries are under-
represented in the Fund. The results concluded that upper-middle income countries have 
quotas commensurate with their economic standing in the global economy. OPEC 
countries, low-income, and lower middle-income countries are over-represented in their 
quota shares. For example, Indonesia, had a current quota of 0.980, but the calculated 
quota based on Fund variables was only 0.753. Another assessment of quotas, the Quota 
Formula Review Group, estimated that Indonesia’s calculated quota was 0.645 (Rapkin 
and Strand 2005). Clearly, Indonesia is over-represented in quota shares. According to 
Rapkin and Strand, major shareholders have attempted to provide low-income and 
middle-income countries a more important role in the Fund’s governance structure. The 
transfer of quota shares from one country to another is a zero sum game and the politics 
of quota distribution has led to higher disparities between actual and calculated quotas 
(Rapkin and Strand 2005).           
The institutional design regarding the distribution of votes has been a major 
problem for the legitimacy of the organization. Many member states argue that they lack 
a strong presence and voting power within the institutional design of the Fund (Truman 
2006). Case in point, in 2004 European Union members were responsible for directly 
controlling 23 percent of the votes in the Fund (Truman 2006). In May 2004, ten newly 
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admitted European member states controlled 2.1 percent. Through coalition building with 
non-European states the EU added 12.5 percent to its voting weight; resulting in almost 
45 percent of the Fund’s voting power (Truman 2006). As stated above, the reallocation 
of voting shares is a zero sum game. In the case of Japan becoming the second largest 
economy, many European member states resisted Japan obtaining a larger share of voting 
power when it moved from fifth to second place in the 1990s (Rapkin, et al.1997).     
All members of the IMF are assigned an equal share of basic votes. With the 2008 
Fund reforms, basic votes were assessed at 5.502 percent of total votes (IMF 2013). 
There is some debate about the influence of basic votes. Some scholars argue the basic 
votes were intended to reflect a sense of equality among member states (Woods 2006). At 
the creation of the Fund, basic votes accounted for 11.3 percent of all votes (Rapkin and 
Strand 2005; Strand 2014). Since then, as membership in the Fund has increased the 
share of quota share votes has increased and this has diminished the effect of basic votes 
because the number of basic votes stayed about the same. The share of basic votes 
diminished to 2.1 percent prior to recent reforms (Strand 2014). This has affected the 
balance of power for small states. Japan has a total vote share of 157,022. St. Lucia has a 
total vote share of 890. Overall, the importance of basic votes is relative to the country’s 
economic strength. St. Lucia cannot utilize basic votes as a counter-weight to the actual 
voting share of large states. Basic votes represent a higher proportion of voting power for 
small states (Buira 2000). Without basic votes smaller states do not have much power 
attached to their votes. The proportion of basic votes has decreased over the years. In 
1956 over 14 percent of votes were basic votes, by 1999 percentages of basic votes 
decreased to 2.1 percent (Leech 2002). The current pending reforms will account for 
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basic votes at 5.502 percent of the total ratio. Today, the total votes are calculated at 
2,519.736. 5.502 percent of 2,519.736 will sum 138,635. With 188 members each 
member will have 737 basic votes.    
Decision-Making 
Decision-making procedures for the IMF are complicated. All members must 
adhere to legally binding decisions. However, these decisions do not require consensus. 
Special majorities and a weighted voting system are essential to the IMF. Most issues 
require a simple weighted majority while other more important issues require an 85 
percent weighted majority (Truman 2006). The U.S. has the power to block some 
decision-making votes due to it possessing 17 percent of all votes (Stone 2011; Strand 
2014). Special majorities during the voting process are needed for political, economic, or 
other major issues confronting major states or the Fund, over 50 categories require 
special majorities (Strand 2014).   
Special Drawing Rights 
The Bretton Woods era, 1945 to 1971, was weakened by the Triffin Dilemma 
(Steil 2013). Although, it did provide stability this was a time of economic uncertainty 
and turbulence, dependence on bilateral trade and inconvertible currencies was taking its 
toll on the Bretton Woods system. For example, in 1946, European import costs rose 
dramatically because of inflation. Between 1945-1949, a recession decreased the demand 
of US imports (Steil 2013). In 1949, Britain devalued the sterling by 30 percent. In the 
first half of 1950 the U.S. had a current account surplus of three billion. As a result, 
European allies began to express opposition to the international monetary system known 
as the gold exchange system (Steil 2013). Many foreign governments blamed the U.S. for 
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exporting inflation. Particularly, France led the opposition to the gold exchange system. 
During this time the Triffin Dilemma was becoming a reality. In the 1960s, foreign 
central banks exceeded the holding of U.S. dollars. The U.S. did not have sufficient 
reserves of gold to exchange for dollars (Joyce 2013). Eichengreen (2008) argues the 
appropriate solution to the Triffin Dilemma was to establish other forms of international 
liquidity reserves for the dollar so to prevent a future Triffin Dilemma. During the 1960s 
there was much debate about the winners and losers of a new reserve currency. The G10 
took the lead in establishing committees and policy reviews for the new reserve asset. As 
a result, in 1968, the Fund’s Board of Governors approved the first amendment to the 
Articles of Agreement, which created Special Drawing Rights (Eichengreen 2008; Steil 
2013).    
Article XV details the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) allocated to members of 
the Fund. The system was created to serve as an interest bearing international reserve 
asset under the direction of the Fund (IMF 2013). SDRs are not official currencies or a 
claim to the Fund, but Fund members may utilize SDRs as useable currency (IMF 2013). 
In other words, SDRs cannot be used to purchase tangible goods, but member states can 
exchange them amongst themselves on a voluntary basis as a unit of account. SDRs serve 
to increase the official reserves of a country and once added to the official reserves the 
member state may exchange the SDRs for hard currency (International monetary Fund 
Data 2013). Beginning January 1, 1970 three billion SDRs were used to support the fixed 
exchange rate system (Williamson 2009). The use of gold and the U.S. dollar supported 
the exchange rate for SDRs. As the international monetary system has changed, so too 
has the role of SDRs. Today, SDRs are defined as a basket of currencies consisting of the 
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U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, Euro, and pound sterling. In 2011, a new SDR valuation and 
interest rate took effect. Currencies were assigned the following weight: U.S. dollar 41.9 
percent, Euro 37.04 percent, Pound sterling 11.3 percent and the Japanese yen 9.4 percent 
(IMF 2013).     
Member states may allocate SDRs in proportion to their Fund quotas. There is no 
interest charge or other fees associated with SDR allocation (IMF 2013). The SDR 
allocation serves as an international reserve asset that may serve as unconditional 
liquidity. Otherwise, distressed member states would be compelled to turn to expensive 
domestic or external debt to accumulate domestic reserves (IMF 2013). The allocation of 
SDRs is distributed to meet the goals of the Fund. SDR allocations have assisted in 
preventing economic stagnation, deflation, excess demand, and inflation. Based on the 
dates of SDR allocation, it appears that the distribution of general SDRs has been 
correlated to periods of financial uncertainty. The first allocation was distributed in 1970-
1972 for a total amount of 9.3 billion (IMF 2013). The second allocation was distributed 
in 1978-1981 for a total amount of 12.1 billion. Finally, the third allocation was in 2008-
2009 during the financial crisis for a total amount of 161.2 billion. A special one-time 
SDR allocation of 21.5 billion was enacted on September 9, 2009. The total SDR 
allocation since 1970 has been equivalent to 318 US billion dollars (IMF 2013). 
Formal and Informal Governance 
The balance of power between powerful and less powerful states has been a 
contentious issue since the beginning of the International Monetary Fund. Issues that 
concern the balance of power range from which countries sit on the Executive Board, to 
conditionality requirements to various decision-making protocols. For example, 
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transparency, the selection of the managing director, and the variations for loan 
requirements have generated debate about the Fund’s decision-making process. This 
section will focus on the informal rules and how they influence the governance model of 
the Fund. This section will use the variations of loan conditionality to draw attention to 
the influence of informal rules and practices.  
Copelovitch (2010) argues the Fund has been the de facto lender of last resort in 
the international monetary system. For example, between 1984 and 2003, the Fund 
disbursed more than 400 US billion to countries facing balance of payment and financial 
crises. As a result, some loans received more conditionality requirements than others. 
Many conditionality requirements have reflected the preferences of the G-5 countries. 
Thacker’s (1999) seminal work on the Fund points to a strong correlation between 
politics and Fund lending. Stone’s (2006; 2008) contribution focuses on the formal and 
informal practices that distribute benefits and loans within the Fund. Some like Gould 
(2006) argue private creditors have unprecedented power over the Fund conditionality. 
The formal and informal procedures establish equilibrium and cooperation 
between powerful and weak states (Stone 2011). Regarding the institutional design of the 
Fund, major shareholder states have an interest in promoting polices such as trade 
openness and market orientated economic reforms (Stone 2011). Transparency is not a 
major consideration in the institutional design of the Fund. The Executive Board 
meetings, which approve funding for member states, are highly confidential in practice 
(Thacker 1999). The recent increase in transparency was due to criticism from emerging 
and low-income states (Gould 2006; Strand 2014). Another controversial example is the 
selection process for the Managing Director post. The European Union selects the 
59 
 
Managing Director of the Executive Board (Woods 2006). In return the U.S. appoints the 
president of the World Bank (Buira 2000; Strand 2014). The selection process is by 
informal conventions, but these informal conventions play an important role in the 
selection of the Fund’s Managing Director. Article XII offers little guidance over the 
selection of a Managing Director (Kahler 2001). The institutional design is created to 
avoid criticism of the major shareholders actions by not explicitly documenting the 
internal mechanisms of power manipulation of international institutions (Stone 2011).  
The Fund’s institutional design has been highly criticized for being a tool of US 
hegemonic power (Copelovitch 2010; Gould 2006). Stone (2008) argue the Fund utilizes 
the “informal governance” model for its institutional design. The model has four factors. 
The first factor is voluntary participation by strong and weak states to provide legitimacy 
for the international organization. The second factor is conditional delegation. The third 
factor concerns the conflicting short-term interests and mutual long-term interests 
between states. The fourth factor concerns the formal and informal governance of 
international organizations.   
The Fund utilizes these four pillars of institutional design because international 
organizations must have some legitimacy in order to encourage participation, facilitate 
collective action, coordinate expectations, and define rules (Stone 2008). Necessary to the 
success of international organizations is that non-powerful states must share in the 
distribution of benefits. The allocation of voting rights must be attractive enough for 
weak states to resist exiting the system (Stone 2008). Ironically, the allocation of voting 
rights does not define the distribution of decision-making power, because strong states 
can use informal influence to influence decisions. When powerful states choose not to 
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interfere, the formal rules and standard procedures distribute power for all states in the 
organization (Stone 2008).  
As a result, the Fund’s institutional design employs a two-track model called 
conditional delegation (Stone 2008). There are two methods of operation. The first is the 
ordinary times method. The second method is the short-term strategic interest method. 
During ordinary times there is no compelling interest for major shareholders, particularly 
the United States, to be involved with conditionality programs and decision-making rules 
(Stone 2008). The major shareholders have sufficient confidence in the technocratic 
ability of the Fund to allow the Fund to be autonomous in day-to-day operations. 
Conversely, short-term strategic interests, between system leaders and other countries, 
override any autonomy the Fund has established. The short-term strategic method is 
utilized when the core interests of the U.S. are affected. The process functions smoothly 
because other major shareholders concur that the United States acquires temporary 
control of the organization (Stone 2008).    
Informal practices and informal participation are necessary conditions required 
for the continuation of unequal power distribution and institutional design of the Fund 
(Stone 2008). For the case of the U.S. and its voting power within the Fund, the U.S. 
holds 17 percent of the voting power by acting as a minority shareholder analogous to the 
manner minority shareholders behave in publically held corporations. Minority 
shareholders control public corporations by informal participation. For the U.S. the two 
informal practices of the Fund that facilitate informal participation are voting unanimity 
and the centralization of information (Stone 2008).     
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Informal participation allows influential shareholders to manipulate the 
management proposals and set the formal agenda of the Managing Director (Stone 2008). 
This method is manipulative because the Managing Director has formal unprecedented 
proposal power and the Executive Board often votes in a unanimous or non-unanimous 
manner. It should be noted that the Managing Director leads the board meeting with an 
informal procedure called the “sense of the meeting” (Stone 2008). During the voting 
process amendments to country-lending items are not permitted because they are pre-
negotiated with government bureaucrats. For the Fund, the U.S. has an organizational 
advantage over other countries. The advantages consist of the diplomatic core service, 
private financial institutions, information gathering, issuing the international reserve 
currency, and the advantages of the Fund located in Washington, D.C. (Stone 2008). 
These factors influence informal participation.  
Centralized information increases the advantages of informal participation (Stone 
2008). Formal rules do not allow Executive Directors to participate in the negotiating 
process for loan programs. Information sharing regarding loan conditionality, 
confidential documents, and other information regarding member state loans is prohibited 
from Fund staffers to Executive Directors. As a result, Executive Directors cannot easily 
influence conditionality (Stone 2008). This does not mean that other factors do not 
influence decisions made by the Executive Directors. Stakeholders that influence the 
Board of Governors, Executive Directors, and Managing Director are the G7, G20, and 
G24 (IMF 2013). In early 2000s, the Fund claimed to be inclusive of civil society 
organizations by publishing a policy and procedure guide book for effective civil society 
organization participation (Strand 2014). The Fund promoted civil society organization 
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engagement as a symbol of transparency and participates in public consultations via 
policy forums (IMF 2013).       
Many members of the G20 hold seats on the Board of Governors and Executive 
Board of the Fund (Lombardi 2010). However, variation in loan conditionality begs the 
question, who or what informally influences loan conditionality? Fund approval for loans 
require a simple majority of Executive Board votes, the Board tries to avoid formal 
approvals on Fund lending decisions at all cost (Copelovitch 2010). Copelovitch argues 
this informal method of approving loans facilitates the interest of advanced industrialized 
countries on the Executive Board, the size and terms of the loans reflect the interest of the 
G5 countries. Controlling Fund lending decisions requires that the G5 countries secure 
three additional votes from Executive Directors from three wealthy countries. This type 
of cooperation is likely to occur because the interests of the G5, G7, and G10 countries 
often coincide with each other (Copelovitch 2010).            
A number of loan practices conducted by the Fund have raised criticisms 
regarding the legitimacy of loan conditionality and the application of political motives for 
loan approval. Three factors account for the latter. The first factor deals with borrowers 
who fail to comply with loan conditions, but continue to have easy access and receive 
additional loans. The second factor is that a country’s representative on the Executive 
Board is originally from the home government; representing the political interest of their 
domestic government. The third is the weighted voting system and decision making 
processed is inherently political and evolving special majorities help the major 
shareholders maintain influence. For example, the U.S. alone has veto power over many 
decisions (Thacker 1999). Thacker argues the Fund utilizes five economic requirements 
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for loans made to member states. First, the balance of payment position of a country is 
the starting baseline for determining the participation level of Fund programs. Put 
differently, if a country does not have a payment deficit problem it will not qualify for 
loan disbursement. Conversely, a balance of payment problem will facilitate Fund 
program participation. Second, many loans are distributed to member states regardless of 
the country’s overall debt position. Third, the per capita income of a country is not 
considered as a contributing factor for future economic growth. Fourth, poor credit 
ratings are not heavily weighted in the loan approval process. Lastly, policymakers have 
different interpretations about how the international political economy operates. 
According to Thacker, (1999) neo-Marxist advocate that capitalist in the core country 
dictate Fund policy at the expense of the periphery countries. The periphery countries 
will be more likely to access loans from the Fund in order to expand global capitalism. 
Political economists concerned with the influence of domestic politics on international 
policy argue that multinational corporations and other lobbies pressure U.S. government 
policymakers to protect their interests on the Executive Board (Thacker 1999).      
IMF scholars have produced political influence models to hypothesize why 
macroeconomic variables have little influence when loan conditionality is applied to 
relief seeking member states. These models include the political proximity model, 
political movement model, and the neutrality model (Thacker 1999). The political 
proximity model follows that the U.S. is more likely to influence the Fund to approve 
loans to countries aligned to the U.S. Conversely, the U.S. will influence the Fund to 
deny loans to anti U.S. countries like Vietnam (Thacker 1999). This model does not value 
the macroeconomic conditions of borrowing countries, but places more emphasis on the 
64 
 
foreign policy like-mindedness of borrowing countries. The latter can be measured by 
examining United Nations General Assembly voting records (Thacker 1999). 
United Nations and Fund Votes 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has a 15-member board, five 
permanent members and ten elected seats that serve a two-year term. The elected seats 
are highly competitive and yield handsome returns for the seat holder. Countries elected 
to the Security Council on average obtain a 54 percent increase in U.S. foreign aid and a 
seven percent increase in U.N. development aid (Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland 2009). The 
USNC mandate requires a majority of nine votes for important international security 
issues. Major shareholders seek to obtain unanimous votes because it reduces the cost of 
international campaigns, provides legitimacy for international causes, increases public 
support, and voting unanimity serves as insurance for countries who vote against the 
major shareholder (Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland 2009). UNSC members who vote 
against the U.S. are punished severely. Vreeland (2007) argues that Stone has 
successfully analyzed the connection between U.S. foreign aid and Fund punishment for 
non-compliance with conditions attached to Fund loans. For example, Russia was thought 
to be of strategic importance to the U.S. after the Cold War, as a result Russia received 
little to no punishment for non-compliance (Vreeland 2007).      
The evidence for rewarding friends and punishing enemies has been researched 
by Dreher and Vreeland (2011, 10). They hypothesize that “elected UNSC members that 
vote with the United States are more likely to participate in IMF programs, and they 
receive larger IMF loans; elected UNSC members that vote against the United States are 
less likely to participate in IMF programs, and they receive smaller loans” (Dreher and 
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Vreeland 2011). Two dependent variables are used for empirical testing. The first 
variable is the dichotomous indicator of participation in IMF programs. The second 
variable is the size of the Fund loan. The data covers the time period from 1954-2004 and 
122 out of 159 participating countries. The data set includes 1,656 country year 
observations under Fund programs out of a possible 4,694 general observations (Dreher 
and Vreeland 2011).  
The researchers produce four models. Model one explains United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) voting by UNSC members and their Fund participation for all 
Fund programs. Model two, UNSC voting practices and Fund participation for 
concessional Fund programs. Model three, UNSC voting practices and the size of the 
loan commitment in all Fund programs. Model four, UNSC voting and the size of the 
loan commitment for concessional loans (Dreher and Vreeland 2011).   
Model one is representative of all Fund programs. For the authors the data best 
reflects the hypothesis when the U.S. votes “yes.” Therefore, when a UNSC member 
votes “yes” Fund participation is highest for these members. Conversely, when the U.S. 
votes “no” Fund participation is highest for countries that vote against the U.S. and low 
participation rates for countries that vote “no”. In general, countries that vote “yes” on the 
UNSC usually have a higher rate of participation in Fund programs. Model one does not 
show a clear pattern of behavior. However, when the U.S. votes “no” countries on the 
UNSC who also vote “no” have a higher rate of Fund participation. Conversely, when the 
U.S. votes “yes” and other countries vote “no” these countries voting “no” have a lower 
Fund participation rate (Dreher and Vreeland 2011). For this purpose, participation 
applies to countries who obtain loans. Model one is focused on all Fund facilities, there is 
66 
 
no distinction between oil facilities or heavily or indebted countries (Dreher and Vreeland 
2011).  
Model two focuses on concessional Fund programs only. The concessional Fund 
programs are obtained by less powerful states and usually requires strict conditionality 
requirements for long-term reforms (Dreher and Vreeland 2011). The concessional loans 
are attached with concessional interest rates. Usually they are favored by poorer states. 
The second model provides a straightforward picture. Countries who vote “yes” or “no” 
matter as long as they vote in line with the U.S. These less powerful states are more 
likely to obtain Fund financing. For Dreher and Vreeland this descriptive evidence is 
highly favorable to their hypotheses.  
Models three and four both focus on the size of loan commitments. These models 
account for all fund programs including concessional lending. The results that emerge 
from these models support the author’s hypotheses. When a country votes “yes” or “no” 
as aligned with the U.S., these countries get the highest commitments in Fund lending. 
When a country votes in contrary to the U.S., these countries receive the lowest 
commitments from the Fund (Dreher and Vreeland 2011). Prior research does indicate 
that countries holding a UNSC seat are more likely to obtain Fund loans this may not be 
true for all UNSC seat holders. The latter depends if countries on the UNSC follow the 
voting pattern of the Fund’s largest shareholder, the U.S. (Dreher and Vreeland 2011). 
In 1992, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait took center stage at the United Nations. 
During this time Yemen voted against the U.S.-Iraq resolution in the UNSC, this is 
estimated to have cost Yemen 70 million in U.S. aid and Yemen failed to qualify for a 
Fund loan for six years (Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland 2009). Zimbabwe entered into a 
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Fund arrangement in 1992. During this time, Zimbabwe served on the UNSC, it failed to 
support one resolution against Iraq and Zimbabwe was threatened with strict 
conditionality for continued Fund loans. As a result, Zimbabwe supported 11 Security 
Council resolutions against Iraq (Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland 2009). In the case of 
Romania on the UNSC, Romania supported every US-supported resolution against Iraq. 
It then rescinded a generous loan package of 380.5 million SDRs, of which 318.1 million 
SDR was disbursed. Ecuador entered a Fund arrangement in 1991 and received 20 
million SDRs. Ecuador abstained on two resolutions and voted on 12 supporting the U.S. 
(Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland 2009). Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland estimate that UNSC 
temporary members received programs with 20 percent fewer conditions. UNSC 
members received 17 conditions while those not on the UNSC received 21 conditions. 
The main contribution these scholars find is that permanent members of the UNSC care 
about how countries vote in the UNSC and some developing countries are willing and 
able to acquiesce to the permanent members. This previous empirical research supports 
Steinwand and Stone’s (2007) as well as and Thacker’s (1999) argument of the “Doctrine 
of Economic Neutrality and Financial Programming Model” are seldom utilized as 
baseline measurements for loan decisions. Non-economic variables are closely associated 
with lending and conditionality. Many loans distributed by the Fund for the period of 
1952-1984 would not be justified on purely economic foundations (Thacker 1999, 47).     
The political movement model states the absolute political alignment of a country 
to the U.S. is important, equally as important is the movement away or toward the U.S. 
on international political issues (Thacker 1999). For example, when Hungary, 
Yugoslavia, and Romania became more ideologically connected to the U.S. they obtained 
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favorable Fund loans. During the Cold War, Zaire and the Philippines obtained loans by 
the Fund while never meeting the macroeconomic criteria for Fund assistance (Steinwand 
and Stone 2007). On the other hand, Poland and Czechoslovakia did not obtain Fund 
loans during the period when they were closely aligned to the Soviet Union (Thacker 
1999).  
The neutrality model emphasizes political realignment by forcing major 
shareholder to compete for political realignment by the developing country toward the 
position of the major lender (Thacker 1999). The borrower has a set ideology and will 
only move to a new equilibrium point that will generate sufficient aid to offset the 
domestic political cost incurred by an ideology shift. Political movements toward the 
U.S. increase the possibility of favorable loan conditionality (Thacker 1999).  
Due to the recent reforms, Fund conditionality requirements have become more 
transparent. The evidence concludes that Fund programs vary in degree of 
macroeconomic adjustments and structural reforms required (Steinwand and Stone 2007). 
Some borrowing countries must comply with macroeconomic performance goals. Other 
borrowing countries must comply with lower levels of economic freedom and more 
conditions. Yet other countries are only offered assistance based on strategic international 
benefits to major shareholders (Steinwand and Stone 2007). 
Theoretical Approach to The Institutional Design 
As described above, several factors contribute to the institutional design of the 
Fund. For example, loan conditionality, informal governance practices, and decision 
making rules are factors that have shaped the role of the Fund since its creation. It is 
important to examine what theoretical models have influenced the Fund’s institutional 
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design, international behavior and decision making processes. Copelovitch (2010) argues 
that when it comes to loan conditionality and variation the Fund utilizes the principal-
agent paradigm focusing on “common agency” framework. Common agency states that 
the G5 countries have de facto control over the Executive Board and the preference 
heterogeneity of the G5 will determine the variations and conditions of the loan. 
Steinwand and Stone (2007) argue recent research is moving from economic forecasting 
models to theoretically guided political economy models that utilize domestic politics and 
international strategic factors.       
In order to be able to assign a theoretical model to international organizations, the 
purposes they serve must be examined (Steinwand and Stone 2007). Three major theories 
have dominated the debate: functionalism, structuralism, and public choice. 
Functionalism has been associated with collective action and cooperation as 
preconditions to resolving problems and political and economic failures (Steinwand and 
Stone 2007). The transaction cost, and enforcement variables derived from this 
perspective are used in the Fund’s institutional design.  
Public choice advocates argue the goal of international officials is to increase their 
power, international organization skills, and prevent domestic political damage to the 
elected officials in their home countries. Much of this perspective is based around 
individual of decision-making at the staff level, private actors, lenders, and borrowing 
states (Gould 2006; Steinwand and Stone 2007). These international organizations are 
blamed for the failures of neoliberal market reforms imposed on emerging and low-
income economies (Steinwand and Stone 2007).  
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The structural view emphasizes that states have different national interests and 
power capabilities. International conflict is natural for international politics. States have 
different interests that run contradictory to each other. Many times this conflict is 
between rich states that are strong and poor states that are weak. The structural view 
emphasizes that international organizations are created by powerful states to serve their 
interests. On many occasions, weaker states suffer the negative consequences of being 
associated with international organizations. The case of European over-representation 
over the BRICS can be viewed as a negative consequence of Fund membership. The 
international relations paradigm that best fits the institutional design of the Fund can be 
viewed as the structural paradigm that is derived from neorealism. Stone and Steinwand 
(2007) acknowledge the structural model has its flaws because of the potential 
interpretation as Marxist or realist. However, the utilization of power can be 
demonstrated in the United Nations Security Council voting records and loan 
conditionality. Also, Leech (2002) refers to the Coleman method of power analysis to 
explain the importance of power in voting systems. Furthermore, it is fundamental to 
acknowledge the relative power of each member and the absolute power the member has 
within the voting system (Strand and Rapkin 2005). In the case of the Fund, empirical 
research has attempted to explain which states benefit and which states are held to 
different standards for the distribution of Fund loans, conditionality, and Fund 
surveillance (Steinwand and Stone 2007). 
Conclusion 
The internal governance policies and institutional design of the Fund have 
facilitated the Fund’s role in global governance. The Fund has become the most powerful 
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international institution (Copelovitch 2013). Consequently, the nature of its internal 
governance has fostered harsh criticism. On many occasions the Fund has lost legitimacy 
among emerging and low-income economies. These critics argue the Fund is a tool of 
American hegemonic power (Copelovitch 2010; Woods 2006). Additionally, the scope 
and timing of Fund’s assistance is not always effective. Much of the current IMF 
literature points to three main conclusions. First, borrowing countries with foreign policy 
preferences that aligned to major shareholders obtain more Fund loans. Second, domestic 
political factors have a role in determining participation in Fund programs. Third, the 
Fund and borrowers have different motives for Fund participation, though these motives 
are hard to establish empirically (Steinwand and Stone 2007). Other scholars argue that 
functionalist and public choice theories still apply to the institutional design of the Fund. 
Based on the Fund’s original intent, shrewd architects, and Articles of Agreement the 
Fund’s institutional design was organized around the structuralism paradigm to promote a 
zero-sum environment and reflected the international power politics of a self-help 
international system.    
The institutional design of the Fund is inherently political. Borro and Lee (2005) 
conclude the Fund to be a bureaucratic and political organization. Three factors explain 
Fund lending. First, loan approval and the size of the loan depend on the borrowing 
country’s quota share, the larger the share, the larger the loan. Second, how many 
nationals does the borrowing country have on the Fund payroll? This will influence the 
probability of acquiring a loan. Lastly, a borrowing country’s political and economic 
connections to the U.S. and major Europe countries will influence loan conditionality. 
Finally, quota shares are inherently political. The reallocation of quota shares in the Fund 
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has created much discord between members. Two example of discord are China’s entry 
into the Fund and Russia assuming the preliminary Soviet seat at the end of the Cold 
War. The next chapter will explore the national strategies of China and Russia in 
assuming an equitable role in the Fund. These two turning points shifted the balance of 
power within the Fund and marked significant changes in the future of the international 
financial architecture that was unforeseen by the Fund.   
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CHAPTER 4 
CHINA AND RUSSA BALANCE OF POWER ADJUSTMENTS 
Chapter four focuses on significant cases of discord and reform regarding Fund 
governance to the end of the Cold War. Namely, this chapter will explore China’s entry 
to the Fund and Russia assuming the Soviet seat at the end of the Cold War. Both cases 
marked significant turning points in the International Monetary Fund. For example, the 
Fund achieved nearly universal membership and experienced changes in its institutional 
design. More generally there were adjustments in the balance of power within the Fund.  
The first case study will deal with the People’s Republic of China (Mainland 
China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan). The first section will highlight a brief 
historical account of the ROC and international organizations. The second section will 
highlight the beginning of the PRC’s rise. Section three will examine the discord between 
the ROC and PRC regarding Fund negotiations for the PRC’s representation.  
The second case study will concentrate on Russia assuming the Soviet seat during 
the early 1990s. By Russia assuming the Soviet seat in the Fund a door was opened for 
another 14 countries to gain membership (Boughton 2012; Stone 2002). This 
accomplishment shifted the institutional design of the Fund and presented challenges and 
successes for the Fund. For example Stone (2002) and Sachs (1993) argue that Poland 
was a successful case of a transitional economy, while Russia was a clear failure. The 
first section will account for the parties that opposed the Soviet Union’s membership in 
the Fund. The second section will analyze internal documents to account for discord 
amongst Executive Directors, Fund staff, and the power politics of Fund membership.     
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China, Taiwan and International Organizations 
Beginning in 1945, the China’s Nationalist Party established its sovereignty 
utilizing the name the Republic of China (ROC). For example, in October of 1947, 
Taiwan signed the agreement to enter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Taiwan was one of 23 original contracting parties to the GATT (Feng 1988). 
Also, the ROC was one of the founding members of the United Nations. In 1949, the 
ROC was defeated by forces that became the communist People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and was forced to retreat to the island of Taiwan. 
Beginning in 1949, the ROC on Taiwan initiated reforms to achieve 
unprecedented economic growth. However, it faced two major challenges, the sudden 
increase in population and rising military expenses (Lin and Myers 1994). Inflation was 
high and per capita GNP was measured at 50 US dollars. As a result of a decade of 
structural reforms, between 1952 and 1960 the GNP growth rate was 7.5 percent. 
Between 1960 and 1970, GNP grew at an average rate of 9.6 percent and between 1970 
to 1980 GNP grew at 7.8 percent (Lin and Meyers 1994). Taiwanese policymakers 
understood that to develop, international cooperation was essential to the future of 
economic growth. Taiwan liberalized export policies and increased access to international 
markets. Also, rapid growth was accompanied by international responsibility and Taiwan 
was willing to establish a foreign policy doctrine for integration and cooperation in the 
global economy (Lin and Meyers 1994).     
From 1951 to 1960 Taiwan continued to hold a United Nations seat (Feng 1998; 
Hickey 1997). The ROC and its allies successfully blocked the PRC from occupying the 
UN seat on the premise that the PRC was not a peaceful state (Hickey 1997). In 1965, 
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nine communist and neutral countries asked the General Assembly to seat the PRC as the 
representative for mainland China. These countries consisted of Albania, Algeria, 
Burundi, Cambodia, the Congo, Cuba, Ghanna, Mali, and Romania. In November of 
1965, the U.S. and eight other countries opposed the resolution by communist countries. 
The U.S. and its allies submitted a resolution that a two-thirds voting majority was 
needed to expel Taiwan from the UN (Besser 1965). Taiwan’s allies consisted of 
Australia, Brazil, Columbia, Gabon, Italy, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand. In 1970, 
the PRC was gaining more support from the international community for the UN seat 
Canada and several African countries supported the PRC for a UN seat (Bundy 1970). In 
October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly voted 76 to 35 in favor of seating 
the PRC. There were 17 abstentions. This historic vote ended the 22 year battle over who 
would represent China at the UN (Shannon 1971). During this same time period, the 
Secretary General of the United Nations issued a text cable, Resolution 2758 (XXVI), to 
the Fund informing the Executive Board that all rights and privileges were restored to the 
People’s Republic of China and recognizing its government representatives as the only 
legitimate representatives of China in the United Nations and expelled the ROC’s 
representatives from the United Nations (IMF 1973a).    
The World Bank representation issue for China was not as confrontational as at 
the United Nations. Beginning in 1960, Taiwan’s relative quota and subscription size 
declined. As a result, Taiwan lost the right to appoint a Director to the Executive Board 
of the World Bank (Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999). In 1974 the PRC informed the 
United Nations that Taiwan should be expelled from all international institutions 
associated with the UN; and specifically, the World Bank. In response the World Bank 
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sent official correspondence to Beijing inquiring about future membership, 
representation, and the negotiating process. The PRC declined to answer the 
correspondence (Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999; Lynch 1974). In 1980, the PRC and 
World Bank negotiations concentrated on the issue of Taiwan needing to be expelled 
from the World Bank (Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999). Taiwan did not intensely oppose 
the World Bank decision. The World Bank would have to stop all forms of assistance to 
the ROC. On May 15, 1980 the Executive Board of the World Bank approved the 
People’s Republic of China as the sole representative of China in the World Bank 
(Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999; Rowen 1980).     
The International Monetary Fund and Taiwan experienced an efficient 
institutional relationship. Based on internal documents, the Fund granted Taiwan active 
support regarding technical assistance. The Fund also praised Taiwanese officials for 
steps adopted to establish a par value policy and continued reforms for eliminating trade 
restrictions (IMF 1974). In 1970, the Fund dispatched staffers from the Central Banking 
Service department to assist the ROC in modernizing its Central Banking Law. Two 
banking issues were addressed. The first issue involved assistance with revising 
legislation that would modernize the exchange system. The second issue related to the 
preparation of a policy and procedure manual for the Taiwanese Central Bank. The 
mission lasted three weeks and took place the first week of March (IMF 1974). During 
this time, Taiwan was receiving support from the U.S. In 1972, the U.S. urged Japan to 
support the Taiwanese government in continuing its membership in the Fund and World 
Bank even if Japan was forced to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan in order to 
establish normal relations with China (Harrison 1972). Additionally, in November of 
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1978, the Fund continued to send staffers to Taiwan on technical missions. Staffers 
assisted Taiwanese officials regarding exchange control and exchange market matters 
(IMF 1973a).   
The PRC’s Rise and Discord at the Fund 
The PRC’s rise in the international political arena has been a fascinating subject 
for many scholars, policymakers, and international organization bureaucrats. Beginning 
in the early 1970s, China began slowly but systematically engage international 
institutions. Beginning in the 1960s China established economic contacts with Japan. 
China began to benefit from participation in the global economy with the U.S., Western 
Europe, and Japan (Hudson 1997). This led to a series of domestic macroeconomic and 
structural adjustments. At this point, China began to shift its ideological position toward 
international organizations. By 1980, the PRC had more than a fifth of the world’s 
population, its GNP was the eighth largest, and it gained admission into the United 
Nations, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Jacobson and Oksenberg 
1990).  
The membership process with the Fund was not without disagreement. Two issues 
concerned the People’s Republic of China. The first issue was over who would represent 
China in international institutions. The second issue was over the actual quota allocation 
for a new member state (Boughton 2001; Jacobsen and Okensberg 1990). Developments 
within the Fund intensified the discord regarding Taiwan among member states. For 
example, in August of 1950, Chau Enlai Minister of Foreign Affairs for the PRC sent a 
cable to the Managing Director requesting the ROC not be allowed to participate in the 
1950 Paris meeting and the PRC be recognized as the only legitimate voice of China 
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(IMF 1973a). This was followed by the Czechoslovakian delegation submitting a draft 
resolution supporting the PRC and requesting the expulsion of Taiwan by the September 
6, 1950 meeting in Paris (Assetto 1988).  
Consequently, the Czechoslovakian resolution led to a number of Governors to 
voice their opposition to the resolution. For example, directors for the ROC, the U.S., and 
the Philippines voted against the resolution. Czechoslovakia, India, and Yugoslavia voted 
for the resolution. The resolution was voted down by a show of hands (IMF 1973a). In 
1951, the membership of the Fund voted to indefinitely postpone the issue. The vote was 
43 to 3 in favor of tabling the issue (Assetto 1988). Czechoslovakia pressed the PRC 
issue until it was expelled from the Fund in 1954 for not following membership rules. 
The period of PRC non-involvement with the Fund would last until 1971(Jacobsen and 
Okensberg 1999). The ROC, de facto, held the Fund seat for China.  
The major opening for the PRC came with admission into the United Nations in 
1971. The PRC utilized this opportunity to monitor global economic affairs (IMF 1973a; 
Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990). Ironically, in 1971 a week before the UN voted to expel 
Taiwan, the ROC withdrew 59.9 million in hard currency from the Fund. Many 
international observers viewed this action as a protective measure (Rowen 1971). As a 
result of the landmark decision, China began to be receptive toward membership in the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and GATT (Boughton 2001; Hudson 1997; 
Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999). 
On September 24, 1972, Taiwan expressed concerns over a possible expulsion 
from the Fund and the World Bank. Taiwanese officials worried about the possible 
financial consequences from expulsion from the two financial institutions. They worried 
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about the ROC’s borrowing ability, international confidence in the Taiwanese economy, 
and the future disbursement of 100 million dollars in development loans from the World 
Bank (New York Times 1972).  
On September 24, 1973, the PRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chi Peng-Fei, 
issued a formal letter to the Fund managing director. Chi Peng-Fei specifically argued 
that China was a founding member of the Fund, that for 20 years the seat was illegally 
held by Taiwan, and that the seat should be returned to the PRC. The Fund responded by 
assuring the PRC that the matter would be examined by the Executive Directors of the 
Fund. Due to the legal complications an immediate response would not be issued (IMF 
1973b; Rowen 1973). Fund documents reveal that Chi Peng-Fei utilized the UN General 
Assembly Resolution 2758 as legitimacy for his claim. Fund document EBM/73/317 
states the following.  
On October 25, 1971, the U.N. General Assembly adopted at its 26
th
 
Session Resolution 2758 (XXVI), in which it was explicitly resolved to 
restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the 
representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of 
China to the United Nations, and expel forthwith the representatives of 
Chiang Kai-Shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the 
United Nations and all the organizations related to it. (IMF 1973b). 
During this time frame, the Fund invited the PRC to the United Nations to 
discuss the possibility of the PRC assuming the obligations and rights 
associated with Fund membership. A November 2, 1973 meeting, 
however, failed to resolve the issue of representation (Boughton 2001).   
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In 1976 the Fund was faced with a decision to establish a Trust Fund facility for 
developing countries. The Trust Fund would be financed by selling 25 million ounces of 
the Fund’s gold stock from 1976 to 1980 (Boughton 2001). This decision would force the 
PRC to move on its decision to seek membership because the gold sales raised the 
contentious issue of who would claim property rights and financial benefits from the 
sales (Hudson 1997; Jacobsen and Okensberg 1990). On September 30, 1976 the 
President of the People’s Bank of China transmitted a cable to the Fund affirming the 
1973 request for the expulsion of Taiwan. More importantly, the cable was to 
communicate that all rights, assets, and interests in the Fund belonged to the PRC. The 
state bank of China had the lawful right to deal with quotas, assets, and interests within 
the Fund (IMF 1976a). Ultimately, the official communication was to oppose the 
Taiwanese claims for the gold, property, rights, and obligations in the Fund (Jacobsen 
and Okensberg 1990). It should be noted that in previous correspondences to the Fund, 
the PRC failed to make clear its full intentions of joining the Fund (IMF 1977). 
The Fund responded to the PRC’s September 30, 1976 correspondence regarding 
the gold sales. It was communicated to the PRC that the Trust Fund and restitution of 
gold were not governed by the provisions of the Articles of Agreement. Any decision 
about the restitution of gold would be based on principle and not an arbitrary exercise of 
discretion (IMF 1976b). Additionally, the Executive Board recognized the ROC as the 
government of China and dismissed the claim by the PRC. The PRC did not meet a prima 
facie legal standard to deprive the ROC of the gold. The PRC had not expressed interest 
to be the representative of China in the Fund and there was little justification to withhold 
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gold to another member state based on an expectation that another government would be 
recognized in the future (IMF 1976b).  
In 1977 the Fund attempted to find a solution that would be beneficial to all 
parties involved in the gold restitution dispute. The Fund continued to argue the PRC did 
not have a claim to the gold. However, the gold dispute would be postponed in order to 
give the PRC an opportunity to formally express its intention to join the Fund. If by April 
1, 1977 the PRC did not respond with an explicit claim to join the Fund and assume the 
rights and obligations granted to member states by the Articles of Agreement then the 
first arrangement for the restitution of the gold to the ROC would be completed (IMF 
1977; Rowen 1977). During the late 1970s, Romania and Yugoslavia, the only nonmarket 
economies in the Fund, encouraged China to enter the Fund (Jacobsen and Okensberg 
1999). 
In 1979, the ROC delegation accepted its fate and worked to make the transition 
process amicable for all parties. Negotiations for the gold tranche that the ROC had not 
repaid resumed. Ultimately, the solution was for the ROC to repay its debt to the Fund 
and repurchase the gold (Boughton 2001; Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999). On April 14, 
1980 the Executive Board decided to return 470,708 ounces of gold and two purchases of 
SDR 77,632,715 and SDR 30,002,772 to Taiwan (IMF 1980a). Cooper (1981) argues 
Taiwan’s financial position was strong and not hurt by the expulsion from the Fund. 
Consequently, Taiwan walked away with an 81 million dollar bonus.   
The second problematic issue regarded voting power. If China agreed to enter the 
Fund it would only receive 1.68 percent of all the votes in the Fund as China would 
inherit the voting share of Taiwan (Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999). This was 
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unacceptable for China. The PRC’s goal in joining the Fund was to promote its long-term 
foreign policy goals and the small quota did not reflect China’s economic weight in the 
global economy (Boughton 2001; Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999).  
The Fund conducted several years of research planning for China’s entry. The 
Fund created a China desk, used CIA intelligence data and World Bank data to create an 
entrance policy for China. Also, Fund staffers were sent to China for entrance 
negotiations (Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990). Negotiation focused on the issue of 
Taiwan, voting power, the fate of the gold deposited by China, and the rights and 
obligations of Fund members under the Articles (Hudson 1997).  
In 1980 the PRC was admitted into the International Monetary Fund with little 
opposition. As a result, China became eligible for development loans, gained legitimacy 
as a member of the international community, gained access to exercise all rights and 
obligations, and became eligible for Special Drawing Rights (IMF 1980b; The New York 
Times 1980, D1).  
In 1944 the original quota for China was SDR of 550 million. On August 5, 1980, 
China used the influence of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Quota for China to request an 
increase in quota shares to commensurate its economic power, an additional 650 million 
SDR, totaling 1.2 million SDR (IMF 1980c). Chairman Jacques de Groote of the Ad Hoc 
committee on China’s Request for an Increase in Quota delivered a special report to the 
Executive Board recommending the quota increase and an additional increase totaling 1.8 
SDR. The report utilized a condition that China submit full payment no later than 
September 26, 1980 (IMF 1980c). In November of 1980 the Board of Governors honored 
a seventh quota retroactive adjustment and the quota was set to SDR 1.8 billion (IMF 
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1980c; Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990). In 1983, the Eighth General Quota Review set the 
quota at SDR 2.39 billion that translated into 18,250 votes and 2.82 percent of the total 
votes, ninth largest in the Fund (Hudson 1997; Jacobsen and Okensberg 1990). As a 
result of China’s growing economic power and voting weight the Executive Board was 
expanded from 21 to 22 seats to provide China a single constituent seat (Boughton 2001; 
Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999). Eventually the Executive Board would be expanded to 
24 seats to accommodate Saudi Arabia and Russia as the latter assumed a seat at the 
Fund.     
Russia’s Road to the Fund 
 In 1944 at the beginning of the Bretton Woods conference the Soviet Union was 
undecided about participation in the Fund. Participation in the Fund would have required 
the Soviet Union to meet conditionality requirements. The Soviet Union negotiated for 
four goals at the Bretton Woods conference: special consideration for state-trading 
nations and countries badly damaged by WW II, the size of quotas, status of deposits and 
gold reserves, and the type of information needed to be provided to the Fund (Assetto 
1988). For the Soviets, the disclosure of information was the most sensitive issue at hand. 
Ultimately, the USSR would only commit to seven out of 12 requirements outlined in the 
Article VII (Assetto 1988). It is assumed by most that disclosure of economic data by the 
Soviet Union would have exposed its economic weaknesses to the international 
community (Boughton 2012). As a result, from 1945 to 1985 the Soviet Union was not 
given serious consideration for Fund membership. 
In 1985 the Mikhail Gorbachev regime began to consider economic reforms 
(Boughton 2001). The Soviets witnessed the economic successes that Hungary and 
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Poland experienced during the 1980s (Boughton 2001; Boughton 2012; Stone 2002). As 
a result, Soviet bureaucrats informally approached the Fund to inquire about the 
possibilities of obtaining membership. Unfortunately, they were not successful because 
the U.S. was still in opposition to the Soviets joining the Fund. Not until November of 
1988 did a Soviet working group visit Washington on an information gathering session. 
In 1989 Fund economists met with a mid-level Soviet delegation in Moscow to discuss 
and exchange information (Boughton 2012). During the information session officials 
never mentioned the possibility of the Soviet Union joining the Fund (Boughton 2012).     
During 1986 to 1989 the Soviet economy was near collapse and foreign debt 
skyrocketed from 30.7 billion to 53.8 billion (Gould-Davies and Woods 1999). The 
looming financial crisis did not influence the parties opposing Fund admission. Boughton 
(2012) argues that Soviet efforts to join the Fund were futile until the Soviets overcame 
opposition from the U.S. government. For example, in 1986 U.S. Congressman Jack F. 
Kemp formally opposed the Soviet Union from joining the Fund. He urged Treasury 
Secretary James A. Baker III to reject a bid from the Soviet Union on the basis that the 
Soviet Union had a record of aggression abroad and oppression at home (Rowen 1986a). 
On November 22, 1986 Treasury Secretary Baker responded in a letter to Kemp stating 
that the Reagan Administration would oppose any such move by the Soviet Union. 
Additionally, the U.S. would work within the Executive Boards of the IMF and the 
World Bank to prevent the Soviet Union from joining the two financial institutions 
(Rowen 1986b). In 1989 the U.S. continued to oppose Soviet efforts to join the Bretton 
Woods institutions. Treasury Secretary James Baker continued to oppose the Soviet 
Union, this time claiming the Soviet economic system was completely incompatible with 
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capitalism. Furthermore, Soviet membership could become disruptive and could pose a 
challenge for the market orientated IMF (Toth 1989).  
U.S. opposition to the Soviet Union would continue until mid-1990. On July 4, 
1990 the Bush administration received official correspondence from the Soviet Union 
requesting high level talks with members of the G7 countries regarding the transition to a 
market economy (Boughton 2012). Gorbachev was seeking support for his efforts to 
reverse the 71 years of economic isolation (Mcnamus 1989). At this time, the Fund 
organized a multi-jurisdictional group to study the Soviet economy. The study concluded 
with a number of ideas for reforms for the Soviet economy. 1990 was a pivotal year for 
the Soviet Union as 12 to 15 Soviet officials were designated “special invitees” and 
assigned Fund office space. For the duration of their time they were allowed to attend 
Fund sessions, but were not allowed access to Interim Committee meetings. The Bush 
Administration was not opposed to the special “invitees” designation (Rowen 1990).        
Gould-Davies and Woods (1999) argue the Fund took the opportunity to create a 
new role for itself in providing assistance for economies in transition. Since the demise of 
the Bretton Woods system the Fund no longer managed an exchange rate system. 
Beginning with the Latin America era of the 1980s the Fund increasingly served as lender 
of last resort and looked to expand its activities to the Soviet Bloc.   
Russia’s Special Association with the Fund 
As a result of a Fund study, in early 1991 the Special Association doctrine was 
placed on the agenda for Executive Board meeting discussions (IMF 1991c). Fund 
internal documents outlined the preconditions the Soviet Union needed to meet for the 
Special Association status to move forward. The preconditions discussed areas of advice 
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and technical assistance. More importantly the Fund formally informed the Soviet 
authorities that access to economic data on the Soviet economy was an important factor 
for approval of future membership (IMF 1991c). The Fund explained the Special 
Associate status as important to the Soviet Union because it would allow the Fund to 
work with the central government and at the request of individual Soviet republics to 
provide assistance (Chicago Tribune 1991).  
On October 8, 1991 the Fund and President Mikhail Gorbachev signed an 
agreement establishing a special association between the USSR and the Fund (IMF 
1991b). The special association consisted of cooperation between both parties where the 
Fund would provide reviews of the Soviet economy, technical assistance, educational 
courses, and Fund documents. It also allowed Soviet attendance at Fund meetings and 
gave favorable treatment to the republics of the Russian Federation. Under this agreement 
the Soviet Union would be mandated to provide financial information to the Fund and 
allow the Fund to establish a resident office in the Soviet Union. Moreover, Fund 
officials would have the privileges and immunities specified in Article IX of the Articles 
of Agreement. The Special Association would be terminated upon full membership or 
three months after a receipt of a written notice (IMF 1991b). On December, 27, 1991 the 
Fund received an official correspondence by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
requesting that the status of the Special Association be continued by the Russian 
Federation and the titled “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” should be deleted by the 
Fund. During the Executive Board meeting a number of concerns were raised about the 
legal implications for the Russian Federation and the Fund. In particular, paragraph six 
that provided a framework for the Fund to have access to the republics of the USSR The 
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Executive Directors concluded that the Board would consider the submitted request (IMF 
1991d).  
The Soviet Union’s membership application process was perplexing to many 
international observers, academics, and policymakers. During the July 1991 meeting of 
the G7 countries, President Gorbachev failed to disclose to the G7 that the Soviet Union 
had already applied for full membership with the Fund (Bradshers 1991). On July 23, 
1991 a press release was issued informing member states that the matter would be under 
consideration. The Soviet approach to full membership caused criticism by U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Nicholas F. Brady, who stated “we were completely surprised by their move, 
Soviet membership in the institution is not going to happen” (Bradshers 1991).                                  
On January 17, 1992 the Executive Board convened to approve two proposals for 
the Russian Federation. The first was to established the “Committee of the Whole on 
membership; and Former Republics of the U.S.S.R,” to study the criteria and the impact 
of Fund membership. The second was an interim arrangement that would allow the Fund 
to continue cooperation with the former Soviet Republics (IMF 1992b). The meeting was 
not without debate as many directors supported both proposals. However, during the 
meeting Executive Directors representing less developed countries like Brazil and 
Argentina brought forward and argued the quota calculation formula was of immediate 
urgency for the current members because the allocation of quotas to the new members 
would affect the current representation on the Executive Board (IMF 1992b). Woods 
(2006) has documented the major opposition by developing countries toward Russia’s 
admittance into the Fund. Developing countries argued that existing resources should not 
be transferred to Soviet Bloc at the expense of less developed countries.  
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In February of 1992 the Fund’s treasury department proposed quota calculations 
for the former Soviet Union republics (Momani 2007a). This was a difficult task because 
Soviet economic data could not be considered as valid. The difficulty arose from not 
being able to accurately measure the economic weight of each independent republic. 
Ultimately, the Fund staff recommended the same variables to be used for the Eighth 
General Review to determine the quota allocation. As a result, under the Eighth General 
Review data the IMF treasury staff proposed the former Soviet Union Republics as a 
whole should obtain 3.66 percent of Fund quotas. The Ninth General Review data 
proposed the quota allocation should be 3.19 percent (Momani 2007a). When the quotas 
were to be allocated to each republic, the Russian Federation would obtain 2.34 percent 
of quota allocations as it made up 61 to 66 percent of the Soviet economy (Momani 
2007a). The G7 Executive Directors were not satisfied by the 2.34 quota allocation for 
Russia. They recommended the staff to reconsider the quota allocation and reexamine the 
four quantitative factors: depreciated exchange rates, inter-republic trade, openness ratio, 
and the deprecation component of GDP used in calculating the former Soviet Union’s 
quota allocation (Momani 2007a).  
Reconsidering the variables used for quota allocation caused internal discord 
between the IMF Treasury staff and G7 Executive Directors. Treasury staff refused to 
change the formula for intra-republic trade and depreciation rates of GDP because the 
inconsistent data made it difficult to systematically apply the figures to quota calculations 
(Momani 2007a). After the Treasury staff adhered to the request of the Board, the quota 
allocation numbers still resulted in less then a three percent quota for Russia (Momani 
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2007a). As a result of Executive Director pressure the Fund treasury staff produced a 
quota allocation that satisfied the G7 Executive Directors. 
On March 24, 1992 H.R. Bill 4547 “Freedom For Russia and Emerging Eurasia 
Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992” was introduced in Congress. On 
April 1, 1992 the White House released a press release supporting the Freedom Support 
Act of 1992. The White House argued with the collapse of the Soviet Union the U.S. was 
in a position to assist Russia and Eurasia with democracy and open markets. The 
Freedom Support Act of 1992 provided a framework for the enhanced cooperation 
between the Soviet Republics and the U.S. As a result, business opportunities were 
created (IMF 1992c). On April 9, 1992 the Bush administration began a public relations 
campaign to gain public and Congressional support for the bill. The bill would be funded 
by a complex combination of credits, loans, and cash programs totaling three to four 
billion dollars. Congressional support was lukewarm for the bill. For instance, Senators 
Christopher Dodd and Jesse Helms publically criticized the White House for attempting 
to garner support for the bill (Friedman 1992). 
During the March 31, 1992 Executive Board meeting, the Managing Director 
praised the Russian Federation for implementing macroeconomic reforms and proceeded 
to comment on the quota calculation for Russia. The issue of quota calculations generated 
much debate. The main issue was the 22.5 percent adjustment that considered intra-
republic trade being applied to Russia. Executive Directors believed the quota calculation 
was a net adjustment that excluded inter-republic trade and included variables like the 
existing exchange rate and GDP figures. In a prior staff paper circulated to Executive 
Directors there was an implication that intra-republic trade was being calculated into the 
90 
 
formula. Some Directors argued the methodology for the quota calculation required 
clarification because an adjustment of 22.5 percent was being applied to Russia (IMF 
1991a). Hiroo Fukui, Executive Director representing Japan supported the view the 22.5 
percent adjustment was not based solely on intra-republic trade, the adjustment accounted 
for the exchange rate and GDP, but also included political factors (Momani 2007a; IMF 
1991a). The Executive Director Renato Filosa, who represented Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Poland, and Portugal, argued there was no need to recalculate the quota figures and the 
recommendation under the Ninth General Review should stand. Executive Director 
Posthumus who represented Yugoslavia, Netherlands, Romania, Cyprus, and Israel did 
not oppose an increase in quota as long as it was applied fairly to other members. In the 
end, the Eight Quota Review for SDR 2,876 and the Ninth Quota Review for SDR 4,313 
was provisionally approved (IMF 1992a).   
During this meeting, a Russian Federation delegation was present and claimed 
that it would be difficult for the Russian parliament to ratify the membership conditions if 
the Russian Federation did not obtain at least a three percent quota (IMF 1992a; Momani 
2007a). Furthermore, the Russian Federation was under the impression that the three 
percent quota was a symbol of support for difficult economic reforms implemented. The 
Russian delegation understood the quota calculation was based on an established Bretton 
Woods formula and political considerations may be taken into the quota allocation (IMF 
1992a). In March of 1992 the Executive Board took a vote and approved the quota 
allocation for Russia. On the day of the Executive Board vote, the Fund issued a press 
release acknowledging the three percent quota allocation for Russia. However, the Board 
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of Governors had not approved the quota prior to the press release. The press release was 
an uncommon move by the Fund (Momani 2007a).  
 While the Soviet Union never became a member of the Fund, the 15 republics 
under it guidance applied for full membership as well as former allies of the USSR 
(Boughton 2012). The three Baltic countries applied first: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
The U.S did not oppose the membership of the three Baltic countries as long as they 
complied with Fund criteria. However, an official speaking on the condition of 
anonymity stated the U.S. favored a special relationship for the Soviet Union in lieu of 
full membership with the Fund (New York Times 1991). On June 1, 1992 the Russia 
Federation became a member of the International Monetary Fund with a quota allocation 
of SDR 2,789 million and quota share of 3.0048 (IMF 1992a). At this time, the Fund’s 
membership totaled 165 countries and the Executive Board was expanded from 22 to 24 
seats to accommodate Russia and Saudi Arabia.   
Conclusion 
The Fund’s institutional design has changed over time in order to confront the 
challenges of a changing international economy. However, changes tend to generate 
cases of discord among member states and internal practices within the Fund. It is 
fundamental to the institutional design of the Fund that quota shares be reallocated when 
admitting new members and that states be concerned with preserving their power in the 
Fund. Essentially the Fund quota system means membership is a zero-sum-game. 
For China, admission to the Fund meant it was a step closer to the World Bank 
and other international financial institutions. China could now be seen as a global player 
in international politics and have access to the Fund’s data, technical assistance, and 
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training facilities (Boughton 2001). More importantly, it helped paved the way for 
China’s unprecedented economic growth and raised prospects of major changes in the 
institutional design of the Fund  
Russia’s road to the Fund was influenced by the Soviet Union and the global 
Group of Seven Countries (G7) (Momani 2007a). As a result, Russia obtained a seat on 
the powerful Executive Board. Executive Board seats are reserved for the most powerful 
world economies, but Russia was not a powerful economy. Momani (2007a) argues the 
executive seat for Russia was offered as a consolation prize for a lack of a Marshall Plan 
style post-Soviet collapse solution. Today, the Executive Board consists of 24 Executive 
Directors.  Based on these two case studies, Fund technocrats have attempted to apply 
economic and technical variables free of political factors in determining the quota 
allocation for potential member states. However, political influence has been the 
predominate factor deciding the final quota allocation and the position of the members in 
the Fund’s hierarchy. Both case studies account for the influence of power politics, the 
universal membership of the Fund, changes in the institutional design, and an evolving 
financial architecture for the future.    
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CHAPTER 5 
JAPAN, EUROPE, AND THE BRICS 
 Since the end of the Cold War, the Fund has experienced challenges to and 
changes in its institutional design. The decade of the 1990s witnessed impressive 
economic growth. World economic output in the 1990s was measured at 1.5 percent per 
capita higher than in the 1980s (Boughton 2012). In the 1980s and 1990s, Japan 
embarked on a mission to become a major stakeholder in the Bretton Woods system. 
Although Japan experienced a stagnant economy for much of the 1990s it was 
determined improve its position in the Fund. As the international monetary system 
experienced major changes, so too did the emerging economies. As a result, the BRICS 
experienced economic contractions and, eventually, impressive economic growth. As 
BRICS moved up in the global financial hierarchy they started to expect representation in 
the governance of the Fund commensurate with their economic strength. At the same 
time, European over-representation became an obstacle to a realignment of quota and 
voting shares.  
This chapter will focus on cases of discord and reform regarding Fund 
governance. The three areas of concern will be Japan’s role in the Fund beginning with 
the 1980s, European over-representation, and the changing role of the BRICS within the 
Fund. The next section will examine Japan’s strategic role for obtaining the number two 
position at the Fund and more generally, the important role it has in the Fund. The next 
section will focus on European over-representation on the Executive Board and in voting 
shares. The section will examine the possibility of a consolidated European Union seat 
and the implications for Fund governance and institutional design. The following section 
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will focus on the BRICS and how they are attempting to influence the governance model 
of the Fund. Also, the challenges and benefits do the BRICS create for the Fund.         
Japan’s Ascension in the Fund 
 Beginning in the 1980s, Japan sought a larger role in the International Monetary 
Fund; one that would be commensurate with Japan’s global economic position. Due to 
these efforts Japan increased its role in the decision making processes of the Fund 
(Rapkin and Strand 1996; Wan 2001). Japan overcame its institutional disadvantage in 
the Fund by negotiating with major economic powers to increase its financial 
contributions in order to obtain a larger quota share that would translate into more 
influence over the decision making process (Holroyd and Momani 2012;Wan 2001).  
Japan was admitted into the International Monetary Fund in 1952. For Japan 
membership meant greater acceptance by the international community and access to 
policy advice. By the 1960s, Japan implemented an international strategy of passivity in 
lieu of power politics. Japan was a rule taker instead of a rule maker (Wan 2001). In 
1957, Japan obtained a credit facility of 125 million and in 1967 another for 350 million 
from the Fund. By 1964, Japan hosted the Fund’s annual meeting; this was a symbol of 
Japan’s growing influence in the Fund. However, Japan continued to maintain a low 
profile in the Fund (Wan 2001). By 1970, Japan was the fifth largest vote holder in the 
Fund with a 4.25 percent voting share. Originally, Japan was allotted a Fund quota of 250 
million, the ninth largest shareholder with 2.86 percent of the voting power. By the mid 
1960s, Japan ranked seventh in the Fund hierarchy with a 3.44 percent voting share (Wan 
2001). In 1970, Japan was given its own seat on the prestigious Executive Board, 
replacing India (Holroyd and Momani 2012).  
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Beginning in the early 1980s, Japan was making major financial contributions to 
the Fund, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank (Wan 2001). As a result, Japan 
began to compete with other member states for benefits, voting weight, and agenda 
setting influence. Japanese officials were not as focused on influencing policy formation. 
The main Japanese goal was to accumulate a greater voting share (Wan 2001). By the 
1980s, Japan was a major economy. Japan’s per capita GDP was only 31 percent below 
that of the U.S. (Hamada, Kashyap, and Weinstein 2011). In 1980, Japanese GDP was 
estimated at 1.1 US trillion dollars (World Bank 2013).   
Japan occupied a stakeholder position in the Fund. As the Executive Director 
representing France acknowledged, Japan’s impressive economic performance and 
macroeconomic adjustment deserved high praise. However, growing Japanese influence 
presented a problem (Boughton 2001). During this period, the Fund was in dire need of 
more capital as its loan commitments exceeded the capital reserves on hand. West 
Germany, Japan, Britain, Switzerland, and Saudi Arabia considered assisting the Fund 
(Farnsworth 1983). Ultimately, the Fund entered into four promissory note arrangements. 
The four entities providing capital to the Fund were the Bank of International Settlements 
for an amount of SDR 2,505 and the Bank of Japan for an amount of SDR 375 million. 
Also, the National Bank of Belgium and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency contributed 
to assist the Fund (IMF 1984a; IMF 1984b). Consequently, the Executive Board 
approved a new loan facility on April 24, 1984.  
During 1986, the global economy was tumultuous and many member states still 
experienced balance of payment problems. At this time, the Fund became worried about 
its liquidity position. In November 1986 Japan extended a loan offer to the Fund in the 
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amount of SDR three billion (IMF 1986b). On December 1986, the Fund issued a press 
release explaining the details of the borrowing agreement. The Fund agreed to borrow 
SDR three billion from Japan with a total of six years to draw the funds (IMF 1986a).  
The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) was established to provide 
temporary financing for countries with balance of payment difficulties. Managing 
Director Michel Camdessus proposed the new facility and in June of 1987 the facility 
was endorsed by the G7 economic summit in Venice (Pearson and Lachia 1987; Wan 
2001). In March of 1988, the proposed borrowing agreement conditions were created 
where the Fund would borrow from the Export-Import Bank of Japan. The amount would 
be up to SDR 2.2 billion with an option of an increase to SDR 2.5 billion. On April 4, 
1988 the agreement was approved by the Fund (IMF 1988c). Overall, Japan was the 
largest contributor to the original Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility and continued 
to contribute to the enlargement of the facility in 1994. Japan committed 447 SDR 
million in grants and 2,200 SDR million in loans prior to 1994 (Wan 2001).       
             As a result of these large financial contributions, by the late 1980s Japan began to 
bargain for a larger percentage of voting shares in the Fund. Japan was determined not to 
engage in more burden sharing without added representation and voice on the Executive 
Board and within management (Rapkin et al. 1997). Japanese Finance Ministry officials 
indicated that Japan would attempt to seek a quota boost of at least eight percent from the 
then current 4.7 percent quota (The Wall Street Journal 1988). Japanese officials 
publically and privately disclosed they were unhappy with Japan’s position in the Fund 
and Japan was seeking to occupy the second placed position in the Fund’s hierarchy 
(Atlas 1989). These officials made a compelling argument as to why quota shares should 
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reflect relative world economic weight. Japanese officials argued that Japan surpassed the 
U.S. as the world’s largest provider of foreign aid and that Japan was providing program 
assistance for middle income countries (Farnsworth 1989). On March 21, 1988 at an 
Executive Board meeting the Executive Director for Japan expressed that Japan was 
committed to assisting international financial institutions and the Fund would remain a 
priority for Japan. Japanese officials noted that a growing discontent in Japan toward its 
quota share could become a potential obstacle for future financial contributions (IMF 
1988a; 1988b). In sum, Japan was disappointed its voting share in the Fund was not 
commensurate with its number two position in the world economy.  
The U.S. opposed Japan’s quota increase by arguing that no increase in Fund 
capital was needed and that the U.S. Congress would not approve additional financial 
contributions by the U.S. Also, four billion dollars of unpaid overdue loan payments had 
not been paid by the Fund’s poorest members. The U.S. position on this issue created an 
additional obstacle for Japan. Eventually, the U.S. accepted Japan’s request for an 
increased voting share (Rapkin et al. 1997). As a result, the Interim Committee agreed to 
increase the quota share. Japan would move up in position and this would cause other 
member states to lose their respective positions in the Fund’s hierarchy (IMF Ninth 
General Review of Quotas Data). British Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, publically 
acknowledged Japan should be the second largest shareholder. This realignment, 
however, bruised some European egos (Atlas 1989). Britain and France opposed Japan’s 
increase in voting share since they would be ranked below Japan (Rapkin et al. 1997). 
Due to France having a larger economy than the United Kingdom, France would not 
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accept a lower ranking position than the United Kingdom. As a result, France and Britain 
settled for 5.48 percent of the total voting share (Rapkin et al. 1997).     
While France and Britain disagreed about rank ordering, the West German 
Finance Minister utilized an Olympic analogy to describe the future ranking order. The 
U.S. would be unopposed and granted the gold medal. Germany would not be opposed to 
sharing the silver medal with Japan, if Japan deemed it appropriate, and two bronze 
medals would be awarded to France and Britain (Atlas 1989). The Ninth General Review 
of Quotas increased Japan’s share in the Fund from 4.7 percent to 6.1 percent of the total 
Fund shares. Japan would increase it voting share to the number two position, sharing 
second place with Germany. For Japan this was a step up from position when it was 
number five (Rapkin et al. 1997; Wan 2001). While Japan had a voting share of 4.7 
percent, Japan was responsible for 4,223 billion SDRs. At this time, Japan’s total GDP 
was 3.0 trillion, trade accounted for 19.0 percent of total GDP, total reserves were 93.7 
billion, and its national product in PPP terms was 25,208 per capita (World Bank 2013). 
Holroyd and Momani (2012) argue that political and economic influence in the Fund is a 
zero-sum game. When one member gets a larger quota it is at the expense of other 
members and that no mutual benefits to quota realignment exist.   
During the 1990s, Japan continued to support the Fund. During the extension of 
the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Japan contributed SDR 2,150 million. In 
1994 Japan was given one of three Deputy Managing Director positions (Holroyd and 
Momani 2012). In the mid-1990s Japan experienced an economic slowdown. In 1997 
Japanese officials implemented policy reforms to restructure the banking system with 
added regulations and oversight (Holroyd and Momani 2012). 
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During this time, Japan was number two at the Fund and expressed its criticism 
and support for the U.S. when appropriate (Wan 2001). For example, during the Asian 
Financial Crisis Japan had a vested interest in assuring the regional economy would not 
collapse because of investment and external payments owed to Japanese firms and the 
fear of potential financial contagion to other Asian economies (Lincoln 2004; Wan 2001). 
Japan was disappointed with the response from the Fund and the U.S. during the Asian 
Financial Crisis. Asian countries requested assistance from the Fund in shoring up 
liquidity problems. The Fund argued the Asian crisis was a result of structural 
deficiencies and demanded intrusive conditionality requirements (Fisher 2001; Holroyd 
and Momani 2012; Katz 1999). Holroyd and Momani (2012) argue that Japan’s 
relationship with the Fund has been tumultuous, particularly since the Asian Financial 
Crisis. Despite prior discord with the Fund, Japan was willing to continue its stakeholder 
and financier role during the global financial crisis that began in 2008.       
The Asian Financial Crisis occurred in the late 1990s. Asian countries, 
policymakers, and scholars have been dissatisfied by the Fund’s response to the regional 
crisis. Feldstein (1998) argues the Fund failed to advocate for measures to correct the 
balance of payment problems East Asian economies were experiencing. The Fund 
focused on domestic structural reforms instead of balance of payment policies. The Fund 
applied the same reforms used in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Feldstein 
1998). Japan’s frustration over the Fund’s response to the AFC and the U.S. and Asian 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) response to the crisis motivated Japan to propose 
an Asian Monetary Fund (Rapkin 2001). During a World Bank and IMF meeting, Japan 
proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund with pledges of 100 billion from Japan 
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and other Asian countries. The U.S. and other Asian countries discouraged the proposal 
for fear of a potential threat to American hegemony in the region (Lincoln 2004).  This 
regional facility would have the power to assign and distribute pre-committed financial 
packages to its members in the case of financial emergencies (Rapkin 2001). The AMF 
would be a regional alternative to the Fund. This idea was quickly castigated by the Fund 
and the U.S. Treasury department. Japan had an interest in creating the AMF. First, Japan 
was highly exposed to regional financial contagion because of strong economic ties to 
Thailand. Second, Japan was the largest source of FDI into Thailand. Third, the AMF 
proposal was generated because of financial preference divergence between the U.S. and 
Japan and the U.S. domination of the Fund (Lipscy 2003).             
        During the global financial crisis of the 2008-2009 Japan demonstrated global 
leadership in responding to stabilize the global economy and financially assisting the 
Fund with a 100 billion loan (Grimes 2009). Prime Minister Taro Aso pledged the 
contribution as an interim measure before the G20 summit in Washington as a symbol of 
global leadership. The Fund was in dire financial straights as it only had 200 US billion 
available to lend troubled member states (Holroyd and Momani 2012).  
What took scholars by surprised is that Japan allocated the 100 billion dollar loan 
to the Fund without preconditions or increase in quota (Holroyd and Momani 2012). This 
was a politically conscious move by Japan due to the zero-sum game approach to quota 
reallocation in the Fund. Three reasons account for Japan’s contribution to the Fund. 
First, Japan’s foreign policy has an element of responsibility to the international political 
economy. Second, Japanese policymakers prefer to utilize the Fund as a scapegoat for 
domestic reform policies. Policymakers can blame the Fund for the domestic economic, 
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political, or social problems that may develop due to structural reforms. Lastly, Japan’s 
contribution is viewed as a safe investment that will not create costly domestic political 
cleavages (Holroyd and Momani 2012). Japan’s ongoing role in the Fund since the 1980s 
has been one of a major stakeholder by providing financing to the Fund in times of need. 
During this time, Japan implemented a strategy of passivity while taking advantage of the 
Fund’s economic weakness when it could. Japan gradually raised its profile, increased its 
voting share, and changed its rank order of the Fund to the number two position. While 
Japan was growing in influence this was not the same for emerging economies like the 
BRICS and Japan’s growing influence caused discord among the over-represented 
European countries.    
European Over-Representation 
 With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992, the Fund increased its 
membership to an almost universal level. The Executive Board was expanded to 
accommodate 24 Executive Directors. For most observers, is undeniable that Europe is 
over-represented on the Executive Board. The two main issues regarding European over-
representation are the assignment of Executive Board seats and voting weights (Truman 
2006).  
 As a result of the Ninth General Quota Review major shareholders accommodated 
Japan’s increased quota. Little was done, however, to diminish European over-
representation. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom held on to their appointed 
seats on the Executive Board (Rapkin, et al. 1997). During 1999, European countries 
occupied eight of the 24 seats on the Executive Board. During this time, U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Robert Rubin attempted to reshuffle the Fund’s governing bodies to reflect the 
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changing dynamics of the international economy. Germany’s Finance Minister quickly 
opposed the U.S. proposition (The Irish Times 1999).  
 During the late 1990s, European countries convened at the Vienna European 
Council to establish a strategy for Europe’s future role in monitoring international 
monetary and economic policy within the G7 and the International Monetary Fund (Bini 
Smaghi 2004). As a result, a sophisticated informal practiced has allowed the European 
countries to speak with one voice, influencing the decision-making process and 
representation of the European community on the Fund’s Executive Board.  
 The sophisticated informal mechanism consists of the European Central Bank, 
European Council of Ministers, the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) (high 
ranking G7 officials from finance ministries and central banks), the Sub-Committee 
International Monetary Fund (SCIMF), and the European Countries Representatives in 
the IMF (EURIMF) (Bini Smaghi 2004). When issues affecting the European Union are 
debated in the Fund, the chair representing the Euro-group (EURIMF) makes the 
argument on behalf of all participating countries. Cooperation has been focused on 
monetary and exchange rate policies and Euro area issues (Bini Smaghi 2004).       
In January of 1999 two arrangements were made for the European countries on 
the Executive Board: the creation of an EU observer and the EURIMF committee. A 
representative of the European Central Bank was allowed resident observer status during 
Executive Board meetings; this observer has no voting rights (Bini Smaghi 2004; Wessel 
and Blockmans 2013). The observer serves as a liaison and advisor to the Executive 
Directors, the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), and the Council of EU Finance 
Ministers (Ecofin) (Bini Smaghi 2004; Wessel and Blockmans 2013). The Econfin is a 
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permanent committee which is made up of all Fund Executive Directors who represent 
European Union members (Wessel and Blockmans 2013). The EURIMF was established 
to present a unified European position on the Executive Board and to further the 
representation of the EU on the Executive Board (Bini Smaghi 2004; Wessel and 
Blockmans 2013). Also, the EURIMF selects a permanent chair for a two year period, the 
chair establishes a working relationship with the Fund management and staff with the 
intention of influencing the Fund’s agenda and lobbying European Union positions (Bini 
Smaghi 2004). This relationship is based on an informal practice, cooperation, and an ad-
hoc process. European over-representation has been a central issue of study for many 
scholars. The methodology used to measure European over-representation has included 
consideration of variables like trade openness, exchange reserves, and GDP.                                   
 Buira (2005) utilized world GDP and population variables compared to those of 
the U.S. to determine the case for European over-representation in the Fund. On the 
Board of Governors the European Union with a total of 25 countries had 31.9 percent of 
votes while only accounting for 31.1 percent of world GDP and 7.2 percent of the 
world’s population. The U.S. accounted for 17.1 percent voting weight, 29.3 percent of 
world GDP, and 4.6 percent of the world’s population (Buira 2005). The 25 European 
countries had a six percent advantage in GDP compared to the United States, but had 86 
percent more voting weight than the U.S. (Buira 2005). The Euro zone-12 countries 
accounted for 22.9 percent voting weight, 22.9 percent of world GDP, and 4.9 percent of 
the world’s population. In sum, the Eurozone accounts for 33 percent more voting power 
than the U.S. Based on these measures the European Union is obviously over-
represented. 
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 During 2005, 25 European Union member states influenced the election of ten of 
the 24 Fund Executive Director seats (Truman 2006). Out of the ten seats the European 
Union helped elect six Executive Directors and eight alternates Executive Directors were 
European nationals. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom appoint their own 
director (Buira 2005). Overall, eight Executive Directors are appointed and 16 are elected 
by constituencies of member states. During this period, 19 Executive Directors were 
elected to represent four constituencies (the Nordic, Belgium, Dutch, and Italian), the 
four constituencies totaled 37 countries (Mahieu, Ooms, and Rottier 2005). Countries like 
Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands can ensure their country officials are elected to 
represent their constituencies. These three Executive Directors represent other European 
and non-European members. For example, Italy represents Albania, Greece, Malta, 
Portugal, San Marino, and Timor-Leste. Although Timor-Leste is not a European country 
the votes for members belonging to the constituency are aggregated (Buira 2005). In 
other words, directors must cast votes as a bloc and constituencies cannot split votes. 
Currently, single country constituencies are held by the U.S., Japan, Germany, United 
Kingdom, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia (Bini Smaghi 2004).  
 The above indicates that constituencies on the Executive Board are important for 
decision-making, there are no formal rules governing how constituencies coalesce. States 
change constituencies to obtain more influence within the Fund (Woods and Lombardi 
2006). During the early 2000s, Poland left the constituency represented by Italy and 
joined the constituency chaired by Switzerland in order to keep the position of Alternate 
Executive Director (Woods and Lombardi 2006). Constituencies with the largest 
collective votes include Belgium with ten members and an aggregate of 5.15 percent total 
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voting power. The Netherlands and its constituency representing 12 members account for 
4.86 percent of the total votes (Woods and Lombardi 2006).  
Constituencies serve an important function in the Executive Board. In the Fund 
there is a clear distinction between interests of the rich and poor countries, industrialized 
and less developed, and creditor and debtor countries (Mahieu, Ooms, and Rottier 2005). 
For the most part, constituencies are formed on criteria like GDP, geographical terms, 
and creditor/debtor status of the country. In the Fund there are ten constituencies with 
homogeneous interest and six mixed constituencies. Developing countries will benefit 
from the influence of mixed constituencies because they tend to be more powerful than 
constituencies that are constructed of developing countries only (Mahieu, Ooms, and 
Rottier 2005). The reason for this has to do with the fact that influence is greater with 
mixed constituencies because they have established relationships due to their mediator 
role between powerful and weak states.                      
Consensus rather than formal voting is the tradition of the Executive Board 
resulting in disproportionate European influence on the board (Truman 2006). During this 
time, ten European countries accounted for 44.35 percent of the voting share. It should be 
noted that the U.S. also has unprecedented power on the Executive Board. The U.S. had 
the largest quota and 17.08 percent of the votes. Therefore, the U.S. has veto power 
regarding proposals that require 85 percent majority of weighted votes (Truman 2006). In 
the Fund more than 75 percent of the members are not directly represented on the 
Executive Board, or in senior management positions (Woods 2006). 
In contrast, Bini Smaghi (2004) argues the current institutional design of the Fund 
undermines the effectiveness of the 15 European Union countries that are divided into 
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nine different constituencies. European countries give different priorities to different 
issues and some issues can best be solved at the national level in lieu of the European 
Union level. European Union influence is limited at the Fund. Having a single EU 
constituency does not necessarily imply that the EU would have stronger influence on 
Fund policies. On the other hand, emerging economies, Japan, and the U.S. have 
expressed concerns over European Union over-representation in the Fund (Bini Smaghi 
2004; Truman 2006).  
Frieden (2004) argues a single EU seat is great in theory, but in reality it is a 
controversial and complex issue. This would require the EU countries to collectively 
agree on common policy and bargaining position regarding EU international issues. 
Frieden puts it best: “Adopting a common international EU policy is analogous to 
adopting a common internal EU policy” (Frieden 2004, 262). The principle of 
subsidiarity will be a prevalent factor in determining the costs and benefits associated 
with the increased bargaining power and cost associated with compromise resulting from 
heterogeneous interest.       
Two factors often highlighted the debate over the EU single seat issue at the 
Fund. First, the Euro is the official currency of the European Union, a common interest 
rate and exchange rate policy apply to European members, therefore, one single seat 
should apply to the EU (Buira 2005). The second issue is the institutional strengthening 
of European cooperation for economic policies (Mahieu, Ooms, and Rottier 2005). The 
implementation of a single EU seat would alter the institutional design and governance of 
the Fund (Strand and Rapkin 2005).  
107 
 
The creation of a single EU seat is like an international can of worms. It has the 
potential to increase the polarization of Fund governance because it would place two 
major shareholders as Fund decision-makers. The U.S. and the European Union would be 
able to each veto many decisions (Mahieu, Ooms, and Rottier 2005). An alliance between 
the major shareholders may aggravate the polarization problem between creditor/debtor 
states. Also, a single EU seat would have implications for constituencies; non EU 
member countries would be forced to seek new constituencies (Bini Smaghi 2005). 
Currently, based on the Articles of Agreement, the Fund is located in the country that is 
the major shareholder. If European countries merged their quotas in the Fund, such a 
merger could require the Fund be relocated to Europe (Bini Smaghi 2005). Conversely, a 
single seat could provide for a more equitable distribution of voting shares and Executive 
Board chairs for emerging economies and developing countries (Mahieu, Ooms, and 
Rottier 2005).      
The establishment of a single EU seat would require a recalculation of quota and 
voting shares for the new EU constituency and the recalculation of quota and voting 
shares to other members (Mahieu, Ooms, and Rottier 2005; Bini Smaghi 2005). It is 
highly unlikely that major shareholders would allow the combined EU seat to keep the 
aggregated total of votes. During the early 2000s, the aggregated quota and voting share 
for the EU-25 countries was calculated at 38.44. The actual quota was 32.16, and 
percentage of votes was 31.92. For the United States, the calculated quota was 17.11, the 
actual quota 17.38, and percentage of votes was 17.11. Lastly, Japan’s calculated quota 
was measured at 10.12, the actual quota was 6.23 and the percentage of votes was 3.14 
(Bini Smaghi 2005). 
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A single EU seat would also effect the composition of the Executive Board. Five 
Fund members each appoint an Executive Director: U.S., Japan, Germany, France, and 
the UK. A single EU seat would open two Executive Board seats to emerging economies. 
All EU countries would remain Fund members, but Europe would speak as one voice and 
have one vote. The single EU seat would contribute financially to the Fund according the 
recalculated quota. Also, voting share would be based on the recalculated quota (Mahieu, 
Ooms, and Rottier 2005). Former Fund official Ariel Buira advocates that country 
representation on the Executive Board should consist of an equal number of directors 
representing developing countries and industrial countries. Europe is the perfect 
candidate for a reduction in chairs; the European countries could be well served by two or 
three chairs. No Executive Director, according to Buira, should represent more than 12 to 
15 countries and staff working for Executive Director offices should reflect the member 
countries of the constituency (Buira 2005).      
 Another factor in Europe’s disproportionate influence is the selection of the 
Managing Director. Historically the Fund Director has been from a European country. 
This is an important position because the Director serves as the chair and chief executive 
officer of the Fund. During 2007, the German Delegation formally nominated Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn; the future Managing Director traveled the globe in order to lobby member 
countries to support his candidacy. After the resignation of Strauss-Kahn the European 
Union rallied behind French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde for the position. She 
also traveled the global seeking support from emerging economies like Brazil, China, and 
India (Alderman and Bowley 2011). Lagarde supporters argued that a European was the 
best candidate to deal with the ongoing European economic crisis. Some international 
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observers argue this was a weak argument. If the latter were the case then a Latin 
American would have been the best candidate to deal with the Latin American debt crisis 
or an Asian for dealing with the Asian Financial Crisis (Batista 2010). Other candidates 
for the Managing Director seat were Agustin Carstens form Mexico and Stanley Fisher, 
the governor of Israel’s central bank (Gjelten 2011).     
 Emerging economies have argued European influence in the Fund is explicitly 
biased. During the European crisis, the Fund distributed large amounts of financial 
resources to European member states. Greece was allotted 30 billion Euros, 26 billion 
Euros for Portugal, 24 times its quota, 22.5 billion for Ireland, which is 23 times its quota 
(Henning and Khan 2011). International observers have declared the Fund conditionality 
associated with the European financial facilities to be less severe then those imposed on 
Asian countries during the Asian Financial Crisis. For Asian countries this is a result of 
European over-representation in the Fund’s governance (Henning and Khan 2011). For 
example, during the Asian Financial Crisis loan conditionality for these countries was 
more qualitatively and quantitatively strict. Fund loans to European countries 
incorporated fewer policy requirements and structural reforms than cases in Latin 
America (Broome 2010).          
 In March of 2008, the Reform of Quota and Voice in the International Monetary 
Fund was approved by the Board of Governors. This reform process required the 
amendment of the Article of Agreement and for member states to ratify the package of 
reforms (IMF 2011). In November of 2008 global leaders gathered in Washington to 
discuss the current international financial architecture. The French advocated for policy 
regulations to limit the dangers of unbridled global capitalism and French President 
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Sarkozy was lobbying for allies to support the French position. The United Kingdom 
argued for a new Bretton Woods system. The Chinese delegation pursued a quid pro quo 
strategy, more influence for China for more capital contributions to the Fund. Conditions 
were tied to the Chinese approach. This issue presented discord in the short term for the 
global leaders (Davis 2008).                    
The 2008 quotas were followed by further reforms in 2010 with the completion of 
14
th
 General Review of Quotas. The 2010 reform package implemented a doubling of 
quotas, six percent of quotas shares to emerging market and developing countries, and 
protects the voting share of the poorest member states. Equally as important was to make 
the BRICS among the ten largest shareholders (IMF 2011). In addition to the ten largest 
shareholders, the largest European countries (France, Germany, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom) kept their positions among the top 11 shareholders (IMF 2010).   
When implementation of the 2010 Governance and Quota Reform package is 
complete, the European Union will still be over-represented. According to the post 2010 
reform package the 27 European countries will account for 29.4 percent of the voting 
share. This is a clear case of rich developed countries versus emerging economies for 
decision-making influence in the Fund. This has been a contentious issue for Fund 
emerging economies, particularly the BRICS. Economic growth has allowed the BRICS 
to become global stakeholders. Today, they seek to influence the institutional design and 
governance of the Fund.         
BRICS Challenges for Representation 
 Throughout the Fund’s history membership has continued to increase. Brazil 
joined the Fund in 1946. India joined the Fund in 1945. The Russian Federation became a 
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member in 1992 and China rejoined in 1980. The BRICS abbreviation stands for Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Many of these countries do not share national 
commonalities, but share the common trait of exceptional growth. The six largest 
emerging economies are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the Russian 
Federation (Das 2010). China is the largest and has the most influence in the global 
economy. For this section of the chapter BRICS refers to the emerging market economies 
of South Africa, China, India, Brazil, and the Russia Federation. Historically, there was 
confusion about the BRICs and BRICS. In the BRICs acronym African countries were 
not included. When the term BRICS is utilized this includes South African emerging 
markets (The Economist 2013). Together, in 2009, the BRICs accounted for a GDP in 
terms of PPP of 15 percent. By 2010, GDP growth exceeded 25 percent (The BRICS 
Report 2012; Das 2010). The BRICS account for more than 40 percent of the world 
population (The BRICS Report 2012).   
Starting in the 2000s, the Fund faced three crises in general: legitimacy, 
relevance, and budgetary finance (Truman 2008). The Fund has two institutional 
challenges with the BRICS and other developing countries. One is the legitimacy issue. 
The second is the issue of European over-representation and how this affects the 
representation of the BRICS and low-income countries and the governance of the Fund 
(Truman 2006). The representation problem and the economic development of Fund 
members have created an environment of industrialized versus developing member states 
(Mahieu, Ooms, and Rottier 2005). The first two issues have caused much discord among 
the Fund and BRICS member states. The third issue focuses on how the legitimacy crisis 
has depleted the financial resources of the Fund.  
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Case in point, as described above, other member states made financial 
contributions directly to the Fund during the global recession of 2007-2008. However, 
China, Brazil, India, and Russia refused to contribute directly to the Fund. China, Russia, 
India, South Korea, and Brazil contributed through a new Special Drawing Rights bond 
system (Holroyd and Momani 2012). The bond fund was preferred by the BRICS because 
they would be able to recuperate their money, it was more flexibility, and easier to 
reserve if conditions changed. Also the bonds would be available on the secondary 
market (Davis 2009).                 
 Many of the BRICS had financial transactions with the Fund since the early 
1980s. Much of the discord between the Fund and the Asian economies was centered on 
the Asian Financial Crisis. Many Asian countries resented the Fund for not properly 
responding to the AFC (Katz 1999; Holroyd and Momani 2012). The resentment 
resonated with Latin American countries. Brazil and Argentina quickly paid off loans due 
to the Fund and promised to seek future financial assistance elsewhere (Lynch 2006). For 
example, in 2003 outstanding loans financed by quota subscriptions totaled 98.9 billion 
(Truman 2008). By December of 2005 the total for outstanding loans was 43.2 billion. As 
of September 30, 2008 outstanding loans totaled 11.5 billion and 21 out of 23 member 
states had repaid their loans in full (Truman 2008).       
As a result of the Fund’s response to the AFC, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) 
was established by the ASEAN plus three (Japan, China, South Korea) to facilitate 
economic cooperation and self-help programs for regional members (Chey 2009). The 
CMI is an informal institution and less ambitious than the proposed Asian Monetary 
Fund. CMI provides liquidity assistance to its members and is a form of self-insurance, 
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however, the Fund has some informal influence over the CMI (Chey 2009). For the 13 
founding countries monetary cooperation, transparency and building a stronger region 
were fundamental to the CMI (Washington Post 2000). Several founding members of the 
CMI belong to the BRICS and other emerging economies like the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. The four mentioned countries account for a total of 2.09 percent 
voting share and 52,946 thousand votes in the Fund (IMF 2013).  
 Arrangements like the CMI and other regional institutions have not gone 
unnoticed by the Fund. From 1999 to 2009 Fund members continued voiced their 
opposition to the conditionality of the new financing vehicles (Truman 2008). Fund 
members utilized bilateral loans and regional lenders for loans. These arrangements 
reduced the use of lending facilities in the Fund. Some observers claim bilateralism and 
regionalism, if not administered by the Fund could weaken the international financial 
system (Truman 2008). As a consequence of resentment and unfair loan conditionality 
Asian countries are not discouraged from utilizing the Asian regional arrangements for 
solving future financial problems. The lack of legitimacy in global and regional 
arrangements will make the Asian countries rule makers rather than rule takers (Sohn 
2005).  
For Asian countries legitimacy is focused on three issues: inclusiveness, rule-
governance, and fair returns (Sohn 2005). The BRICs have encountered legitimacy 
problems with the Fund on the account that the European Union has failed to recognize 
the importance of equal representation at the Fund and failed to be responsive to Asian 
regional economic concerns. This has been an area of much discord within the Fund. 
During the 2012 Fund meeting in Tokyo, the most obvious issue creating discomfort was 
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the lack of implementation of the governance and quota reforms agreed to in 2010. The 
topic of concern was the continued over-representation of the Euro area economies that 
share a common currency (Gros et al. 2012). Prior to the Tokyo meeting, at the G20 
summit, the BRICS settled on a 70 billion dollar loan package for the ongoing financial 
crisis. European and US officials requested that emerging powers behave like responsible 
stakeholder during the time of need. In other words, emerging economies needed to 
financially contribute to the Fund. As a result of the continued lack of willingness to 
allow emerging economies a stronger voice in the Fund, the emerging economies 
proposed the creation of a BRICS Development Bank (Gros et al. 2012).  
In June 2013, Russia pledged to use its influence of the G-20 presidency in 2014 
to reorganize the institutional design of the Fund, in particular reforming the voting 
system to enhance the role of the BRICS (Rianovosti 2013). During this same time, the 
BRICS countries established a charter for a new development bank. The bank intends to 
facilitate loans for infrastructure development, modern day port facilities, and reliable 
power and rail services (Reuters 2013). This is an effort by emerging economic powers to 
establish institutions and forums that are an alternative to Western-dominated 
international financial institutions. Some international observers believe this is a direct 
challenge to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Polgreen 2013). 
However, Gros et al (2012) argue this is highly unlikely because the proposed 100 billion 
dollars for the reserve fund of the BRICS Development Bank is little compared to the 
established 780 billion reserve fund of the IMF. The development bank will be 
established with a 100 billion reserve fund. China will be the largest contributor with 41 
billion. India, Brazil, and Russia will each contribute 18 billion and South Africa will 
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contribute five billion (BBC News 2013). Although, the development bank proposal is 
impressive in theory the practical applications may present challenges to the BRICS 
Development Bank. Symbolically, this represents a move away from the Washington 
Consensus to the Beijing Consensus. A number of questions remain unanswered. Where 
will the Bank be located? What will be the governance structure and criteria that will 
determine what projects are funded (Institute of Development Studies 2013).     
Challenges derived from underlying political and economic differences between 
the BRICS can present obstacles to economic cooperation. For example, India is a 
democracy and China is a one-party state based on autocratic rule (O’Neill 2013). 
Historically, Indian and Chinese tensions have influenced military and security decisions, 
economic and diplomatic relationships (Malik 2012). In 1962, a short lived war occurred 
over a Himalayan border dispute, followed by brief conflicts in 1967 and 1987. Recent 
attempts to settle the border issue have been futile (Karackattu 2013; Malik 2012). In 
2010, the Chinese government issued a communication that a border settlement would 
take a very long time. Recently the Chinese government provoked the Indian authorities 
by sending military troops into the mountains of Ladakh, about 30 Chinese troops erected 
overnight sleeping tents. Ultimately, Indian military officials protested the Chinese 
actions (Harris 2013).       
The energy rich South China Sea has been an area of dispute among many Asian 
governments. India is located outside the South China Sea. However, India operates 
inside the South China Sea via naval deployments. India has interest in oil exploration, 
and growing strategic military cooperation with other South East Asian countries (Scott 
2013). Recent disagreements between Vietnam and China regarding maritime navigation 
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have caused the ASEAN countries to use the U.S. Japan, and India as counterweights to 
China’s power (Hong 2013). In 2011, China and India entered into a dispute over the 
Indian state oil company exploration with Vietnam. China claimed this was a violation of 
Chinese sovereignty. China’s concerns are that future maritime exploration for natural 
resources by foreign governments will become a bargaining tool for future negotiations 
over the South China (Page and Wright 2011). India is not the only country that China 
has had border disputes with. Russia and China have different political and economic 
interests. The latter has the potential to create challenges in the newly formed BRICS 
Development Bank.  
As trade has expanded Russia-China relations have improved. Beginning in the 
1960s the relationship of the two countries was plagued with animosity. Russia and China 
do not share common cultures and territorial disputes date back to the 18
th
 century 
(Dobriansky 2000). In 2001 both countries signed the Sino-Russian Treaty on Good 
Neighbor, Friendship, and Cooperation (Wishnick 2001). This alliance was due to mutual 
benefit and an attempt to diminish the global power of the U.S. post- Cold War and 
influence a multipolar international system (Wishnick 2001). However, this relationship 
was quickly strained by new challenges relating to different economic and political 
policies, legacies of mistrust, and changing domestic and international environments 
(Wishnick 2001).  
Today, China is a rising power with a growing export driven economy. Russia has 
a stagnate petro economy with little potential export growth. Russia sells military 
hardware to Southeast Asia countries that claim territorial sovereignty in the South China 
Sea, including selling sophisticated attack submarines to Vietnam (Mankoff 2013). This 
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issue is creating much discord between Russia and China. Ongoing mistrust between 
India and China is also a continuing problem. In 2010, a four day conference was held 
between high ranking officials due to ongoing territorial disputes, a hotline between 
leaders of both countries was established to encourage communication over the issue 
(Ridge 2010). The ongoing history of mistrust and animosity between China, India, and 
Russia may be too big of a challenge for the BRICS Development Bank to overcome. 
Equally important, what role will Brazil and South Africa have in the BRICS 
Development Bank?  
Brazil is considered to be a major player among emerging economies. In the 21
st
 
century global political economy Brazil and China have entered into a strategic 
partnership (Gouvea and Montoya 2013). The BRICS have changed the economic 
landscape of financial globalization. Moreover, China has become a major recipient of 
foreign direct investment, from 3.5 billion in 1990 to 106 billion in 2011. During the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century Brazil became China’s largest trading partner in Latin America 
(Cardoso 2012). In 2006, Brazil exported 11 million tons of coffee beans to China (Ding 
2008). In 2010 China invested nearly US 12 billion in the Brazilian economy.  
China has engaged Latin America with diplomatic and economic efforts. This has 
created opportunities and challenges in the region. China and Brazil have participated in 
trade negotiations, have been active stakeholders in global climate concerns, and worked 
collectively in the IMF, G20, and WTO (Gouvea and Montoya 2013). Despite the 
challenges that China and Brazil confront much of their relationship has been categorized 
by a comprehensive partnership that focuses on trade and prosperity. For example, areas 
of partnership include trade, energy, mining, finance, agriculture, information 
118 
 
technology, and innovation (Haibib 2010). Consequently, in 2009 China became Brazil’s 
largest trading partner surpassing the U.S. and the European Union. However, both 
countries have had serious challenges over trade, investment, finance and political 
concerns. First, tensions have evolved over what Brazil considers Chinese neo-colonialist 
strategies. Brazilian political leader have claimed that China is pursuing a “North-South” 
paradigm instead of a “South-South” economic paradigm and fear that China is acting as 
Western powers did in accumulating natural resources (Cardoso 2013; Gouvea and 
Montoya 2013). This has impacted bilateral trade relations (Cardoso 2013). A second 
contentious issue is commercial competition between Latin America and Africa.   
 A political challenge at the United Nations in 2005 effected relations between 
China and Brazil. The failure of China to support Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat on the 
United Nations Security Council created a political challenge for both countries. Also, 
during the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference and Copenhagen Summit 
there was discord regarding climate negotiations (Cardoso 2013; Gouvea and Montoya 
2013).  
Based on the strategic alliance between Brazil and China, Brazil may have a 
stabilizing role in the BRICS Development Bank. Brazil has too much invested to simply 
be a spoiler in the emerging economies reform agenda and BRICS Development Bank. 
Moreover, China’s need for natural resources may benefit Brazil in the long term and 
China has much to lose if Brazil is not part of the development bank. China’s has the 
second largest economy, four times larger than India and Russia and about 16 times 
larger than South Africa (Fletcher 2011). Will South Africa fall into the periphery-core 
model of the past as a member of the BRICS development Bank? 
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The relation the Fund has to the BRICS Development Bank may be difficult to 
categorize. However, significant differences appear to be prevalent with both institutions. 
For example, the BRICS Development Bank has been created as a counterpart to 
orthodox neoliberalism and promotes development by developing countries (Institute of 
Development Studies 2013). Another difference will be to promote greater cooperation 
between developing countries and to create arrangements on a global scale. The most 
important difference will be that the BRICS Development Bank will not have a link to 
the Fund (Institute of Development Studies 2013).                         
Conclusion 
           The Fund has experienced unprecedented changes with the ascension of Japan, the 
continued over-representation of the European Union, and the rise of the BRICS and 
other emerging economies. These three factors have forced the Fund to be more 
transparent, effective, and accountable. It is fair to mention that Japan has been a major 
contributor and financier to the Fund. Japan has earned a stakeholder role, the second 
position in the hierarchy of the Fund, and has been a trailblazer for attempting to break 
the strong hold of European representation on the Executive Board. The European Union 
has maintained a strangle hold on the Executive Board of the Fund and is not likely to 
relinquish the over-represented position without intense discord. The failure to 
implemented 2008 and 2010 reforms is a prime example of how difficult it will be for 
emerging economies to obtain fair representation on the Executive Board and adequate 
voting shares. A reallocation of voting seats will be difficult to obtain because it will be 
hard for European countries to agree to a single foreign policy that is representative of 
their national interests in the international area. The BRICS with their economic power 
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will have to attempt to influence and promote financial regionalism and multilateralism 
as a counterweight to the Fund. Wade (2011) argues the rise of multilateralism is made 
possible by several factors. The first factor is the decline the G7 share of world GDP. In 
2000 the G7 accounted for 72 percent of global GDP. In 2011 the percentage share 
declined to 53 percent. The second factor is China’s rise is another important factor 
contributing to multilateralism. The third factor is monetary policy because today the 
major financial capitals in the world pay attention to China’s monetary policy. The fourth 
factor is developing and transnational countries contribute more to global output. 
Between 2000 and 2009, global output by these countries rose by 10 percentage points 
and when measured by purchasing power parity there was an increase of 40 to 50 percent. 
The fifth factor is south to south trade. From 1997 to 2009 Asian exporters decreased 
from 46 to 36 percent to the U.S., the EU, and Japan. The sixth factor is the EU is 
becoming more cohesive and the Euro is becoming the second international reserve 
currency and this creates challenges for the international economic governance system 
(Wade 2011). Equally important, if the BRICS want more decision-making power in the 
Fund they will have to follow the Japanese model for obtaining a higher position in the 
hierarchy of the Fund. A strategic plan based on a cohesiveness approach to obtaining 
more influence will be fundamental to the BRICS. Also, the BRICS, at times, must be 
passive rule takers, and aggressive players utilizing economic leverage to alter the 
institutional design of the Fund toward their favor.  
 However, the U.S. position should not be over looked in terms of European over-
representation and accommodations for the BRICS. For example, during the G20 meeting 
in November 2010, the U.S. informed the G20 that they would not support the 
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continuation of the twenty-four seat Executive Board in the Fund. This forced Europe to 
relinquish two. After ongoing diplomatic negotiations the U.S. agreed to approve the 24 
seat Board. However, European representation on the Executive Board still diminished 
(Wade 2011). Consequently, this is a prime example of power politics and an attempt to 
retain U.S. veto power within the Fund.                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
CHAPTER 6 
PRE-SINGAPORE, POST SINGAPORE, AND THE 14
TH
 GQR 
Chapter six will begin by analyzing the Fund’s internal governance and reform 
initiatives. The first section will include a brief review of cases from prior chapters to 
provide a rationale for the idea that quota shares and internal governance should be 
commensurate with a country’s economic strength. The next section will analyze data on 
quota reform from the pre-Singapore, post-Singapore, and 14
th
 GQR time frames. World 
Bank country and lending group data will be utilized to classify Fund members into 
different income groups and examine quota allocations. This section will present 
descriptive data comparing low-income, middle-income, upper middle-income and high-
income countries regarding quota allocation and GDP. Additionally, a brief comparison 
of the EU and the BRICS focusing on the voting power disparity due to the 14
th
 GQR 
will be discussed. The following section will present data for the BRICS, G8, and G20, 
comparing the quotas before recent reforms and to UN contribution percentage and 
population variables to determine over or under-representation in the Fund. The chapter 
will conclude with a second section discussing possible reforms to the Fund.    
Internal Governance and Reform 
The Fund has evolved in order to address the changing global political economy. 
Along the way, the Fund has garnered many critics. International financial elites, 
government policy makers, and average citizens have expressed rebuke for the Fund. The 
case for Fund reform has been made and is long overdue. Many governments in the 
international financial architecture have been dissatisfied with their relative positions in 
the Fund’s hierarchy and have made a push to reform the Fund. Three issues have 
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repeatedly promoted reform initiatives: the legitimacy crisis, under-representation that 
often encourages a rich versus poor states environment, and loan conditionality 
requirements. The under-represented problem experienced by emerging market 
economies has encouraged debate regarding European over-representation and the proper 
roles for emerging market economies and developing countries (Rapkin and Strand 
2006). Many of these countries have experienced impressive growth and argue their 
economic contributions to the global economy are not reflected in their quota shares. 
Also, small economies argue their small quota do not give them a voice in the Fund. 
However, research conducted by Rapkin and Strand (2006) concludes that low-income 
countries are over-represented in the Fund when comparing their GDP shares to their 
quotas.        
The main concern in the quota share debate has focused on the distribution of 
power within the Fund. Developing emerging market countries must have their economic 
strength reflect their voting weight to make the Fund a legitimate and effective 
international institution (Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004). The global political 
economy of the first half of the 20
th
 century has changed. The Fund has the capacity to 
strengthen economic cooperation, enhance economic security, and promote globalization 
that will benefit different regions and groups (Kelkar, Chaudhry, and Vanduzer-Snow 
2005).  
The global political economy has changed due to seven factors. The first factor is 
the globalization of new technology. New technology enhances production and increases 
economic interaction. The second factor is the increase in private capital flows. When 
private capital flow is disrupted there is a potential to create economic shocks (Kelkar, 
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Chaudhry, and Vanduzer-Snow 2005). The third factor is the shifting of global 
demographic balances. Advanced economies are not producing working age populations 
as fast as developing economies. As a result, capital flows will go where younger 
populations exist. The fourth factor is the political influence of emerging market 
economies. The fifth factor is the increasing relative economic strength of Asia in the 
global economy. Three of the four largest economies are Japan, China, and India (Kelkar, 
Chaudhry, and Vanduzer-Snow 2005). The sixth factor is the growing regionalism in 
Asian and Europe in reaction to members’ dissatisfaction with the Fund. The seventh 
factor is international institutions and governments are promoting greater transparency 
and accountability in global governance. Based on the changing forces of the global 
economy the Fund should promote reform initiatives beginning with the distribution of 
more institutional power to developing and emerging market economies (Kelkar, 
Chaudhry, and Vanduzer-Snow 2005).                
 Much of the current reform process has been due to the rise of China and India, 
which today are major global economies but are under-represented in the Fund (Kenen 
2007). Also, the Fund’s current governance model is complicated and does not allow for 
the Fund to focus on its original mandates of managing the international monetary system 
and the promotion of a stable and cooperative global economy (Kenen 2007).       
 As mentioned in the previous cases of discord, the issue has been concentrated on 
quota allocation and the shift in the balance of power. Japan’s rise to the second position 
at the Fund was not automatic; it was a very political process. Initially, the U.S. was in 
opposition to a Japanese quota increase. France, the United Kingdom, and Germany 
opposed Japan’s bid for a larger quota. Japan publically declared in a Fund Executive 
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Board meeting that continued opposition to a larger quota share for Japan may present 
opposition at home for Fund financial contributions (IMF 1988a). Eventually, Japan 
moved from 4.7 percent to 6.1 percent and obtained the second position at the Fund.     
China’s negotiations with the Fund over a quota that would reflect its economic 
weight in the global economy was an important factor when it joined the Fund (Boughton 
2001; Jacobsen and Okensberg 1990). China’s strategic plan for entry into the Fund 
reflects the importance of quota allocation. Beginning in the early 1970s China began a 
diplomatic effort to seek membership in the Fund. During 1980 China utilized diplomatic 
efforts to influence the Ad Hoc Committee to recommend an increase in quota share. 
Ultimately, China obtained 2.82 percent of votes (Jacobsen and Okensberg 1990).         
The most current cases of discord have revolved around the BRICS. The BRICS’ 
economic weight in the global economy is not commensurate with the quota share and 
decision making power at the Fund. As a result, the BRICS have started to implement a 
strategy for a BRICS Development Bank. However, there is much debate as to how 
successful the development bank will be because major shareholders have heterogeneous 
policy preferences that prevent cohesiveness among major shareholders.              
 Bryant argues (2008) a member’s voting share in the Fund is the key factor 
determining its relative political influence at the Fund. When the Fund was created the 
quota formula was designed by the U.S. Treasury to produce a politically predetermined 
result. Political motives are at the heart of the quota system 
Analysis for Various Country Groups 
The 2010 reform package was approved by the Board of Governors in December 
of 2010. Four key components make up the reform package. The first reform is a 
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doubling of the Fund quotas. This will be the largest quota increase in the Fund’s history. 
The last time a quota increase was adopted was in 1998 with the 11
th
 GQR. The second 
reform is a shifting of six percent of quota share to emerging markets of six percent. This 
will increase their voting power and their relative financial commitment to the Fund. The 
third reform is to create an all elected Executive Board. The fourth reform is reducing the 
representation of advanced countries on the Executive Board. Currently, 10 seats are held 
by European countries (IMF 2013).        
The pending 14
th
 GQR will be important to determine the legitimacy of Fund 
reforms. In the Fund’s Singapore meeting in 2006, the Managing Director proposed and 
the Directors approved a two-stage process for the reallocation of quotas. During the first 
stage of quota reforms, China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey each received immediate 
small ad hoc increases (Kenen 2007). Their prior quotas never reflected their relative 
economic strength. The second stage of negotiations was held in mid-2008. The Fund 
would adopt a new formula for quota calculation. The revised quota formula accounts for 
a GDP measure that is a blended measure compromised of 60 percent market exchange 
rate GDP and 40 percent PPP GDP. The second variable is economic openness. This 
measures the average total of current payments and receipts for goods and services. This 
factor accounts for 30 percent of the formula. The third variable is economic variability. 
This measures the receipts for net capital flows for a three year period. This factor 
accounts for 15 percent. The fourth variable is international reserves and accounts for five 
percent of quotas. This measures the foreign exchanges, SDR holdings, the reserve 
position in the Fund and gold holdings. The new formula is intended to be simple and 
more transparent then the previous formula (IMF 2013).  
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All quota data information for this section will utilize Fund variables.  GDP is 
considered the most important variable calculating quota shares because GDP is the most 
comprehensive measure of economic size (Chen 2013). The data are drawn from the 
Fund, UN, and World Bank. The data will be used to demonstrate the relationship 
between quota reform and Fund legitimacy. The pre-Singapore data dates back to 2006. 
The post-Singapore data accounts for the 2008 quota and voice reform changes and basic 
votes calculated at 5.502 percent of total votes. The 14
th
 GQR data accounts for the 2010 
reforms that will reflect new quota and voting shares that will be effective upon the 
acceptance of 85 percent of the Fund members (IMF 2013). In sum, quotas at three time 
periods are examined.     
Table 1 represents 33 low-income countries as categorized by the World Bank. 
During the pre-Singapore period, the aggregate quota shares for the 33 countries totaled 
1.7 percent of the total quota shares. During the post 2008 reform period, the same 33 
countries accounted for 1.6 percent of the aggregate quota shares. When the 14
th
 GQR is 
adopted the 33 countries will account for an aggregate share of 1.6 percent of the total 
Fund shares. Low-income countries are defined as countries with gross national income 
(GNI) of less than 1,035 U.S. dollars (World Bank 2013). Some of the low-income 
countries include Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Burundi (See table 1).   
For Burundi the pre-Singapore quota share was 0.036 percent. For post-Singapore 
and the pending 14
th
 GQR quota share did not change from 0.032. Burundi has a 
population of 9.850 million people with a GDP of 2.472 billion (World Bank 2013). 
Burundi’s GDP global percentage is 0.005; its PPP is measured at 160 US dollars, and is 
considered a Sub-Saharan African developing country. Afghanistan’s pre-Singapore 
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quota share was 0.076 percent and the quota share for the post-Singapore and 14
th
 GQR 
stayed the same at 0.068 percent. Afghanistan’s population is measured at 29.87 million 
and has a GDP of 18.03 billion. Afghanistan accounts for 0.03 percent of global GDP 
with a PPP of 330 US dollars and is considered a South Asian developing country (World 
Bank 2013).                  
Table 2 presents quotas for lower middle income countries. For the pre-Singapore 
period aggregate quota share of 46 countries accounted for 6.7 percent of all quotas. The 
post-Singapore 2008 quota reforms decreased the aggregate total to 6.1 percent. The 
pending 14
th
 GQR will further decrease the aggregate quota share to 5.7 percent of 
overall Fund shares.   
Lower middle income countries are defined as countries with gross national 
income (GNI) between 1,036-4,085 US dollars (World Bank 2013). Based on the factors 
for the pending 14
th
 GQR the 46 lower middle-income countries have an aggregate GDP 
60/40 blend of 4.9 percent of global GDP. Hypothetically, if GDP was the benchmark 
factor determining quota shares then the lower middle income countries are over-
represented in quota shares. For example, Honduras has a GDP of 0.033. During the pre-
Singapore period Honduras had a quota share of 0.061 percent. During the post-
Singapore time period the quota share decreased to 0.054 percent and during the pending 
14
th
 GQR the percentage quota share decreases to 0.052 percent (see table 2).        
Table 3 presents data on the upper middle-income countries with gross national 
income of 4,086-12,615 (World Bank 2013). This group of countries includes developing 
and transition countries that often utilize Fund resources (Strand and Rapkin 2005). The 
aggregate quota share for the 52 countries during the pre-Singapore period was 16.7 
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percent. For the post-Singapore 2008 period the aggregate shares increased to 17.9 
percent. For the pending 14
th
 GQR aggregate quota shares will increase to 20.48. Quota 
shares for this country group have increased as a result of recent reforms.    
According to the World Bank country and lending group data, China, Brazil, and 
South Africa are members of the upper middle-income country group. These three 
countries account for a majority of the quota shares and GDP within this country group. 
Together, China, Brazil, and South Africa account for 15.40 percent GDP and 9.34 
percent of the quota share for this group. After the 14
th
 GQR the voting share of the three 
countries will be 8.90 percent (IMF 2013).    
Table 4 displays quotas for high-income countries. These countries have a larger 
percentage of the aggregate quota share. High income countries have a gross national 
income of over 12,616 US dollars (World Bank 2013). For the pre- Singapore period high 
income countries had an aggregate quota share of 72.13 percent. During the post-
Singapore 2008 reforms these countries experienced a decrease in their quota share to 
71.08 percent. After the pending 14
th
 GQR the aggregate quota share will be 68.38 
percent of the Fund shares. Many high income countries have smaller quota shares than 
their GDP shares justify. If economic variables utilized under the Fund formula are the 
only factors determining the quota share then high income countries are over-represented 
in the Fund.          
The five largest shareholders of the Fund are also ranked among the high income 
country group. France, the U.K. the U.S., Germany, and Japan represent a combined total 
of 37.80 quota share. Once the 14
th
 GQR is implemented this will translate into 35.90 
voting share. 24 of the 28 European Union members are ranked within the high income 
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country group. Regarding the 14
th
 GQR and the U.S. share, the U.S. would not suffer a 
major defeat by giving up a small percentage of its quota share because it still retains veto 
power with 17.40 percent voting quota share. Based on the GDP figures the U.S. is 
under-represented with a GDP blend of 21.50 percent. The U.S. is allowing its quota 
share to fall in order to distribute a more equitable quota share to emerging market 
economies.              
Scholars and policymakers argue the European Union has been over-represented 
in the Fund. Table 5 includes the 28 countries that hold membership in the European 
Union and Fund. The data show that during the pre-Singapore period, the EU accounted 
for an aggregate quota share of 37.82 percent. During the post 2008 reform period the EU 
accounted for 36.80 percent of quota shares. For the 14
th
 GQR the EU will account for an 
aggregate share of 35.22 percent of quotas (IMF 2013).     
The EU members with the largest quota shares are Germany, France, U.K. Italy, 
Netherlands, and Spain. After the 14
th
 GQR these countries will have an aggregate quota 
share of 16.7. The quota share translates into 20.04 percent of total votes (IMF 2013). If 
these countries coalesce around a particular issue to form a voting bloc it gives them veto 
power in the Fund over certain issues. The Netherlands and Spain represent other 
countries in their constituency. Vote splitting for constituency groups is not permitted in 
the Fund and this will slightly increase the EU’s voting power. This indicates that some 
Fund Directors are better able to represent their constituencies because of the voting 
power and the voice of the constituency (Lombardi and Woods 2008). Constituencies 
with small voting shares can hardly influence the decision making processes of the Fund.                
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Table 6 displays data for the BRICS. A total of five countries are analyzed. 
During the pre-Singapore period Brazil accounted for 1.42 percent, Russia accounted for 
2.78 percent, India 1.95 percent, China 2.98 percent and South Africa for 0.874 percent.  
The aggregate total for the BRICS is 10.00 percent of Fund quota shares. Today, based 
on the post-Singapore 2008 quota and voice reforms these countries account for an 
aggregate quota share of 11.49 percent. Upon implementation of the 14
th
 GQR the 
aggregate quota share for the BRICS will be 14.79 percent. The 14
th
 GQR will provide 
the BRICS with a voting share of 14.10. This sum is not sufficient to form a voting bloc 
for veto power. Major decisions require an 85 percent majority. In other words, if there is 
an issue that does not benefit the BRICS, this potential voting bloc would have to lobby 
another constituency to align itself with the BRICS in order to be able to prevent the 
passage of the proposed decision. The U.S. does not need to lobby other member states 
because in the current quota share it has 17.69 percent of the quota share and will have 
17.40 percent if the 14
th
 GQR is approved.   
The 14
th
 GQR reforms will continue the disparity between voting share and 
economic strength. Table 7 shows the voting shares on the Executive Board for Brazil, 
China, India, Germany, France, and the U.K. Table 7 examines the voting share for the 
three European advanced countries that have an appointed Executive Director compared 
with the advanced market economies that are supposed to obtain a significant vote share 
increase. During the post 2008 reform period Brazil, China, and India had an aggregate 
voting share of 7.87 percent on the Executive Board. The European countries like 
Germany, France, and the U.K. had a voting share of 14.36 percent on the Executive 
Board. For the 14
th
 GQR Brazil, China, and India will have a voting share of 10.90 
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percent. The three European countries will have an aggregate voting share of 13.35 
percent. However, the aggregate GDP for Brazil, China and India will account for 18.40 
percent. The aggregate GDP for the three European countries will account for 11.80 
percent of global GDP. This is a clear disparity in voting power on Executive Board and 
economic strength of a country (see table 7). The 14
th
 GQR does not improve the 
governance model of the Fund because the quota share is not commensurate with the 
economic power of Brazil, India, and China. Virmani (2011) argues that China and India 
have been major contributors to global economic output. Since 2007, India has been the 
second largest contributor to global growth surpassing the European zone and in 2010 
India surpassed China by a third in global growth.    
The latter is directly in contradiction to the reforms that Kelkar, Chaudhry, and 
Vanduzer-Snow (2005, 47) have advocated. These scholars put it best by stating, “In our 
view, veto power determined by different coalitions of states would encourage 
cooperation. EU countries and a collation of states would encourage cooperation. EU 
countries and a collation of Japan, China, and India ought to have veto power. Similarly, 
a coalition of Asian, Africa, and Latin America would enjoy a veto.” The BRICS have 
accumulated a larger percentage of quotas than before, but the prevalent question still 
remains: do the BRICS have a quota share commensurate with their economic positions 
in the global economy? 
Based on the GDP variable for the 14
th
 GQR the BRICS are under-represented in 
quota shares and as a result in vote shares. Aggregate GDP for the BRICS accounted for 
21.70 percent of global GDP (IMF 2013). In the case of China its GDP was 11.65 
133 
 
percent. However, the quota share assigned is 6.39 percent. This will give China a vote 
share of 6.06 percent and will make it the third largest member in the Fund.        
The 14
th
 GQR will not impose a drastic change on the Executive Board. The U.S. 
will remain the largest holder of quotas and votes and have de facto veto power. Japan 
will remain in the number two position with a GDP of 7.50 percent and quota share of 
6.40 percent with a voting share of 6.10 percent. China will move up to the third position 
with 11.65 percent GDP contribution and a quota share of 6.39 percent with a voting 
share of 6.06 percent. Germany will be placed in the fourth position with a quota share of 
5.50 percent and a voting share of 5.30 percent. France and the U.K. would have the 
same quota share of 4.20 percent and vote share of 4 percent. Based on the current 
reforms there are 20 shareholders that have the largest quota shares. Once the 14
th
 GQR 
is implemented 19 of the current largest quota shareholders will still be among the largest 
shareholders. The only change will be that Turkey replaces Venezuela. During the post-
2008 period Turkey had 0.61 percent quota share. For the 14
th
 GQR Turkey will have 
0.97 percent quota share. The six percent shift in quotas to emerging markets will not 
change the current top 20 country positions dramatically. Put differently, Malta with a 
post-2008 quota share of 0.043 will not see a two percent increase.    
Implementing the 14
th
 GQR may take longer than anticipated. During the October 
2013 Fund meeting foreign officials expressed frustration over the lack of progress 
toward approving the 2010 reform package. The Indian finance minister, P. 
Chidambaram, stated, “Why does this problem remain with us in meeting after meeting. 
Also, there is no clarity, even after the passage of a year, as to when this will be finally 
achieved” (The New York Times 2013). Unfortunately, as of October 2013 the U.S. 
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Congress has failed to take up the reform issue. As of September 12, 2013 141 members 
have approved the proposed amendment on reforms of the Executive Board. Countries 
such as France, Germany, the U.K, Brazil, India, and China have approved the reform 
amendments. The 14th GQR reforms on quota share increase have been approved by 152 
countries (IMF 2013).  
Economic and Population Measures for the G8, EU, and BRICS 
 This section will present data comparing contributions to international institutions 
that provide public goods and to global population percentages. For the comparisons in 
this section the financial contributions to the U.N. and population numbers from the 
World Bank will be utilized. Contributions to global public goods determine the 
willingness of countries to participate in the international system. Population is another 
factor that some observers have suggested be included in the calculation of quotas.
 Affluent OECD countries are experiencing a population aging problem. 
Populations are on average becoming older. The 65 and older groups will increase in 
numbers surpassing the working age (15-64) group. Younger generations will account for 
a smaller portion of the work force (Eberstadt 2006). The aging problem will have direct 
consequences for economic institutions and macroeconomic performance (Eberstadt 
2006). Possible problems due to population aging are: increased healthcare expenditures, 
labor force pressures, and savings levels. These and other factors can pose adverse 
challenges for productivity and economic growth (Eberstadt 2006). Emerging economies 
are not immune from this problem. For example, India has two aging problems: one 
problem is the increase in youth over the next 20 years. The other problem is the fertility 
rate has dropped by more than two-fifths over the past three decades (Eberstadt 2006).  
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 There is much debate about the legitimacy of the population and aging problem in 
the industrialized world. Population variables will be hard to implement as part of the 
quota formula because this would automatically give certain developing and emerging 
economies a sharp increase in quota shares. The problem of funding the increased quota 
share will also become problematic for developing and emerging market economies 
(Strand and Rapkin 2005).  
Members should support the Fund according to the size of their economies. For 
example, a larger economy will use more resources and has a greater structural and 
systemic impact if a financial crisis occurs (Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004, 737). 
Financial contagion and the negative spillover effects are not limited to regions or 
specific international actors. A country’s investment in the economic global system is 
reflected in part in its GDP. Hence, the willingness to contribute to global public goods 
based on its GDP is one important measure for determining Fund quota shares (Kelkar, 
Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004).   
 Table 8 displays the BRICS quota share for the years analyzed. The quota share 
for the pre-Singapore period is 10.00. The post-2008 period accounts for an aggregate 
quota share of 11.40. Based on the pending 14
th
 GQR the aggregate amount is 14.70 
percent. When global population percentages are utilized among the BRICS, China 
surpass all other countries with a percentage share of 18.90 for global population. India 
moves up to the second position with 17.30 percent. Brazil occupies the third position 
with 2.70 percent. Russia moves to the fourth position and South Africa remains in the 
fifth position (see table 8 and graph 1).  
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 Based on UN contribution China remains at the number one position among 
BRICS with 3.10 percent of global contributions. Brazil moves into the second place. 
Russia occupies the third position, India the fourth position, and South Africa remains in 
fifth. The aggregate GDP share is 21.70, population share for the BRICS accounts for 
41.80 percent of global population, and total UN contributions of 7.10 percent (see table 
8 and graph 2).               
 Table 9 shows the G8 quotas with economic and population measures for pre-
Singapore, post-Singapore and the 14
th
 GQR time period. The measures utilized for this 
data analysis will be the percentage of a country’s UN contribution and the population 
percentage compared to global population. For the pre-Singapore period, the aggregate 
quota sum for the G8 countries accounts for 48.80 percent. The post-2008 period 
accounts for 47.70 percent and the 14
th
 GQR aggregate quota share is 46.00 percent.  
 If the percentage of global population is the dominant variable used among the G8 
for the 14
th
 GQR quota allocation, the U.S. would remain at number one among the G8 
countries with 4.40 percent. Russia would move up to number two from its current 
number seven position for all time periods. Japan would move down to the number three 
position. Germany would move down to number four. The number five position would 
belong to France. By Germany moving into the number two position these would slightly 
re-shift the balance of power among the G8 (see graph 3).         
 When the percentage of UN contributions is utilized as the dominant variable for 
the 14
th
 GQR quota allocation the U.S. will remain the number one position with 23.90 
percent of UN Contributions. The U.K will move up to number four passing France (see 
graph 4). Italy will remain at its original position in number six. Canada will move into 
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number seven supplanting Russia into the last position. Aggregate GDP for the G8 
accounts for 48.70 percent, aggregate population share accounts for 12.50 percent, and 
aggregate UN contributions account for 66.00 percent.            
 The G20 countries are displayed in table 10. The aggregate pre-Singapore quota 
share for the G20 accounts for 86.30 percent of all quota shares. The post 2008 reforms 
account for 78.80 percent and the pending 14
th
 GQR account for 81.1 percent. Utilizing 
the population data as the main variable for quota reallocation China will surpass the U.S. 
to the number one position. China has a population share of 18.90 percent. India will 
supplant Japan and occupy the number two position at the Fund. The U.S. will remain in 
the top five positions with a population share of 4.40 percent. Indonesia will move up to 
fourth place from the 15
th
 slot within the G20. Brazil will move up to the fifth position 
with 2.70 percent of the world’s population.  
Based on the population numbers the Executive Board would fundamentally 
change. Germany, Franc, the U.K. would be supplanted from the Executive Board. 
However, these same three countries along with Italy forming a voting bloc would have a 
combined quota share of 17.10 percent; this would be enough to form a constituency and 
veto major decisions. China and India would also have combined veto power. Based on 
the population variable the Fund headquarters would have to be moved from Washington, 
D.C. to Asia.   
Table 10 also displays the quota share if the UN contribution variable were the 
factor determining quota allocation. The U.S. would remain at the number one position 
with 23.90 percent contribution. Japan would remain at the number two position due to 
its 12.20 percent contribution. Germany would remain at number three with 7.80 percent. 
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The U.K. would supplant France to occupy the fourth position with 6.40 percent and 
France would occupy the fifth position with 5.90 percent. The Executive Board would 
remain similar to today and Europe would continue to be over represented on the 
Executive Board. The BRICS would account for a total quota share of 6.80 percent. 
Based on the BRICS UN contribution they would be over represented in quota share. 
Although the BRICS UN contribution is impressive it is still far behind the U.S. and the 
European Union’s total UN contribution of 12.9 percent (see table 10).                                            
Twenty First Century Fund Reforms 
 Reforming the governance model and institutional design of the Fund will be a 
daunting task that will require amending the Articles of Agreement and ratification by 85 
percent of the membership (Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004; Strand and Rapkin 
2005). Fundamental reforms must be implemented for the Fund to be an effective 
international organization. Proponents of governance and quota reforms advocate for a 
balanced approach to Fund reform initiatives; this includes that creditor states must be 
given a stakeholder position in future reforms. Also, the quota formula should be more 
transparent and easier to understand. Expanding the Executive Board has been suggested 
as a possible reform. Amending the regulations for access to Fund loans is a reform that 
will create greater equality among Fund members. The last reform is the possibility of a 
variable to measure contributions to world growth.  
Reform proponents must acknowledge the important role of creditor states. When 
creditor states have a majority of decision making power in the Fund this creates 
confidence in the system (Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004). Also, proponents must 
support a balanced approach that will benefit major shareholders as well as emerging and 
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developing countries (Dervis and Ozer 2005). Developing countries account for one-third 
of global trade. In 1992 developing countries GDP was estimated at 31.86. By 2001, 
GDP was estimated at 37.56 percent. During the same nine-year period the European 
countries GDP performances has declined from 34.20 to 29.04 percent (Kelkar, Yadav, 
and Chaudhry 2004).  
Reform initiatives for the Fund must be rooted in principles, transparency, and 
democratic procedures to enhance legitimacy and effective global governance. Economic 
and political agreements have been embedded in the quota system, which is reflected in 
the governance structure. Reforms must maintain quota formulas that are simple to 
calculate and transparent. The second requirement is that creditors in financial institutions 
must have a decisive voice in the institution. Lastly, any proposed reforms must accept 
the veto power of the largest shareholder, the U.S. (Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004; 
Rapkin and Strand 2006). The latter is based on the Fund’s formal and informal 
governance model. An 85 percent majority vote is required for major decisions and the 
U.S. has the potential to prevent major decision with 17.40 percent shares. Member states 
do not bring proposals up for votes that have not been approved by the U.S. (Woods 
2006).  
Fund reforms must be fundamentally different than the current quota regime. 
Quotas should be the sole factor deciding access to resources. Currently, quotas 
determine the contribution of member states in the Fund. Quotas determine how much 
money a member state can borrow and how much voting power the state assumes 
(Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004; Strand 2014). Quota reforms should remove the 
direct correlation between quota shares and the amount to be borrowed. Access to 
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facilities reserves should not be based on the 300 percent rule of a member’s quota 
because this may not be sufficient for resolving a macroeconomic structural problem     
(Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004). Access to loans should be based on need with 
safety restrictions imposed and access to resources based on gross financing. In the past, 
the Contingent Credit Line and Supplemental Reserve Facility implied that distribution of 
loans was based on need not quota. Also, Fund members would have a sense of equality 
if the quota formula were not utilized because the current quota system creates a divide 
between rich and poor countries (Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004).  
Expanding the Executive Board has been a controversial proposal. This would 
include the expansion of the Board to include representation for developing countries. 
This approach would be more viable, but obtaining consensus may become more 
difficult. Another proposal would be to limit the number of countries in a constituency 
group; this would allow for more effective representation by the Executive Director 
(Rapkin and Strand 2005).  
As mentioned previously The Fund has embarked on a reform package that will 
improve governance. Beginning in 2008, the Fund embraced quota reform by reaching an 
agreement to increase the quotas of 54 member countries. China will see an increase of 
over 50 percent, South Korea will see a quota share increase of 106 percent, Turkey will 
increase by 51 percent, and Mexico will see an increase of 40 percent (IMF 2013).  
The second major reform proposal was approved in 2010. According to 
International Monetary Fund data this reform package is historical because it will shift 
decision-making power to emerging market and developing countries. The top ten 
shareholders will represent the top ten economies in the international monetary system. 
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These countries will be the U.S. Japan, France, Germany, the U.K. Italy, Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China (IMF 2013).  
The proposed reforms will provide 110 countries with a quota increase and will 
preserve the voting share of the poorest developing countries in the Fund. This will result 
in more than six percent in quota share to emerging and developing countries. Also, 
industrialized European economies will hold only two seats on the Executive Board and 
all Executive Directors will be elected (IMF 2013). The 14
th
 GQR will double the current 
quotas to SDR 476.8 billion from SDR 238.4. Historically, the amendment process is not 
without discord and is often time consuming. 
As of October 2013, as previously stated, the U.S. Congress has not approved the 
proposed quota and governance reforms. The U.S. is the largest shareholder and no 
country on the Executive Board will bring forward a proposal without U.S. approval. The 
U.S. has taken advantage of the formal governance structure of the Fund. Only large 
member states at the Fund have their own Executive Directors. The U.S. has the largest 
vote and has the opportunity to influence all decision it deems necessary (Woods and 
Lombardi 2006). The U.S. is strategically positioned at the Fund and Executive Board to 
maximize influence. The proposed reforms and the 14
th
 GQR will not be implemented 
without U.S. approval. This is important because the U.S. is the only member states with 
the capacity to veto decisions requiring the 85 percent majority rule (Woods and 
Lombardi 2006).  
Conclusion 
The pending reforms and the 14
th
 GQR have not diminished the disparity between 
the top ten economies in the international monetary system and their influence in the 
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Fund. Based on the data provided by the Fund for the pending 14
th
 GQR the BRICS 
remain under-represented in terms of GDP and voting share when compared to the U.S., 
Japan, France, Germany, the U.K., and Italy (see table 10). The BRICS account for an 
aggregate 18.4 percent GDP that result in a total 14
th
 GQR quota share of 11.5 percent. 
This will yield a combined voting share of 10.03 percent (IMF 2013). 
Whether the reform process has gone far enough to diminish the disparity gap 
between rich and poor countries and the ongoing legitimacy problem is yet to be seen. 
Two pending reforms that cause concern are the all elected Executive Board and reducing 
the advanced European economies on the Executive Board. These reforms are 
problematic because there are no formal rules as to how members create constituencies. 
For example, if the EU members form one constituency, this will provide them with a 
quota share of 35.22 percent. Another hypothetical scenario that needs to be examined is 
the possibility of retribution for developing countries. If the European Union Executive 
Director candidate is not supported by small economies will this cause discord amongst 
members. It appears ongoing reforms have a number of unanswered questions that have 
the potential to create new problems. In sum, the Fund has not done enough to distribute 
quota shares to emerging market economies and reform governance in the Fund. 
Economic variables are not sufficient to replace the power politics ingrained in the 
institutional design of the Fund.          
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Table 1: Quota Shares for Low Income Countries 
    
Country Pre-
Singapore  
Post 
2008  
14th 
GQR 
GDP 
Blend 
Afghanistan 0.076 0.068 0.068 0.003 
Bangladesh 0.250 0.224 0.224 0.238 
Cambodia 0.041 0.037 0.037 0.028 
Burundi 0.036 0.032 0.032 0.005 
Benin 0.029 0.026 0.026 0.014 
Guinea-Bissau 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.002 
Central African Rep. 0.026 0.023 0.023 0.004 
Chad 0.026 0.028 0.029 0.018 
Ethiopia 0.063 0.056 0.063 0.074 
Congo, Rep. of  0.040 0.035 0.034 0.025 
Rwanda 0.037 0.034 0.034 0.012 
Nepal 0.033 0.030 0.033 0.035 
Malawi 0.032 0.029 0.029 0.012 
Gambia, The 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.003 
Mali 0.044 0.039 0.039 0.018 
Haiti 0.038 0.034 0.034 0.013 
Kenya 0.127 0.114 0.114 0.067 
Liberia 0.060 0.054 0.054 0.002 
Madagascar 0.057 0.051 0.051 0.019 
Mozambique 0.053 0.048 0.048 0.022 
Sierra Leone 0.049 0.043 0.043 0.006 
Somalia 0.038 0.034 0.034 0.001 
South Sudan  na 0.052 0.052 0.024 
Tajikistan 0.041 0.036 0.036 0.013 
Tanzania 0.093 0.083 0.083 0.055 
Togo 0.034 0.031 0.031 0.006 
Uganda 0.084 0.076 0.076 0.039 
Zimbabwe 0.165 0.148 0.148 0.001 
Comoros 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 
Eritrea 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.004 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.042 0.037 0.037 0.012 
Guinea 0.050 0.045 0.045 0.011 
Burkina Faso 0.028 0.025 0.025 0.020 
Total N=33   1.730 1.600 1.610 0.852 
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Table 2: Quota Shares for Lower Middle Income Countries 
 
Country Pre-Singapore Post- 2008 14th GQR GDP Blend 
Armenia 0.043 0.039 0.027 0.018 
Bhutan 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Bolivia 0.080 0.072 0.050 0.045 
Cameroon 0.087 0.078 0.058 0.048 
Cape Verde 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 
Congo, Rep. of  0.040 0.035 0.034 0.020 
Cote dlvoure 0.152 0.136 0.136 0.041 
Djibouti 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.002 
Egypt 0.442 0.396 0.427 0.481 
El Salvador 0.080 0.072 0.060 0.044 
Georgia 0.070 0.063 0.044 0.024 
Ghana 0.173 0.155 0.155 0.067 
Guatemala 0.098 0.088 0.090 0.078 
Guyana 0.043 0.038 0.038 0.005 
Honduras 0.061 0.054 0.052 0.033 
Indonesia 0.973 0.872 0.974 1.222 
Kenya 0.127 0.114 0.114 0.067 
Kiribati 0.003 0.002 0.002 <0.001 
Kosovo n/a 0.025 0.017 0.012 
Lao P.D.R. 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.015 
Lesotho 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.004 
Mauritania 0.030 0.027 0.027 0.007 
Micronesia 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Moldova 0.058 0.052 0.036 0.012 
Mongolia 0.024 0.021 0.015 0.012 
Morocco 0.275 0.247 0.187 0.172 
Nicaragua 0.061 0.055 0.055 0.016 
Nigeria 0.820 0.735 0.515 0.386 
Pakistan 0.484 0.433 0.426 0.430 
Papua New Guinea 0.062 0.055 0.055 0.018 
Paraguay 0.047 0.042 0.042 0.038 
Philippines 0.412 0.427 0.428 0.385 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
0.004 0.003 0.003 <0.001 
Swaziland 0.024 0.021 0.016 0.007 
Senegal 0.076 0.068 0.086 0.025 
Solomon Islands 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.002 
Sri Lanka 0.193 0.173 0.121 0.105 
Sudan 0.147 0.132 0.132 0.118 
Syrian Arab Rep. 0.137 0.135 0.145 0.282 
Timor-Leste 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.009 
Ukraine 0.642 0.575 0.422 0.299 
Uzbekistan 0.129 0.116 0.116 0.084 
Vanuatu 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.001 
Vietnam 0.154 0.193 0.242 0.253 
Yemen 0.114 0.102 0.102 0.066 
Zambia 0.229 0.205 0.205 0.010 
Total N=46 6.667 6.127 5.723 4.972 
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Table 5: Quota Shares for EU Members 
Country Pre-
Singapore  
Post-
2008 
Reform 
14th 
GRQ 
Germany 6.086 6.107 5.583 
France 5.024 4.502 4.225 
Italy 3.301 3.305 3.159 
Netherlands 2.415 2.164 1.831 
Belgium 2.155 1.931 1.344 
Sweden 1.121 1.004 0.929 
Poland 0.640 0.708 0.859 
Bulgaria 0.300 0.268 0.188 
Austria 0.876 0.886 0.824 
Ireland 0.392 0.527 0.723 
Denmark 0.769 0.793 0.721 
Greece 0.385 0.462 0.509 
Finland 0.591 0.530 0.505 
Czech Republic 0.383 0.420 0.457 
Portugal 0.406 0.432 0.432 
Hungary 0.486 0.435 0.407 
Romania 0.482 0.432 0.380 
Luxembourg 0.131 0.176 0.277 
Slovakia 0.167 0.179 0.210 
Croatia 0.171 0.153 0.150 
Slovenia 0.108 0.115 0.123 
Lithuania 0.067 0.077 0.093 
Latvia 0.059 0.060 0.070 
Cyprus 0.065 0.066 0.064 
Estonia 0.031 0.039 0.051 
Malta 0.048 0.043 0.035 
U.K. 5.024 4.502 4.225 
Spain 1.426 1.687 1.999 
Total, N =28  37.82 36.80 35.22 
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Table 6: Quota and Voting Shares for the BRICS 
Country GDP 
Blend 
Openness Variability Reserves Pre-
Singapore  
Post-
2008  
14th 
GQR 
Quota 
share  
14th 
GQR 
Voting 
Share 
Brazil 3.134 1.142 1.502 3.382 1.420 1.782 2.315 2.217 
Russia 2.681 2.106 2.822 4.803 2.782 2.493 2.705 2.586 
India 3.680 1.793 1.607 2.900 1.945 2.441 2.749 2.627 
China 11.65 8.534 5.882 32.20 2.980 3.994 6.390 6.068 
South Africa 0.618 0.498 0.333 0.439 0.874 0.783 0.640 0.634 
Total, N = 5 21.76 14.07 12.14 43.72 10.00 11.49 14.79 14.13 
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Table 7: Country Comparison for Voting Shares 
 
Country GDP 
Blend 
Pre-Singapore Vote 
Share 
Post-2008 Vote 
share 
14th GQR Vote 
Share 
China 11.65 2.928 3.651 6.068 
Brazil 3.134 1.402 1.782 2.217 
India 3.680 1.916 2.441 2.627 
Sub-Total 
N=3 
18.46 6.246 7.874 10.91 
Germany 4.811 5.968 5.800 5.306 
France 3.663 4.929 4.284 4.022 
U.K. 3.369 4.929 4.284 4.022 
Sub-Total  
N=3 
11.84 15.82 14.36 13.35 
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Table 8: BRICS Population and UN Contributions 
 
Country GDP 
Blend 
Pre-
Singapore  
Post-
2008 
14th 
GQR  
Pop. % 
Share 
UN 
% 
China 11.65 2.980 3.994 6.390 18.96 3.118 
Brazil 3.134 1.420 1.782 2.315 2.790 1.575 
Russia 2.681 2.782 2.493 2.705 2.016 1.566 
India 3.680 1.945 2.441 2.749 17.36 0.522 
South Africa 0.618 0.874 0.783 0.640 0.719 0.376 
Total, N=5 21.76 10.00 11.49 14.79 41.85 7.157 
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Figure 1: Population Percentages for the BRICS 
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Figure 2: UN Contributions for the BRICS 
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Table 9: G8 Population and UN Contributions 
 
Country GDP   Pre-
Singapore 
Q. Share %   
Post-2008  14th 
GQR  
Pop.  % 
Share 
UN % 
U.S.   21.57 17.38 17.66 17.40 4.408 23.91 
Japan 7.512 6.228 6.553 6.461 1.791 12.25 
Germany 4.811 6.086 6.107 5.583 1.150 7.838 
U.K. 3.369 5.024 4.502 4.225 0.888 6.456 
France 3.663 5.024 4.502 4.225 0.923 5.986 
Italy 2.977 3.301 3.305 3.159 0.855 4.887 
Canada 2.185 2.980 2.670 2.311 0.490 3.135 
Russia 2.681 2.782 2.493 2.705 2.016 1.566 
Total, N=8 48.77 48.81 47.79 46.07 12.52 66.03 
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Figure 3: G8 Population Share 
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Figure 4: G8 UN Contribution Share 
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Table 10: G20 Population and UN Contribution 
 
Country GDP 
Blend  
Pre-
Singapore  
Post-2008 
Reform 
14th GQR  Population % 
Share 
UN % 
China 11.65 2.980 3.994 6.390 18.96 3.118 
India 3.680 1.945 2.441 2.749 17.36 0.522 
U.S.   21.57 17.38 17.66 17.39 4.408 23.90 
Indonesia 1.222 0.973 0.872 0.974 3.466 0.233 
EU 9.358 13.67 13.58 13.18 3.332 12.90 
Brazil 3.134 1.420 1.782 2.315 2.790 1.575 
Russia 2.681 2.782 2.493 2.705 2.016 1.566 
Japan 7.512 6.228 6.553 6.461 1.791 12.24 
Mexico 1.814 1.210 1.520 1.868 1.697 2.303 
Germany 4.811 6.086 6.107 5.583 1.150 7.838 
Turkey 1.195 0.451 0.610 0.977 1.039 0.603 
France 3.663 5.024 4.502 4.225 0.923 5.986 
U.K.  3.369 5.024 4.502 4.225 0.888 6.456 
Italy 2.977 3.301 3.305 3.159 0.855 4.887 
South Africa 0.618 0.874 0.783 0.640 0.719 0.376 
Korea, Rep.  1.725 0.764 1.411 1.799 0.702 2.209 
Argentina 0.705 0.990 0.888 0.668 0.577 0.281 
Canada 2.185 2.980 2.670 2.311 0.490 3.135 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.786 3.268 2.929 2.095 0.397 0.811 
Australia 1.643 1.514 1.357 1.378 0.319 1.890 
Total, N=20 86.30 78.86 79.96 81.10 63.89 92.85 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter summarizes the main aspects of the previous discussion to 
understand how the International Monetary Fund's institutional design has evolved over 
time and what steps need to be taken to ensure the Fund continues to fulfill its original 
mandate of overseeing the international monetary system. This thesis demonstrates               
power politics matters at every stage and level of Fund institutional design.  
The Fund has two fundamental challenges. The first challenge is for the Fund to 
overcome the legitimacy crisis. The second challenge is for major shareholders to 
acknowledge the changing international monetary system. This acknowledgement must 
be inclusive of emerging markets and other developing economies. More than ever, 
emerging market economies are demanding Fund representation commensurate with their 
global economic strength.  
The current legitimacy problem is rooted in the Fund's history. Recently, the 
legitimacy problem has been aggravated by the lack of reform implementation for equal 
representation for emerging economies. In the past, the Latin American debt crisis and 
the Asian Financial crisis created much resentment for the Fund. As mentioned in the 
previous chapters the Fund failed to respond adequately to macroeconomic and liquidity 
problems by applying the one size fit all approach.               
This thesis examined the Fund's history and how global politics shaped the 
institutional design of the Fund. The original mandate was drafted by the U.S. and United 
Kingdom with the goal of establishing a post WW II international monetary system and 
encourages international trade. Bryant (2008) argues the Fund was originally established 
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to be political in nature. Dervis and Ozer (2005) argue the Bretton Woods system has 
been remarkably durable. The Fund has evolved over time and produced solutions to deal 
with ongoing problems of the time. For example, the creation of the SDR system was a 
response to the dollar not keeping up with the global need for liquidity.  
Chapter two focused on the Bretton Woods System and how the architects of the 
system ingrained political factors into the institutional design of the Fund. The Bretton 
Woods System and the International Monetary Fund responded to changes in the 
international monetary system. For example, the creation of financial facilities and how 
the Fund took the lead in creating a new role for itself with assisting developing countries 
during global financial turbulence (Vreeland 2007). During this time the Fund became 
the de facto lender of last resort and embraced the role of policy advisor.  
This chapter examined the historical analysis of Latin America and Fund 
conditionality. Also, it highlighted the Washington Consensus doctrine and the role it 
played in Latin America and future international financial crises. As Meltzer (1998) 
argues Latin American countries became indebted to the Fund due to high interest loans 
provided by private capital markets and Fund conditionality. Ultimately, other regions 
would also experience the frustration Latin American economies experienced due to the 
Fund’s involvement.  
The Asian Financial Crisis was highlighted in the chapter. The Asian Financial 
Crisis of the 1990s is important to the Fund’s history because it explains the Fund’s one 
size fits all approach to be fundamentally flawed in addressing international financial 
problems. This section examined a number of Asian countries and the policies advocated 
by the Fund. The end result was the Fund’s conditionality failed to produce positive 
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financial solutions for the Asia region. As a result of the two regional cases highlighted in 
this chapter, the Fund’s legitimacy problem became a serious ongoing challenge for the 
institutional design and governance of the Fund.  
Chapter three focused on governance and the institutional design of the Fund. 
Areas of concern in the chapter included technical aspects like the Articles of Agreement, 
the quota and subscription power of the Fund, the weighted voting system, decision-
making bodies, and formal and informal governance of the Fund.  The quota share is 
correlated to the relative size of the country’s economy; this determines voting shares, the 
amount of money available for borrowing, and SDRs. Also, important to Fund 
governance is the surveillance and conditionality powers the Fund has over member 
states.  
Chapter three highlighted the formal and informal governance practices of the 
Fund to demonstrate the how power politics can override macroeconomic variables for 
loan approval and other important decisions for major shareholders of the Fund. 
Considerable time was dedicated to this section as it is most important for international 
organization scholars to understand the influence of formal and informal governance to 
decision making outcomes. Also, attention was given to studies conducted by Thacker 
(1999) Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland (2009), and Dreher and Vreeland (2011) regarding 
voting patterns of countries at the United Nations and how those votes correlated to 
favorable or unfavorable loan conditions.   
Scholars like Stone (2002, 2008, 2011) and Thacker (1999) argue the Fund 
utilized non-economic variables to distribute loans for member states and that informal 
governance is part of the institutional design of the Fund. The formal rules of governance 
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solidify the power of major shareholders, particularly, the U.S. The ongoing legitimacy 
and resentment problem regarding loan conditionality dates back to the early 1980s 
during the crisis management role (Broome 2010).   
Chapter four provided the reader with two case studies of power adjustment at the 
Fund. China’s membership is an example of the Fund’s ability to adjust to changes in the 
global political economy. After the modernization reforms in China, the Fund witnessed 
the membership of the most populated country. In 1983, China's admittance into the Fund 
would alter the future structure of the international monetary system. This case study 
examined internal Fund documents to detail the discord over quota allocations and the 
issue of China’s representation.  
The second case study for the chapter examined Russia joining at the end of the 
Cold War. The major shift for the Fund came when the road was paved for 14 regional 
countries to gain membership in the Fund. As a result, this made the Fund a nearly 
universal international organization. Russia's quota allocation also changed the Fund's 
institutional design. Russia obtained a seat on the powerful Executive Board with no 
obligations to represent a constituency. Overall, Russia’s quota allocation resulted from 
informal governance and power politics at its best. More importantly, the Russia case 
study is an example of America unprecedented formal and informal influence at the 
Fund. Put differently, Russian membership was not a reality in the Fund until the U.S. 
allowed Russia to become a member. 
Chapter five examined the institutional design post-Cold War with the emphasis 
on Japan, Europe, and the BRICS. Japan’s role in the Fund has been one of financier, 
supporter, and power players within the institutional design of the Fund. This case 
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examines Japan’s ascension through the hierarchy of the Fund. From the moments of 
passivity as rule takers to expecting a quota share commensurate with its global economic 
position. Japan also had a role in establishing the idea of multilateralism with the support 
of an Asian Monetary Fund.   
This chapter addressed the problem of European over-representation and the 
institutional cleavages this has created between rich and poor states. Additionally, the 
European case study offers a glimpse of the power politics and informal governance at 
the Fund. For example, the European Council of Ministers and European Countries 
Representative in the Fund (EURIMF) have influence when speaking on issues that effect 
all participating countries (Bini Smaghi 2004). One issue that has been highly 
controversial is the issue of the Managing Director selection process. The selection 
process is a reflection of the implicit and explicit power political agenda manipulated by 
the EU.  
Reform proposals have highlighted the debate over European over-representation 
in the Fund. The challenge for the European Union resides in how to simplify the 
complex and controversial issue of collectivity. If the EU renounces Executive Board 
seats, will this create polarization within the Fund? EU members will need to organize to 
obtain more voting power for their national interest. This may create an environment that 
is strictly political and confrontational in lieu of an environment that is supposed to be 
cooperative in nature. Also, this chapter examines the continued opposition to the 
European over-representation by the BRICS. The BRICS recognized the growing power 
of their economies and contributions to global economic growth. As a response in part to 
the growing representation issue at the Fund the BRICS have proposed a BRICS 
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Development Bank. However, much debate has been raised about the potential success of 
the proposed development bank.  
Chapter six dealt with the descriptive data regarding quota and voting shares. The 
time periods examined were the pre-Singapore, Post-Singapore, and 14
th
 GQR to make 
the observation between quota shares and the legitimacy of proposed reforms. 
GDP was utilized as a standard measure to determine quota shares for the different 
country groups. Different income levels and groups of countries were examined including 
the EU, G8, and G20. Emerging economies like the BRICS were also examined to assess 
whether their quota shares are commensurate to their economic strength. Based on the 
data presented industrialized countries continue to be over-represented in the Fund. The 
main conclusion of this chapter was that the Fund did not go far enough to solve the 
problem of the ongoing legitimacy debate and a more equitable representation for 
emerging market economies. More importantly, the recent reforms send the implicit 
message that the Fund is not accountable to less powerful members. The findings in this 
thesis support the current theoretical literature that argue informal influence and 
governance in the Fund are more important than economic variables for the 
implementation of major decisions, loan conditionality, and decision making processes. 
The work highlighted by Thacker (1999) and Dreher and Vreeland (2011) provide 
examples of informal influence. The pending 14
th
 GQR provides the most recent 
evidence that equality and burden sharing is not a major consideration of the major 
shareholders in the Fund. Table 1 indicates that low income countries are over-
represented in quota allocation based on the aggregate GDP blend. Total GDP blend is 
0.852 percent and the pending reforms will provide low income countries with 1.810 
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aggregate quota share. Table 7 compares voting shares for the three most powerful 
BRICS and the three European countries who are major shareholders in the Fund. China, 
Brazil, and India have an aggregate GDP blend of 18.46 which will result in a potential 
voting share of 10.91 percent of total Fund votes. Germany, France, and the U.K. account 
for a total GDP blend of 11.84 percent. This will result in a potential voting share of 
13.35 percent. The evidence indicates that low income countries are over-represented 
with little potential to increase their GDP to significant levels that will move them into 
major shareholder status. The BRICS are under-represented with a GDP blend that 
justifies a larger quota share.  
The previously mentioned reforms are responses to unprecedented economic 
times. The divide between rich states and poor states has been rarely so prevalent. Wade 
(2011) argues the industrialized economies are incorporating emerging economic actors 
into an industrialized Westernized concept of globalization. However, emerging 
economies are demanding more representation with little strategy and loyalty for their 
preferences. Perhaps, the case study of Japan’s strategic ascension in the Fund will serve 
as a model for emerging and developing countries who seek a greater shift in the balance 
of power.   
Ultimately, the 2010 reforms were a sign that developed economies, particularly 
the U.S. and EU members are not eager to cede decision-making influence to emerging 
market and developing countries. There is no denying the influence of formal and 
informal decision making processes and power politics within the institutional design of 
the Fund. The institutional design of the Fund will adjust to confront the challenges of a 
changing international political economy. However, adjustments in the Fund’s 
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institutional design will reflect the legacy of John Maynard Keynes and Henry Dexter 
White that is rooted in power politics, institutional rules, and informal governance. 
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APPENDIX A: TABLE 3: UPPER MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
 
Country Pre-Singapore Post 2008 14th GQR GDP Blend 
Algeria 0.587 0.526 0.411 0.293 
Angola 0.134 0.132 0.120 0.143 
Argentina 0.990 0.888 0.668 0.705 
Azerbaijan 0.075 0.067 0.082 0.099 
Belarus 0.181 0.162 0.143 0.121 
Belize 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.003 
Bosnia & Her.  0.079 0.071 0.056 0.035 
Botswana 0.029 0.037 0.041 0.028 
Brazil 1.420 1.782 2.315 3.134 
Bulgaria 0.300 0.268 0.188 0.100 
China 2.980 3.994 6.390 11.65 
Colombia 0.362 0.325 0.429 0.507 
Costa Rica 0.077 0.078 0.077 0.061 
Dominica  0.004 0.003 0.003 <0.001 
Dominican Republic 0.102 0.092 0.100 0.095 
Ecuador 0.141 0.146 0.146 0.119 
Fiji 0.033 0.029 0.021 0.005 
Gabon 0.072 0.065 0.045 0.026 
Grenada 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.020 
Hungary 0.486 0.435 0.407 0.226 
Iran 0.700 0.682 0.748 0.900 
Iraq 0.556 0.498 0.349 0.214 
Jamaica 0.128 0.115 0.080 0.026 
Jordan 0.080 0.071 0.072 0.044 
Kazakhstan 0.171 0.179 0.243 0.245 
Lebanon 0.095 0.112 0.133 0.067 
Libya 0.526 0.471 0.330 0.100 
Malaysia 0.695 0.744 0.762 0.465 
Maldives 0.038 0.041 0.004 0.003 
Marshall Islands 0.020 0.025 0.001 <0.001 
Mauritius 0.048 0.043 0.030 0.019 
Mexico 1.210 1.520 1.868 1.814 
Montenegro 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.008 
Namibia 0.064 0.057 0.040 0.018 
Palau 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 
Panama 0.097 0.087 0.079 0.050 
Peru 0.299 0.268 0.280 0.294 
Romania 0.482 0.432 0.380 0.304 
Samoa 0.005 0.005 0.003 <0.001 
Serbia 0.219 0.196 0.137 0.079 
Seychelles 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.002 
South Africa 0.874 0.783 0.640 0.618 
St. Lucia 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.002 
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St. Vincent 0.004 0.003 0.003 <0.001 
Suriname 0.043 0.039 0.027 0.007 
Thailand 0.506 0.604 0.673 0.605 
Tonga 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.008 
Tunisia 0.134 0.120 0.114 0.096 
Turkey 0.451 0.610 0.977 1.195 
Turkmenistan 0.035 0.041 0.050 0.043 
Tuvalu n/a 0.008 0.005 <0.001 
Venezuela 1.244 1.115 0.780 0.522 
Total, N=52 16.76 17.95 20.48 25.10 
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APPENDIX B: TABLE 4: HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES 
Country 
Pre-
Singapore  
Post-
2008  
14th 
GQR 
GDP 
Blend 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.002 
Australia 1.514 1.357 1.378 1.643 
Austria 0.876 0.886 0.824 0.553 
Bahamas, The 0.061 0.055 0.038 0.013 
Bahrain 0.063 0.074 0.083 0.038 
Barbados 0.032 0.028 0.002 0.008 
Belgium 2.155 1.931 1.344 0.675 
Brunei 0.036 0.032 0.032 0.023 
Canada 02.98 02.67 2.311 2.185 
Chile 0.401 0.359 0.366 0.351 
Croatia 0.171 0.153 0.015 0.100 
Cyprus 0.065 0.066 0.064 0.035 
Czech Republic 0.383 0.42 0.457 0.342 
Denmark 0.769 0.793 0.721 0.041 
Estonia 0.031 0.039 0.051 0.033 
Equatorial Guinea 0.015 0.022 0.033 0.025 
Finland 0.591 0.053 0.505 0.333 
France 5.024 4.502 4.225 3.663 
Germany 6.086 6.107 5.583 4.811 
Greece 0.385 0.462 0.509 0.451 
Iceland 0.055 0.049 0.067 0.019 
Ireland 0.392 0.527 0.723 0.304 
Israel 0.434 0.445 0.403 0.327 
Italy 3.301 3.305 3.159 2.977 
Japan 6.228 6.553 6.461 7.512 
Korea, Republic of 0.764 1.411 1.080 1.725 
Kuwait 0.646 0.635 0.579 0.327 
Latvia 0.059 0.006 0.007 0.043 
Lithuania 0.067 0.077 0.093 0.068 
Luxembourg 0.131 0.176 0.277 0.073 
Malta 0.048 0.043 0.035 0.014 
Netherlands 2.415 2.164 1.831 1.128 
New Zealand 0.419 0.375 0.262 0.196 
Norway 0.782 0.079 0.787 0.545 
Oman 0.091 0.099 0.114 0.100 
Poland 0.064 0.708 0.859 0.839 
Portugal 0.406 0.432 0.432 0.354 
Qatar 0.123 0.127 0.154 0.207 
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Russia 2.782 2.493 2.705 2.681 
San Marino 0.008 0.009 0.001 0.003 
Saudi Arabia 3.268 2.929 2.095 0.786 
Singapore 0.404 0.059 0.816 0.367 
Slovak Republic 0.167 0.179 0.210 0.150 
Slovenia 0.108 0.115 0.123 0.077 
Spain 1.426 1.687 1.999 2.107 
St. Kitts 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.001 
Sweden 1.121 1.004 0.929 0.639 
Switzerland 1.618 1.450 1.021 0.725 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.157 0.141 0.098 0.034 
U.A.E. 0.286 0.315 0.485 0.421 
United Kingdom 5.024 4.502 4.225 3.369 
United States  17.38 17.66 17.39 21.57 
Uruguay 0.143 0.129 00.09 0.062 
Total, N= 53 72.54 71.68 69.20 65.45 
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